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Judgments of taste, as judgments about an object, are always singular. Of
course, ˜˜beautiful™™ can also be the predicate of particular judgments
(˜˜some human beings are beautiful™™) or even universal judgments (˜˜all
roses in bloom are beautiful™™). But in such cases, Kant maintains, the
judgment is no longer ˜˜aesthetic,™™ but ˜˜logical™™: it is a combination of
concepts, expressing an inductive generalization from experience, not a
present feeling in connection with a singular object of intuition. The
predicate ˜˜beautiful,™™ in such ˜˜logical™™ judgments, is a general concept
expressing a property common to the objects referred to by the logical
subject of the judgment. This common property was explained in the
first moment: the objects said to be beautiful have in common that
apprehending them is the occasion of a disinterested pleasure for the
apprehending subject. But the predicate of an aesthetic judgment (e.g.
the judgment ˜˜this rose is beautiful™™) expresses a pleasure that is felt at
this moment upon apprehending this object. So the aesthetic judgment
can only be singular (v, 215).
Now Kant claims that because the pleasure is disinterested, the judg-
ment is determined as to its quantity in another respect: the satisfaction
felt in this particular case by me ought to be felt by all other judging
subjects who might find themselves apprehending the same object. If, as
a judgment about the object, the judgment is singular, its predicate
contains an implicit universal judgment, one that says of ˜˜the whole
sphere of those who judge™™ (v, 215) that they ought to agree with my
judgment, namely also attribute the predicate ˜˜beautiful™™ to the object of
my judgment. Thus one might perhaps develop the judgment ˜˜this
object is beautiful™™ in the following way: ˜˜This object is such that appre-
hending it elicits in me a pleasure such that all judging subjects, in
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 273

apprehending this same object, ought to experience the same pleasure
and agree with my judgment.™™
Kant does not explicitly articulate this development of the predicate of
aesthetic judgments. I suggest that it is nonetheless justified by what he
does say. He writes:
The aesthetic universality that is ascribed to a judgment must also be of a
special kind; for although it does not connect the predicate of beauty
with the concept of the object, considered in its whole logical sphere, yet it
extends that predicate over the whole sphere of those who judge [uber die
¨
ganze Spha der Urteilenden]. (v, 215, translation modified)
¨re

This ˜˜extension (of the predicate ˜beautiful™) over the whole sphere of
those who judge™™ is expressed in the developed version of the judgment
proposed above:
˜˜all judging subjects, in apprehending this same object, ought to feel the
same pleasure and agree with my judgment.™™

Kant offers two arguments in support of the thesis that the predicate
˜˜beautiful™™ ˜˜extends over the whole sphere of those who judge.™™ The
first is put forward in x6: since the feeling occasioned by the object
judged to be beautiful is disinterested (this was established by the first
moment), it does not depend on the particular physiological or psycho-
logical characteristics of this or that judging subject (as would be the case
for the feeling expressed by the predicate ˜˜pleasant™™). It ought therefore
to be shared by any judging subject, simply by virtue of the fact of being a
judging subject, namely of having a judging subject™s representational
capacities.
This is a bad argument: after all, even while being disinterested in the
sense Kant gives to the term, the satisfaction drawn from the apprehen-
sion of the object might depend on mental characteristics peculiar to
some, not all subjects. Is this not what happens in playful activities, where
individuals may differ greatly as to the kinds of games they may derive
pleasure from (playing chess, backgammon, charades, or what have
you)? This being so, the disinterested character of the pleasure (the
fact that it is elicited by the mental activity of the subject rather than by
the existence of this or that object) does not by itself seem to be a
sufficient argument for maintaining that it is universally communicable.
Of course, the aesthetic pleasure is of a different nature, since it is
supposed to be a pleasure we take in our mental activity in apprehend-
ing an object, whereas in the cases I mentioned, we take pleasure in our
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274

own mental activity without the mediation of any contemplation at all.
Moreover, a game is bound by rules, whereas aesthetic experience
transcends all rules. So I am not saying the two cases are exactly the
same. The only point I want to make here is that the fact that the
pleasure is elicited by the mental activity itself and is, in this sense,
disinterested, is not a sufficient ground for making it universalizable.
Another objection to the counterexample I am proposing might be
that the playful activities I cite are not disinterested at all: a major part of
the pleasure we derive from engaging in such activities is the pleasure of
winning (or the pleasure of striving to win), where we strive to cause a
state of affairs in the world (asserting our superiority over our opponent,
obtaining authority over her, and so on). But supposing this is true (and
it is not true in all cases: what about charades, or a game of solitaire?) all it
shows is that the pleasure we take in playing is not purely disinterested:
other pleasures are mixed with the pleasure of exercising our mental
capacities. But this is also true of the aesthetic pleasure of reflection Kant
is concerned with. To admit that the disinterested pleasure we take in
the play of our own mental capacities be mixed with interested pleasures
does not by itself amount to a denial that there is a measure of disinter-
ested pleasure in the game, nor does it amount to a refutation of the fact
that such disinterested pleasure can be occasioned by different mental
activities in different individuals.
I conclude, then, that Kant™s attempt to derive the subjective univer-
sality of the pleasure from its disinterested character is unsuccessful.11
But as I said above, this is not the only argument Kant offers in support
of the thesis that the predicate ˜˜beautiful™™ ˜˜extends over the whole
sphere of those who judge.™™ One can find another line of thought in a

11
On this point I agree with Paul Guyer and disagree with Henry Allison. See Paul Guyer,
Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) (henceforth
KCT), p. 117; Henry Allison, Kant™s Theory of Taste: a Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic
Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) (henceforth KTT), p. 99“100.
See also my discussion of Henry Allison in ˜˜On KTT,™™ p. 152, and Allison™s response in the
same issue of Inquiry, pp. 186“7. Allison maintains (p. 183) that in refusing to grant Kant™s
claim that the subjective universality of taste can be derived from the disinterested char-
acter of the relevant pleasure, I deny the systematic nature of Kant™s exposition of the four
moments in the Analytic of the Beautiful. But I do not think this is true. In a standard
analysis of a judgment as to its form, none of the four titles derives from any of the others:
they are just four inseparable aspects according to which a judgment can be analyzed
(quantity, quality, relation, modality). The fact that here what I have called the ˜˜checklist™™
of the four titles serves to bring to light a content does not alter the fact that each title
defines in its own right a particular aspect of the judgment, as to its form and thus as to the
content thought according to this form.
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 275

passage that has elicited a great deal of controversy among commenta-
tors. This is the beginning of x9 in the Analytic of the Beautiful, where
Kant seems to claim that the universal communicability, or capacity to be
shared (Mitteilbarkeit), of the mental state in apprehending the object is
precisely what elicits the pleