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° Henrich concedes that Kant™s use of the term ˜˜re¬‚ection™™ is quite di¬erent
from the use which became prevalent in post-Kantian philosophy in D.
Henrich, ˜˜Kant™s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Back-
ground of the First Critique,™™ in E. Forster (ed.), Kant™s Transcendental Deduc-
¨
tions (Stanford University Press, ±), p. . It is unclear, however, whether
Notes to pages ±°“±° µ
he identi¬es the later usage with his talk of the re¬‚ection of self-conscious-
ness.
± I borrow the term ˜˜re¬‚exively self-referential™™ from Robert Nozick, Philo-
sophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, ±±), pp.
·±¬.
 Allison, ˜˜Re¬‚ections on the B-Deduction,™™ p. ·. Space and time are
uni¬able according to the Aesthetic, since they are all parts of one unitary
space and time. A categorially determined synthesis is, however, necessary
in order for the understanding to represent space and time as unitary. Kant
goes on to argue that space and time as intuited derive their unity from a
synthesis of the understanding that precedes all use of concepts. In conver-
sation, Allison has pointed out to me that he reads the claim that the
synthesis of space and time precedes all concepts as restricted to concepts of
space and time. For Allison, even the determination of sensibility by the
powers of what Kant calls the productive imagination involves the actual
application of categories. On my view, by contrast, this determination of
sensibility by spontaneity accords with the unity of self-consciousness and
thus makes categories applicable to experience, but it does not involve the
use of categories. There is a passage in section ± (not cited by Allison) that
seems to support this view. After insisting that the mineness of intuitions
means that those representations are self-ascribable in one consciousness,
Kant concludes that: ˜˜Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions as a
priori given is therefore the basis for the identity of apperception itself which
must precede all my determinate thought™™ (section ±,  ±). This suggests
that the identity of self-consciousness itself presupposes a unity of intuition
that is given a priori. But Kant goes on in the next sentence to trace the
synthesis upon which this synthetic unity is based to an activity of the
understanding.
 Allison, ˜˜Re¬‚ections on the B-Deduction,™™ in Idealism and Freedom, p. ·, and
also Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. ±.
 Allison, ˜˜Re¬‚ections on the B-Deduction,™™ p. .
µ Henrich, ˜˜The Proof Structure of Kant™s Transcendental Deduction,™™ p.
·°.
 The connection between the unity of space and time and the synthetic unity
of self-consciousness for Kant is undeniable. In a re¬‚ection dating from the
mid seventies, Kant even more directly expresses the thought that the unity
of time and space is based on their relation to self-consciousness: ˜˜Time is
unitary :einig9. (For there is one sub.) :(Denn es ist ein Sub.)9 Which
means as much as: I can know all objects (know them immediately accord-
ing to the form of inner intuition) only in myself and in representations to be
found in my unitary :einigen9 subject . . . Space is nothing but the
intuition of a mere form and without given matter, hence pure intuition. It
is a singular intuition due to the unity of the subject (and the capacity) in
virtue of which all representations of external objects can be placed (next to)
each other™™ (Re¬‚ection ·, Ak. ©©, p. ). A re¬‚ection dating from the
±·°s goes in the same direction: ˜˜The unity of intuition a priori is only
µ Notes to pages ±±°“±±
possible through the connection of the manifold in one apperception™™ (Ak.
©©©, p. ).
· Beatrice Longuenesse describes the dependence of inner sense on the
´
understanding as a dependence on the understanding™s capacity to judge,
Kant et le pouvoir de juger, pp. ·¬. This seems right to me, but what needs to
be pointed out is that this capacity for judgment itself depends for its
existence on our capacity for impersonal (transcendental) self-conscious-
ness. It is the unity that experiences have for such self-consciousness that is
responsible for the kind of implicit unity in what we experience that makes
our judgments applicable to what we experience.
 Robert Pippin has pointed out that  ±±n was a tremendous inspiration to
the development of German idealism, since it seems to break down the
distinction between the spontaneity through which we interpret experience
and the receptivity through which it is given to us in the ¬rst place, see R.
Pippin, Hegel™s Idealism (New York: Cambridge University Press, ±), pp.
“°. Talk of what is di¬erent from the self as a posit of the self was indeed
suggested to Fichte by Kant™s talk of time as nothing but the mode in which
the mind a¬ects itself ˜˜through this positing [setzen] of the representation of
its own activity™™ ( ). While it is true that Kant does make our reception of
space and time as intuitions in a certain sense dependent on the spontaneity
of the understanding, he does not intend to absorb receptivity completely
by spontaneity. For he explicitly distinguishes space and time which have
been constructed by our spontaneity from the forms and, a fortiori, the
content of our receptivity. In the passage in which Kant uses the language
of self-positing, he also distinguishes the form or, rather, the mode accord-
ing to which self-positing occurs from that activity itself. He is also careful to
assign the unity of space and time to space and time a priori and not to
concepts of the understanding. Since understanding is operating through
imagination, concepts are not being explicitly applied to objects. This is
why Kant then refers to section . If there were no forms of receptivity for
Kant that were independent of imagination, he would indeed have fallen
into the Fichtean idea of self-positing. Wayne Waxman actually argues, in
his Kant™s Model of the Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, ±±), that
transcendental idealism commits one to the denial ˜˜not merely of supersen-
sible reality to space and time, but superimaginational as well (here construing
˜sensible™ in a sense exclusive of imagination “ contrary to Kant™s regular
practice). All spatial and temporal relations must then be supposed to exist
only in and through imagination, and in no way to characterize sensations;
there can be no ˜¬‚ux™ of representations in inner sense, and not even color
˜patches™ can be regarded as genuine data,™™ p. ±.
 Anthony Quinton, ˜˜Spaces and Times,™™ Philosophy · (±), ±°“±·, is the
¬rst paper to defend the possibility of experiential spaces that might be
disconnected. M. Hollis, ˜˜Times and Spaces,™™ Mind · (±·), µ“µ,
extends the possibility of disconnected experiences to experiences of discon-
nected times. Richard Swinburne attacks the incoherence of such partially
Notes to pages ±±“±· µµ
connected times in his Space and Time (London: Macmillan, ±), pp. ±¬.
In ˜˜Time,™™ Analysis  (±µ), ±“±±, he maintains that the notion of
partially connected times is not coherent because it would not preserve
personal identity. But, of course, this assumes that personal identity is
something that we know must be preserved. I have already argued that
Kant rejects such an assumption.
° The theory upon which the existence of singularities is based is developed in
Stephen Hawking and Brian Ellis, The Large Scale Structure of Spacetime
(Cambridge University Press, ±·).
± ˜˜When we combine quantum mechanics with general relativity, there
seems to be a new possibility that did not arise before: that space and time
together might form a ¬nite, four-dimensional space without singularities or
boundaries, like the surface of the earth but with more dimensions.™™
Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Doubleday, ±), p.
±·.

  ©  -  ®  ©  µ  ®    © ®   ®  ¬ § ©  
± There is a helpful discussion of the connection between the subject“predi-
cate structure in judgment and the Kantian notion of substance in Dieter
Sche¬el, ˜˜Der Anfang der transzendentalen Deduktion im Falle der
Kategorie der Substanz,™™ in G. Funke (ed.), Akten des µten Internationalen
Kant-Kongresses (Bonn: Bouvier, ±µ), pp. “°±.
 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, pp. ±“±.
 Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, pp. ±“±°.
 Kant™s reference to substances in appearance rules out Gordon Nagel™s
suggestion that the argument against multiple time-series is directed against
the possibility of di¬erent time-series implicit in Leibniz™s monadology and
in his notion of pre-established harmony, The Structure of Experience, (Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, ±), p. ±. The time-series of a monad are not
series that either Kant or Leibniz would ascribe to appearances, but rather
to things as they are in themselves. Leibniz anticipates Kant™s insistence
that phenomenal objects are subject to changes that must be empirically
determinable. So Leibniz™s views concerning phenomenal substance are
not a good target for Kant either.
µ Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, pp. ±“±. The argument is also criticized
by Broad, ˜˜Kant™s First and Second Analogies of Experience,™™ ±“±°;
Wol¬, Kant™s Theory of Mental Activity, p. µ±; and Bennett, Kant™s Analytic, p.
°°.
 Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, ˜˜Kant™s ˜First Analogy of Experience™ and
¨
Conservation Principles of Physics,™™ Synthese  (±·±), ·µ“µ; Allison in
Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, pp. ±°¬; Guyer in Kant and the Claims of
Knowledge, pp. ±µ¬; and Van Cleve, ˜˜Substance, Matter and Kant™s First
Analogy,™™ Kant-Studien ·° (±·), ±µ“±±.
· Franz Brentano, Kategorienlehre (Hamburg: Meiner, ±), pp. °“·. A
helpful discussion of Brentano™s critique of Kant™s proof is to be found in
µ Notes to pages ±“±
Roderick Chisholm, ˜˜Beginnings and Endings,™™ in P. van Inwagen (ed.),
Time and Cause (Dordrecht: Reidel, ±°), esp. pp. ±¬.
 James van Cleve, ˜˜Substance, Matter and Kant™s First Analogy™ ™™ ±“±±.
 Unlike physical states, mental states are, for Kant, inherently anomalous.
This is a function of their inherently perspectival character. But, as long as
mental states have physical counterparts, an objective correlate may be
found for all statements ascribing inner states to oneself, even though there
is no way of reducing inner (mental) states to outer (physical) states. There
are two excellent discussions of Kant™s denial of lawlike properties to
psychological states: Theodore Mischel, ˜˜Kant and the Possibility of a
Science of Psychology,™™ Monist µ± (±·), µ“, and Meerbote, ˜˜Kant on
the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions,™™ pp. ±µµ¬.
±° Kant™s appeal to the successiveness of representations has led Arthur Mel-
nick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience (University of Chicago Press, ±·), p. ,
and Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. µ, to argue that Kant takes
our (putative) lack of direct experience of temporal succession as a key
premise in his argument for the need for causal connection to determine the
temporal relations between representations. This is based on an interpreta-
tion of the synthesis of apprehension at   that I have already rejected in
my discussion of the A-Deduction. In the second edition of the Second
Analogy, Kant contrasts my consciousness that my imagination posits one
state before the other with knowledge of the objective relation between
states ( “). This strongly suggests that we are or can be directly
conscious of succession, while we do not have direct knowledge of the
objective relations between parts of an event, or between di¬erent events. It
does not mean, of course, that we therefore have knowledge of the order
even of subjective succession by introspection alone.
±± Van Cleve, ˜˜Four Recent Interpretations of Kant™s Second Analogy,™™ ·±¬.
± The idea that perceptions are bound down to the order of changes in the
object perceived may be a critical allusion to section µ of Hume™s Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, E. Steinberg (ed.) (Indianapolis: Hackett,
±±): ˜˜All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows
another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem
conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of anything
which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the
necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or
power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning,
when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.™™
± Broad, ˜˜Kant™s First and Second Analogies of Experience,™™ ±µ. Wol¬,
Kant™s Theory of Mental Activity, p. , and Bennett, Kant™s Analytic, pp.
±“, among others, have understood Kant to be confusing subjective
sequence with objective sequence.
± Thus Harper and Van Cleve have argued that the reconstruction of the
argument in D. P. Dryer, Kant™s Solution for Veri¬cation in Metaphysics (London:
Allen and Unwin, ±), esp. pp. ±¬., fails to show that causal connections
Notes to pages ±“± µ·
are necessary to distinguish the occurrence of an event. The objection ¬rst
appears in the review article by Van Cleve, ˜˜Four Recent Interpretations of
Kant™s Second Analogy,™™ . He attributes it to William Harper. Harper
and Meerbote take up the objection in their very helpful introductory essay
to Kant on Causality, Freedom and Objectivity (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, ±), pp. ±“±.
±µ Harrison, ˜˜Transcendental Arguments and Idealism,™™ pp. ±µ“±, accuses
Kant of shifting in his defence of causation from a de dicto to a de re necessity.
Strawson famously diagnoses ˜˜a non-sequitur of numbing grossness™™ in
Kant™s analysis, in his The Bounds of Sense, p. ±. This point is related, but
somewhat di¬erent. As Strawson sees it, Kant shifts from a conceptual
necessity based on the fact of a change, to a causal necessity that a change
occur. Strawson™s justi¬cation of the non-sequitur is based in part on a modal
fallacy pointed out by Van Cleve in ˜˜Four Recent Interpretations,™™ .
Strawson treats the consequent of the conditional necessity involved in event
perception (whose antecedent is not itself necessary) as a conceptual necessity,
thus confusing it with the conceptual necessity of the conditional which must
be ful¬lled, if a perceptual sequence is to be a perception of a change.
± According to Arthur Lovejoy, ˜˜On Kant™s Reply to Hume,™™ Archiv fur ¨
Geschichte der Philosophie (±°), °“°·, Kant falsely infers a synthetic
necessity connecting states of objects from the analytic necessity of the
irreversibility of the sequence of perceptions in the perception of an event.
Lovejoy is correct that the perceptual isomorphism holding between the
sequence of perceptions of a ship going downstream and that objective
occurrence is based on analysis of what it means to be an event. But Kant™s
argument is not analytic as Lovejoy maintains. Causal connections are
conditions for the recognition of events, not part of the meaning of an event.
Without objective changes we could not have any knowledge of subjective
changes either. It is a substantive precondition of experience for Kant, and
not a matter of an analysis of the meaning of the concept of an event, as
Graham Bird, Kant™s Theory of Knowledge, pp. ±µ·¬., interprets the Second
Analogy. For Bird, the causal law is a ˜˜conceptual truth™™ that determines
the meaning of the terms ˜˜cause™™ and ˜˜event™™, see esp. pp. ±, ±µ“±.
±· Arthur Melnick seems to be the ¬rst commentator to emphasize the import-
ance of the idea that changes must be recognizable in the argument of the
Second Analogy, cf. Kant™s Analogies of Experience, pp. ¬.
± Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. .
± ¨
Arthur Schopenhauer, Uber die vierfache Wurzel vom zureichenden Grund. Kleinere
Schriften:Samtliche Werke III (Frankfurt: Cotta-Insel, ±), p. ±±µ.
¨

·   µ   ¬ ¬ · 
± A quite di¬erent reading of this passage may be found in Buchdahl, who
insists on the independence of the kind of necessity involved in speci¬c
causal laws from the necessity involved in the general causal principle; see
Gerd Buchdahl, ˜˜Causality, Causal Laws, and Scienti¬c Theory in the
µ Notes to pages ±“±
Philosophy of Kant,™™ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science ± (±µ),
±·“°.
 Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, pp. , °“±; Guyer, Kant and the
Claims of Knowledge, pp. µ“µµ, µ“µ.
 Henry Allison defends the view that Kant does not require the existence of
speci¬c causal covering laws in Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, pp. “,
and more recently in considerably modi¬ed form in ˜˜Causality and Causal
Law in Kant: A Critique of Michael Friedman,™™ in Idealism and Freedom, pp.
°“±. He appears to have been strongly in¬‚uenced by papers of Gerd
Buchdahl.
 The view that causal connections need not imply the existence of causal
laws for Kant is defended by Henry Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p.
°.
µ Buchdahl, ˜˜Causality, Causal Laws, and Scienti¬c Theory in the Philos-
ophy of Kant,™™ ±·“°.
 Ibid., ±.
· Ibid., ±·“°.
 Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. °.
 Allison in ˜˜Causality and Causal Law in Kant,™™ p. .
±° Paton, Kant™s Metaphysic of Experience, vol. , pp. ·µ“·.
±± Ibid., p. ·.
± Michael Friedman, ˜˜Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural
Science,™™ in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, pp. ± and ±·°.
± Ibid., p. ±·°.
± Allison, ˜˜Causality and Causal Law in Kant,™™ p. ·.
±µ The view that the necessity of speci¬c causal laws is not due to the
understanding and the general causal principle is defended by Buchdahl in
Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ±),
pp. µ±“µ, ˜˜Causality, Causal Laws, and Scienti¬c Theory in the Philos-
ophy of Kant,™™ °°“°±, and °, and ˜˜The Kantian ˜Dynamic of Reason™
with Special Reference to the Place of Causality in Kant™s System,™™ in L.
Beck (ed.), Kant-Studies Today (LaSalle Ill.: Open Court, ±), pp. °“.
Guyer also argues that necessity is derived from reason or re¬‚ective judg-
ment, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. ±, and also, Paul Guyer, ˜˜Kant™s
Conception of Empirical Law,™™ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supp. vol.
 (±°), ±“. The e¬ort to prise apart the necessity of speci¬c causal
laws from the necessity of the general causal principle is criticized by
Friedman, ˜˜Causal Laws,™™ pp. ±·°“±·, ±°¬. Susan Neiman argues plaus-
ibly that the need for the existence of causal regularities in order to be able
to apply the concept of causation implies that the regulative principles of
reason are required in order for the understanding to function correctly, The
Unity of Reason, p. µ·. This is the conclusion that suggests itself from my
analysis of the connection between speci¬c forms of lawlikeness in nature
and the general lawlikeness of nature that Kant postulates in the A-
Deduction in terms of the transcendental a¬nity of nature.
Notes to pages ±“± µ
± Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. µ.
±· Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, pp. ±·±¬.
± Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, p. ±µ; Guyer, Kant and the Claims of
Knowledge, p. °.
± Kant™s thesis that incompatibilism and compatibilism are compatible is
emphasized by Allen Wood, ˜˜Kant™s Compatibilism,™™ in A. Wood (ed.), Self
and Nature in Kant™s Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, ±), pp.
·“±°±.
° The most extensive account of the Davidsonian interpretation of Kant™s
account of agency is Hud Hudson, Kant™s Compatibilism (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, ±), esp. pp. ¬. But the view originates with Ralf
Meerbote, ˜˜Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions,™™
pp. ±“±.
± The view that thought is only relatively spontaneous for Kant is defended by
Ingeborg Heidemann, ˜˜Der Begri¬ der Spontaneitat in der Kritik der reinen
¨
Vernunft,™™ esp. p. ; D. Henrich, ˜˜Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes,™™ in A.
Schwan (ed.), Denken im Schatten des Nihilismus (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, ±·µ), pp. µµ“±±; W. Sellars, ˜˜This I or he or it (the thing)
which thinks,™™ esp. p. °; Ameriks, Kant™s Theory of Mind, p. ±·; Kitcher,
Kant™s Transcendental Psychology, p. µ.
 Allison defends absolute spontaneity for thought in ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of
Materialism,™™ in Idealism and Freedom (New York: Cambridge University
Press, ±), pp. “±°, and in his Kant™s Theory of Freedom (New York:
Cambridge University Press, ±°), pp. °“±. It is also defended by Robert
Pippin, ˜˜Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind,™™ Canadian Journal of Philosophy ±·
(±·), esp. “·. The interpretation of Kant™s theory of spontaneity that
assimilates freedom in judgment to free will goes back to Fichte, but the
substantive view that judgment requires an incompatibilist interpretation of
freedom is already defended by Descartes in his Fourth Meditation.

  ¬ ¦ -  ® ©  µ  ®    ® ¤   °  µ ¤  - ¤ ©   ©° ¬ © ® 
¦    ®   ® ¤ ®  ¬ °     ¬  §
± Kant did not free himself from commitment to the project of rational
psychology until quite late in his career. Kant still thought of the subject of
thought as theoretically knowable in the substantial terms suggested by the
four basic paralogisms that he identi¬es in rational psychology into the
middle of the ±··°s. His discovery of the fallacies involved in inferences from
self-consciousness to substantive claims about the nature of the self or the soul
was the last important innovation in his thinking prior to publication of the
Critique in ±·±. The evidence for this claim is assembled in Wolfgang Carl, Der
Schweigende Kant (Gottingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, ±), pp. ±°±¬.
¨
 Karl Ameriks shows more interest in the metaphysical side of Kant than
most interpreters of the Paralogisms, emphasizing the extent of agreement
between the positive conception of mind that underlies Kant™s critique of
rationalism in the Paralogisms and traditional rationalists™ views. ˜˜The
° Notes to pages ±“±·
Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology,™™ in P. Guyer
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant (New York: Cambridge University
Press, ±), pp. “·, and especially Kant™s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of
the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Ameriks links his approach to the metaphysical
approach to Kant that was in favor in the ±°s in Germany. ˜˜Understand-
ing Apperception Today,™™ in P. Perrini (ed.), Kant and Contemporary Epistemol-
ogy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, ±), pp. ±“·. At the same time, however, he
defends a metaphysical de¬‚ationary epistemological interpretation of the ˜˜I
think.™™ For instance, Ameriks rejects the thesis that Kant requires a notion
of absolute freedom or spontaneity to make sense of theoretical reasoning
and self-consciousness in favor of a relatively spontaneous conception of
self-consciousness. Ameriks criticizes Guyer™s interpretation of the ˜˜I think™™
as requiring a de re necessity, linking an analytic interpretation of the
principle that representations must be self-ascribable to the synthetic as-
sumption that we have empirical knowledge in his ˜˜Kant and Guyer on
Apperception,™™ Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie µ, ±°n. Ameriks then
¨
circumvents the problem of how knowledge is to be justi¬ed by dropping
any presumption that the possibility of knowledge is to be established in the
Deduction in ˜˜Kant™s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argu-
ment,™™ Kant-Studien  (±·), ·“·. Kant is taken simply to assume the
existence of empirical knowledge.
 One may call the self that is the logical object of self-consciousness a
quasi-object to distinguish it from objects subject to third-person criteria of
identi¬cation, cf. Dieter Sturma, Kant uber Selbstbewußtsen (Hildesheim:
¨
Olms, ±µ), p. ±°.
 R. Descartes, La Recherche de la verite, in Oeuvres completes, Charles Adam and
´´ `
Adam Tannery (eds.) (Paris: Leopold Cerf, ±·“±±), vol. ±°, p. µ±.
µ Patricia Kitcher takes the First Paralogism as well as the Third to be about
the permanence of the ˜˜I,™™ Kant™s Transcendental Psychology, p. ±. But I have
tried to show that the First Paralogism is not about permanence or persist-
ence, but about being a basic particular. It is the task of the Third
Paralogism to deal with persistence and permanence. I discuss the Third
Paralogism in more detail in my paper, ˜˜Personal Identity and Kant™s
Third Person Perspective,™™ Idealistic Studies  (±), pp. ±“±.
 I owe the term ˜˜immunity to reference failure owing to misidenti¬cation™™
to Sydney Shoemaker, ˜˜Persons and their Pasts,™™ Identity, Cause, and Mind
(New York: Cambridge University Press, ±), pp. ±“, esp. pp. °¬.
Shoemaker restricts immunity to reference failure to non-deviant causal
and representational circumstances governing personal identity. The possi-
bility of branching and fusion of persons is thus excluded. This restriction
re¬‚ects his exclusive interest in the empirical notion of a person, that is, the
notion of a person linked to a particular representational history.
· Paul Guyer takes Kant to be committed in the Third Paralogism to the
actual existence of other minds that exist outside of me; Paul Guyer,
˜˜Placing Myself in Time: Kant™s Third Paralogism,™™ p. µ±. But there is no
Notes to pages ±·“±µ ±
compelling reason to interpret Kant this way. Kant talks of one taking the
standpoint of another, and of how, in order for one to take another™s
standpoint, one need not assume that the other person actually exists.
Indeed, Kant™s notion of a problematic use of the ˜˜I think™™ in the ascription
of thoughts would suggest that we cannot infer that another exists from the
fact that we can take the other™s perspective. There is thus also no reason to
see a con¬‚ict between Kant™s project in the Refutation of Idealism of
showing that inner experience presupposes outer experience and the argu-
ment in the ¬rst edition version of the Third Paralogism, as Guyer does.
Kant does not claim that one could not have the notion of a temporal order
for one™s experiences without the actual existence of another mind. Instead,
he argues that we could not have such a notion without the possibility of
taking the point of view of another possible mind. It seems plausible to
argue that the very notion of the kind of outer object presupposed in the
Refutation of Idealism as a condition under which inner experience is
possible is, in turn, only intelligible to us if we can abstract from our present
point of view and thus place ourselves in time and space relative to other
actual and possible objects.
 This possibility is discussed by Sydney Shoemaker, ˜˜Persons and their
Pasts,™™ °.
 Contemporary controversy over ˜˜repressed memories,™™ for instance in
cases of alleged child molestation, has become focused on the extent to
which putative memories of abuse might be the result of suggestion by the
therapists questioning the purported victims; see E. F. Loftus, ˜˜The Reality
of Repressed Memories,™™ American Psychologist  (±), µ±“µ·. The
important point is that the individuals in question believe themselves to
have a certain history, and this is as far as immunity to reference failure
extends.
±° A critical discussion of Leibniz™s views on immortality and continuity of
consciousness may be found in Margaret Wilson, ˜˜Leibniz, Self-Conscious-
ness and Immortality: In the Paris Notes and After,™™ Archiv fur Geschichte der
¨
Philosophie, Sonderheft µ (±·), µ“µ.

  · © ®¤ °  ®¤ ®  ©     ¬¦ ¦  ©   ¤ ?
± The importance of the simplicity of I thoughts for Kant™s argument in the
Deduction is emphasized by D. Henrich, ˜˜Identity and Objectivity,™™ pp.
±¬.
 Jonathan Bennett brings this ¬rst-personal perspective out in his essay ˜˜The
Simplicity of the Soul,™™ The Journal of Philosophy (±), µ. Unfortunately,
Bennett™s ascription of methodological solipsism to Kant leads him to argue
that ˜˜Kant is wholly inattentive . . . to all aspects of the notion of an
embodied mind,™™ p. µµ. But Kant™s view is that I have an empirical self only
as a human being, and hence an embodied mind. This mind is indirectly
accessible to the third-person point of view through its connection with the
human being™s body.
 Notes to pages ±“±
 Henry Allison takes the argument from simplicity to the self to go against
non-reductive as well as reductive materialism in ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of
Materialism,™™ in his Idealism and Freedom, p. ·.
 Rene, Descartes, Oeuvres completes, vol. ©©, p. ±. A helpful discussion of
´ `
embodiment in Descartes may be found in Paul Ho¬man, ˜˜The Unity of
Descartes™s Man,™™ The Philosophical Review µ (±), “·°.
µ Allison, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Materialism,™™ p. ·.
 Leibniz, On the Manner of Distinguishing Real Phenomena from Imaginary, in
Philosophische Schriften, C. J. Gerhard (ed.) (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, ±·),
©©, p. ±. See Nicholas Jolley, ˜˜Leibniz and Phenomenalism,™™ Studia
Leibniziana ± (±), .
· It has been suggested that the Fourth Paralogism™s critique of ˜˜dogmatic
idealism™™ ( ··) is directed at Leibniz rather than Berkeley; see George W.
Miller, ˜˜Kant™s First Edition Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism,™™ Kant-
Studien  (±·±), “±. But this is hardly plausible. Leibniz never main-
tains that matter is a self-contradictory notion, despite his interest in the
˜˜labyrinth of the continuum™™ and in a reduction of matter to force. The
dogmatic idealism of the ¬rst edition has also been identi¬ed with the
position of Bayle and Charles Collier, whose Clavis Universalis was bundled
with a German translation of Berkeley™s Three Dialogues in a collection by
Johann Christian Eschenbach, Samlung der vornehmsten Schriftsteller die die
Wirklichkeit ihres eignen Korpers und der ganzen Korperwelt leugnen (Rostock: Anton
¨ ¨
Ferdinand Rose, ±·µ). Lewis Robinson, ˜˜Contributions a l™histoire de
¨ `
l™evolution philosophique de Kant,™™ Revue de metaphysique et de morale ±
´
(±), ±“±, argues for regarding Bayle and Collier as the targets of the
criticism of dogmatic idealism. Heinz Heimsoeth, ˜˜Arthur Collier und der
Durchbruch des neuzeitlichen Bewußtseinsidealismus,™™ Studien zur Philos-
ophiegeschichte (Koln: Kolner Universitatsverlag, ±±), identi¬es Kant™s no-
¨ ¨ ¨
tion of skeptical idealism with Bayle™s skepticism. Heimsoeth maintains that
Kant has Descartes™s methodical doubt in mind when Kant refers to
problematic idealism, p. ·. But, as Wolfgang Muller-Lauter, ˜˜Kants
¨
Widerlegung des materialen Idealismus,™™ Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie
¨
 (±), points out on p. , Kant never explicitly distinguishes between
skeptical and problematic idealism, as he should have done. Skeptical
idealism would actually deny the existence of the external world, whereas
problematic idealism would merely entertain that denial as a hypothesis.
 However, Leibniz and Wol¬ provide obvious targets for the First and
Second Paralogisms; cf. Margaret Wilson, ˜˜Leibniz and Materialism,™™
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (±·), µ°¬.
 The controversy between Kant and Garve and Feder is discussed in helpful
detail by Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, ±·), pp. ±·¬.

± °     §µ  ®   § ©®   ©¤  ¬©  
± Martin Heidegger has suggested in Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh
(New York: State University of New York Press, ±), ˜˜that the ˜scandal of
Notes to pages ±“± 
philosophy™ is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are
expected and attempted again and again,™™ p. °µ (cited according to the
original pagination of the ± German edition reprinted in the translation).
On the other hand, Heidegger o¬ers what amounts to an argument for the
existence of objects outside of us. His argument for the assumption that
Being-in-the-World is a condition for the possibility of the temporal exist-
ence of the self, has at least some similarity with Kant™s argument in the
Refutation of Idealism. There are two key di¬erences. Heidegger attempts
to avoid the use of any assertions in his argument. This is only a super¬cial
advantage, since in order to have conviction his argument needs to be
reformulatable in terms of premises involving assertions. Heidegger also
rejects Kant™s assumption that there is a theoretical approach to the world
that is independent of our practical involvements. This raises too many
questions to answer here. It will have to su¬ce to say that it is not clear that
the problem of skepticism about the external world is substantially changed
by shifting to the perspective of an agent. For the agent must also have some
reason to believe that he or she is able to have a genuine e¬ect in the
external world.
 The allusion is to F. H. Jacobi, David Hume uber den Glauben, oder Idealismus
¨
und Realismus, ein Gesprach (Breslau: Lowe, ±·µ). Unlike Hume, Jacobi does
¨ ¨
not deny that our belief in the existence of the external world is true,
instead he argues only that it is indemonstrable. The problem is that we
cannot infer from what we perceive that objects exist even when they are
not perceived.
 Edwin McCann, ˜˜Skepticism and Kant™s B-Deduction,™™ ··¬. McCann
argues that the second step of the B-Deduction shows that one cannot even
think of oneself as an individual subject of conscious states without having
the determinate self-knowledge that is the basis for Kant™s argument in the
Refutation.
 H. J. Paton takes the empirical determination of consciousness to exclude
pure apperception in favor of objects of inner sense (Kant™s Metaphysic of
Experience, pp. ··“·).
µ Bennett identi¬es empirical consciousness with empirical knowledge of
one™s own history, Kant™s Analytic, p. °µ. Meerbote, identi¬es empirically
determined consciousness with the empirical cognition of our sensation-
states (and thought-states), ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Problematic Material
Idealism,™™ pp. ±±“±±·. Similar views are expressed by Richard Aquila,
˜˜Personal Identity and Kant™s ˜Refutation of Idealism,™ ™™ Kant-Studien ·°
(±·), ±; McCann, ˜˜Skepticism and Kant™s B-Deduction,™™ ; and
Baum, ˜˜The B-Deduction and Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ p. µ.
Allison™s interpretation of the Refutation seems also to favor an appeal to
self-knowledge as the lead-o¬ premise in the argument. He identi¬es the
consciousness presupposed in this premise as actual self-knowledge rather
than mere self-consciousness (Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. ·). He also
maintains that Kant identi¬es this consciousness of inner states with inner
experience ( ·µ). But, on the other hand, he claims that the argument is
 Notes to pages °°“°
committed to the real possibility of empirical self-knowledge. The notion of
real possibility in Kant is somewhat obscure, but Allison interprets real
possibility as being possible in or over a period of time in accordance with
the Analogies of Experience (Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, pp. ±“±°). It is
thus somewhat unclear what strength Allison gives to the ¬rst premise. The
¬rst premise might presuppose that one has actual self-knowledge or that
one is only in a position to acquire such self-knowledge.
 Bennett maintains Kant™s Analytic that the Refutation does not presuppose
the argument of the First Analogy, or at least that it ought not to. Part of his
argument for this claim is that the Refutation would have to be linked ˜˜to
the latter™s [the First Analogy™s] least comprehensible part “ not to the
analysis of existence-change but to the obscure doctrine that time is perma-
nent and unperceivable,™™ p. °. Bennett does not argue for this mistaken
claim, so I shall pass over it in favor of his major criticism. ˜˜Most important
of all: if the Refutation of Idealism presupposes the First Analogy, then the
˜proof™ of the latter must be taken as o¬ering, in support of the conclusion
that self-consciousness requires experience of something permanent, an
argument which is neutral as to whether the ˜something permanent™ is inner
or outer. This is an impossible reading of the First Analogy, which is clearly
stated in both editions as a thesis about the division of ˜appearances™, i.e. of
the objective realm, into substances and properties™™ (Kant™s Analytic, pp.
°“°). Bennett™s point is based on the dubious assumption that Kant
straightaway identi¬es the objective with the outer. But this identi¬cation is
precisely part of the task of the Refutation. Neither the Deduction nor the
Analogies require such an identi¬cation in any sense.
· Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. °µ.
 This also seems to be the way the argument is understood by Herbert Blunt,
˜˜La Refutation kantienne de l™idealisme,™™ Revue de metaphysique et de morale,
´ ´ ´
pp. “.
 The thing outside of me is to be taken here not only as a permanent
perceptible, but as something that belongs with me to a unitary experience.
And this experience is as much something external as it is something
internal to my consciousness.
±° Erling Skorpen, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ Journal of the History of
Philosophy, maintains that ˜˜permanence cannot be a strict a priori concept if,
as Kant claims in the Refutation, permanent objects can be directly per-
ceived as such without the help of representations of permanence. If they
can, then the concept of permanence begins to look like an a posteriori
concept, and so too the concepts of time and substance which are analyti-
cally bound up with it,™™ p. . But permanent objects may be directly
perceived despite the fact that permanence itself is not directly perceptible
or even something of which one can have strictly empirical knowledge.
Skorpen goes on to suggest that Kant™s transcendental idealism is incompat-
ible with the thesis of direct perception that is crucial to the Refutation of
Idealism: ˜˜What would have to be modi¬ed in keeping with the Refutation
Notes to pages °“° µ
is the claim that the object of perception and knowledge is fashioned in its
essentials by the sensibility and understanding of man and is therefore
di¬erent from the thing-in-itself,™™ p. °. This also seems to me to be
mistaken for similar reasons.
±± Broad, Kant: An Introduction, p. ±.
± Douglas Langston has criticized the thesis that the arguments of the Fourth
Paralogism and the Refutation are incompatible in ˜˜The Supposed Incom-
patibility between Kant™s Refutations of Idealism,™™ Southern Journal of Philos-
ophy, µ“. Langston focuses on the issue of whether the claim in the
Fourth Paralogism that I am immediately conscious of my representations is
incompatible with the claim in the Refutation that external objects are
anything in me at all. The incompatibility is asserted both by Kemp-Smith, A
Commentary on Kant™s ˜˜Critique of Pure Reason™™ pp. ±“±, and A. C. Ewing, A
Short Commentary on Kant™s ˜˜Critique of Pure Reason™™ (Chicago University Press,
±), p. n. Surprisingly, Langston has nothing to say about the crucial fact
that the Fourth Paralogism argument asserts a symmetry of immediacy
between external and internal experience that is rejected in the Refutation.
± Moore rejects the need for an argument for things that no sane person
would doubt. But this is not even compelling on Moore™s own terms, since
he admits the possibility of having inferential or indirect knowledge of things
that can also be known directly or immediately. Moore agrees with Kant
that our knowledge of external objects is immediate. This is why he thinks
that raising his hands provides a proof of the existence of external objects.
One has direct perceptual knowledge of these objects. Barring some further
knowledge of unusual causal conditions such as hallucination, knowledge
that these hands are mine is as certain as anything is. We know that these
hands are here immediately, although we may con¬rm or discon¬rm our
judgment through appeal to much more indirect sources of evidence. ˜˜We
can now see that Kant insists on our possession of just the kind of knowledge
G. E. Moore thought he was exhibiting in his proof of an external world . . .
No theory that represents our knowledge of external things as indirect or
inferential could account for that knowledge; it could not show that we are
in the very position Moore unquestioningly took himself to be in,™™ Barry
Stroud, The Signi¬cance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
±), p. ±.
± Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. .
±µ Erling Skorpen maintains in ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ pp. “,
that ˜˜Kant™s implication in the Refutation is not only that self-knowledge is
inseparable for world-knowledge, but that there is nothing we know about
ourselves which is not already reference to an external world. Any autobio-
graphical or biographical reference, including those growing out of
psychoanalysis, is con¬rmation for this. For even reports like ˜I was hostile,™
˜I am hallucinating,™ etc., are elliptical for longer reports starting where,
when, and under what circumstances,™™ p. . In ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of
Idealism,™™ Journal of the History of Philosophy ± (±·), ±µ“°, Myron
 Notes to pages °µ“°
Gochnauer criticizes Skorpen™s attempt to make all knowledge of inner
states not only dependent upon, but actually inclusive of, knowledge of
outer states (see p. °). Gochnauer maintains that it should be possible to
know that one is performing a logical inference or a mathematical calcula-
tion without also referring to the outside world. ˜˜I might feel sick and I
might solve equations even if there were no external world. But what I could
not do without an external world is to know the temporal ordering of these
two items of consciousness,™™ p. °. The dependence of Kant™s theory of
arithmetic (and of mathematics in general) on spatial sequence undercuts
this alleged independence from spatial models for arithmetic. Mathematics
is based on schemata “ generative rules “ for producing inherently spatial
objects of perception in imagination ( ±°/ ±·: ˜˜Bilder™™). The issue must
be pushed back to the general status of objects of imagination. Raw feelings
are di¬cult for another reason. It is not obvious that the connection
between raw feelings such as pains and the body is a contingent one. This is
at least a controversial issue and one that Kant does not express an explicit
opinion on. Even the independence of logic from spatial objects is less clear
cut than it might seem to be, since Kant thinks that without any implicit
reference to objects of experience, logic cannot make any bona ¬de commit-
ments to the existence of objects.
± An exhaustive survey of the relevant evidence is to be found in a chapter on
˜˜The Application of the Categories to the Self,™™ in A. C. Ewing, Kant™s
Treatment of Causality (London: Kegan Paul, ±), pp. ±“±.
±· This interpretation has been pursued recently by Ralf Meerbote in his
article ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Problematic Material Idealism,™™ in B. den
Ouden and M. Moen (eds.), New Essays on Kant (New York: Peter Lang,
±), pp. ±±±“±µ. Meerbote derives inspiration for his view from Donald
Davidson™s anomalous monism. The ascription of lawlike relations to men-
tal events only under a physical description need not entail a commitment to
physicalism. The identity relation is, after all, a symmetrical one. Some
further premise is needed beyond the anomalous monist thesis to lead one to
physicalism. The physicalism that Davidson and Meerbote defend requires
not only that the physical states instantiating animal representations (and
indeed human representations) be subject to the causal principle, but also
the further premise that mental events are only subject to causal laws under
a physical description. It does not, to be sure, require that mental events are
only caused or causal under a physical description, since, for Davidson,
causation is an extensional notion. However, I cannot ¬nd a premise in
Kant that would justify the ascription to him of physicalism.
± Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. .
± Ibid., p. ±.
° Ibid., p. .
± Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., p. ±µ.
 Ibid., p. ·.
Notes to pages °·“±° ·
 P. Guyer, ˜˜Placing Myself in Time,™™ p. µ.
µ Eckart Forster, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ p. µ. Forster™s objection
¨ ¨
of a contradiction between the theory of space in the Transcendental
Aesthetic and the externality claim of the Refutation goes back to Hans
Vaihinger™s article ˜˜Zu Kants Widerlegung des Idealismus,™™ Strassburger
Abhandlungen zur Philosophie (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, ±), pp. ±±“±. An
¨
extensive criticism of Vaihinger™s claim that the argument of the Refutation
is inconsistent with transcendental idealism is to be found in a postscript to
Anton Thomson, ˜˜Bemerkungen zur Kritik des Kantischen Begri¬s des
Dinges an sich,™™ Kant-Studien  (±°), “µ·.
 Eckart Forster seems to be attracted to the view that the refutation entails a
¨
form of extreme idealism, since he argues that the ˜˜full-¬‚edged idealism™™ he
¬nds in Kant™s incomplete work, the so-called Opus Postumum, is unavoid-
able, if the Refutation is to be integrated into Kant™s philosophy as a whole,
Forster, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ esp. p. °.
¨
· H. A. Pritchard, Kant™s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±°±),
maintains that Kant means: ˜˜a thing external in the sense of independent of
mind, i.e. a thing in itself. For the nerve of the argument consists in the
contention that the permanent the perception of which is required for
consciousness of my successive states must be a thing external to me, and a
thing external to me in opposition to a representation of a thing external to
me can only be a thing in itself,™™ pp. “. Pritchard goes on to ¬nd a
contradiction between this notion of externality and that of the phenomenal
externality of things in space. Perhaps he does not give ˜˜dependence on my
mind™™ the normal connotation of privacy. But even then he has failed to
make out his claim of contradiction. Robert Dostal, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of
Idealism: Transcendental Idealism and Phenomenalism,™™ in G. Funke (ed.),
Akten des µten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Bonn: Bouvier, ±±), discusses
and rejects the phenomenalism that Pritchard attributes to Kant, as well as
Pritchard™s view that the reference to things in themselves is unintentional in
the Refutation (p. ±·). Although it may be unclear whether Pritchard
argues from the privacy of all appearances to the need for external things
that are things in themselves, the argument is explicit in Broad (Kant: An
Introduction, pp. ±“±).
 There is a tendency in the literature to gloss transcendental realism as
synonymous with any awareness of things in themselves. ˜˜But Kant does
not accept realism, understood ˜transcendentally.™ For him it is not true
˜transcendentally™ that we are aware of things that are independent of us.
The correct ˜transcendental™ position is idealism: what we perceive and
know are all ˜appearances,™ things that are dependent on us,™™ Barry Stroud,
˜˜Kant and Skepticism,™™ in M. Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition (Ber-
keley: University of California Press, ±), p. ±. Stroud™s discussion of the
role of transcendental idealism in Kant™s argument against skepticism is
quite helpful. But some direct awareness of things as they exist in themselves
is necessary if Kant™s inference from the existence of appearances to the
 Notes to pages ±±“
existence of things as they exist in themselves is to be valid. This is consistent
with the restriction of all descriptive knowledge to appearances.
 According to J. Findlay, there is the same demand for something outside of
the subject to act on the subject in the case of transcendental self-conscious-
ness, as in the case of empirical self-consciousness. Kant studiously used the
terms ˜˜outside™™ and ˜˜external™™ in an ambiguous manner so as to cover both
the phenomenal outsidedness of bodies in space and the meta-empirical,
transcendental outsidedness of things-in-themselves to that thing-in-itself
which is our own transcendental self: John N. Findlay, Kant and the Transcen-
dental Object (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±±), pp. ±“±µ.
° Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. .
± I have criticized this view in my discussion of the synthesis of apprehension
in chapter three. It is also rejected by Anthony Bruckner in his critical
discussion of Guyer™s reconstruction of the Refutation in ˜˜The Anti-Skepti-
cal Epistemology of the Refutation of Idealism,™™ Philosophical Topics ±
(±±), “µ.

± ±   °©  ©  ¬   ¬ ©  ® ¤    ®  ® ¤  ®   ¬ © ¤  ¬ ©  
± A parallel claim is made for time ( µ“/ µ).
 Against such interpreters as Allison and Strawson, Guyer maintains that the
non-spatiality of things in themselves is the premise from which Kant
argues here for the subjectivity of space, rather than a conclusion drawn
from the premise that space is inherently subjective ˜˜the passage concisely
displays the order of Kant™s inference from the nonspatiality of things in
themselves to the merely subjective nature of space, as well as the claim
about knowledge of necessity on which the premise of this inference itself is
based,™™ Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. µµ. However, the phrase ˜˜that is™™
in the second sentence does not seem to introduce an inference from the
claim made in the ¬rst sentence, but rather a mere explication of the
meaning of that ¬rst sentence. The a priori, and hence necessary, character
of intuition seems to be the claim about knowledge of necessity to which
Guyer also refers as the basis of Kant™s argument. However, it should be
noted that Kant appeals to a distinctive intuitive necessity rather than some
general notion of necessity as the basis for his argument. Since intuition is a
form of representation, some notion of the subjectivity of space is involved
in the initial premise of the argument.
 Kant addresses the problematic character of a priori intuition in the
Prolegomena (section “±°, Ak. ©, pp. ±“). He notes that, since intuition
depends for its existence on the immediate presence of its object, this seems
to rule out the very existence of a priori intuition. For a priori intuition
cannot depend on the previous or present object that intuition requires.
Intuition would have to depend on the presence of givenness of the object, if
the object were a thing in itself. Thus, any intuition of things in themselves
would have to be empirical. A priori intuition is possible as an intuition of
the form according to which objects immediately present to the mind must
Notes to pages “ 
be ordered. It is possible to intuit the form according to which a thing in
itself is immediately present to the mind. But what one is intuiting according
to that form is not the thing as it exists in itself. It is only the thing as it
appears to us a priori. This is the thing as that thing must appear to us in
absolutely all situations.
 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, pp. ¬.
µ Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. ±±°.
 Ibid., p. ±°.
· Morris Lipson attempts to articulate a variant of Allison™s mode of presenta-
tion account of transcendental idealism that does not fall victim to the
problem in question. He argues that space is ˜˜a mode of presentation of
ontological independence.™™ Morris Lipson, ˜˜On Kant on Space,™™ Paci¬c
Philosophical Quarterly · (±), ·. Kant does think of space as a mode in
which objects are presented or given to us ( /µ, µ/µ). Lipson
maintains that it makes no sense to argue that a thing in itself is in space, if
one understands space to be a mode of presentation. For, once we see that
space is the way in which ontological independence is presented to us, ˜˜we
¬nd that we have no basis for suspecting that space is anything else than
this,™™ ·. Even if we have no basis for suspecting space is anything but the
form according to which ontological independence is presented to us, space
might well also itself be genuinely independent of us. Our very ability
successfully to structure the objects of our experience spatio-temporally
suggests that there is some independent basis for the existence of space and
time.
 Allison, ˜˜Transcendental Idealism: A Retrospective,™™ Idealism and Freedom,
p. ±°.
 Allison, ˜˜Incongruence and Ideality,™™ Topoi  (±), ±“±·µ; cf. also J.
Buroker, ibid., ±··“±°.
±° Lorne Falkenstein, ˜˜Kant™s Argument for the Non-Spatiotemporality of
Things in Themselves,™™ Kant-Studien ° (±), µ“.
±± A helpful discussion of this evidence may be found in J. Buroker, Space and
Incongruence: The Origins of Kant™s Idealism (Dordrecht: Reidel, ±±).
± Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. .
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Young, J. Michael, ˜˜Kant™s View of the Imagination,™™ Kant-Studien · (±),
±°“±.
Index




a¬ection, “°, ±°±“±°, ±°µ, ±µ outer, “, ±°±, ±±
self-a¬ection, ±°±“±°, ±°µ apperception, ±, ·, ±°, ±“·, “, °“°,
a¬nity, µµ“, ±· “±±±, ±“±·, ±·, ±“±, ±
empirical a¬nity, µ· analytic unity of apperception, ±
transcendental a¬nity, µµ“, , ±· empirical, ±“±, ±
agency, , ±µ, ±µ,  empirical unity of , “
and causation, µµ synthetic unity of , ±, ·, ±°°, ±°, ±±±
noumenal agency, µµ, µ· transcendental, ±, °“, ·±, ±“±
Allison, Henry apprehension
on absolute spontaneity, µn and causal laws, ±
on a¬nity, µ·“µ, nµ and persistence, ±±“±±, ±µ
Guyer on, “°
on apperception and subjective unity of
consciousness, “, n, nn±±“± immediate, °“°µ, ±
on causation and causal laws, ±, ±µ“±·, in A-Deduction, µ“, µµ
µnn“, , ± of events, ±“±±
on causation and objective experience, ±± Aquila, Richard ·, ·n±
autonomy, , , ±µ
on cognition and the unity of consciousness,
°, n
on consciousness of succession, °° Baum, Manfred , °“±, µ°“µ±nµ, nµ
on holistic time-determination,±, µn Baumgarten, A. G., n
on ˜˜I think,™™ , n Beiser, Frederick, n
on materialism, ±, n, nµ Bennett, Jonathan, , µn±, µn±, ±n,
on no-ownership conception of the self, , nµ
µ±n± Berkeley, George, , µ·, ±, µ
on proof-structure of the B-Deduction, °, Bird, Graham, n, µ·n±
µ°n Bittner, Rudiger, n±
¨
Brandt, Reinhardt, ±n±
on transcendental idealism and
Trendelenburg™s loophole, µ“· Brentano, Franz, µµn·
on unity of space and time, ±°·“±°, Brittan, Gordon, n·
µnn“ Broad, Charles D., ° µµnµ, µn±
Ameriks, Karl, ·, µ±n±, µ“°n Brook, Andrew, , n, ·n
Amphiboly of Concepts of Re¬‚ection, ±°, ° Brouillet, Raymond, °, µ°n
Analogies of Experience, ±±, ±µ, ±, ±°, Bruckner, Anthony, n±
±, ±±, ±, ±µ Buchdahl, Gerd, ±“±µ, n·, µ·n±,
analytic unity of apperception, ± µnnµ“·, ±µ
anomalous monism, ±µµ, µn° Buroker, Jill, n±±
appearance, ±“±, °·“±°, ±“±, °“
and things in themselves, ±µ, ±, °, ±°, Carl, Wolfgang, n, µn±
±“±, “ Castaneda, Hector-Neri, nµ
˜
in the empirical and transcendental senses, categories
±“± and causal laws, ±
inner, ±,  and ideas of reason, ±




Index
and judgment, “ and general causal principle, ±“±
and recognition, , µ“µµ concept, , ±±, 
and self-consciousness, ±°, ± deterministic and indeterministic, ±µ±“±µ
and unity of space and time, ±°·“±± intuition, , “°
application to mental events, , °µ laws, ±
causality, , ±, ±“±·, ±µ, ±µ·“±µ, empirical self, ±, , , ±, °, , ±“, ,
°µ“°· ±°µ“±°, ±±±
empirical unity of apperception, “
change
and causation, ±, °, ±±, ±, ±“±, ±·, Evans, J. Claude, µ±n·
±°, ±µ“±µµ, ±°, ±µ, °µ,  Ewing, A. C., µn±, n±
and dependence of inner on outer, ±“° experience
and dualism, ±“± conditions of, µ, ±±, ±·, ±
and self-identity, ±·“±· inner, ±, ±·, , , , , , , ±±, ±·,
and substance, ±±“±±, ±“±µ, ±, ±· ±··, ±±, ±·, ±µ, ±·, ±, ±, °°, °±,
and uniformity of nature, “° °, °, °·, °, ±, ±, ±
Chisholm, Roderick, µµn· judgments of, “µ
objective, “, µ, , “±°°, ±±“±±
cognition
a priori,  outer, ±, °, , , , ±, ±·, °, ±
and judgment, ·“° subjective, ·, , “, “±°°, ±±“±±
and truth, µ“µµ
animal, “ Falkenstein, Lorne, µn±, n±°
empirical, ±, µµ, · Findlay, John N., ±n
Collier, Charles, n· Forster, Eckart, ·nnµ“
¨
concept, ±, · Frank, Manfred, µn±
and apperception, , “µ, ·“· freedom, , ±°
and function, “µ psychological, ±µµ
and laws, µ±“µ Friedman, Michael, ±µ“±, n·, µn,
a priori, ±, , µ, °, ° nn±“±, µn±·
of change, ±±“±µ function, µ, 
and concept, “µ
consciousness
a priori, , ° and judgment, “,
animal, “ logical, ·“°, nn±“
empirical, ±, ±, , µ·, ·, ·, , ±, , functionalism, ±°“±±, °“, nn“
±°, ±±µ, ±µ, °
immediate, °“°· Garve, Christian, ±
objective unity of , ±, ±° Gochnauer, Myron, µ“n±µ
of bodies, ±·“±µ, °· God, ·µ
of objects, ±, °“°, ± Guyer, Paul
of self, , , ·, ±°, ±, ±µ, °, “·, °“, on causal laws, ±, ±µ, µn, nn±µ“±,
, µ, ·±“·, ··, ±“, ±±, ±µ, · µn±
subjective unity of, ±“, , ±° on immediacy, °“°·, ±, µn±,
Critique of Judgment, ±·, ±, ±µ°“±µ± nn±“, ·n
Critique of Practical Reason, ±, ±µµ on ˜˜I think,™™ “·°, n, n
Critique of Pure Reason, ±, , ±, ·, ° on judgments of change, ±±, ±“, °°,
µn±°
Davidson, Donald ±µ, µn° on necessity and transcendental idealism,
Descartes, Rene, µ, ±·, ·, ±±“±, ±·±, ±·, , ·, n, nn, ±

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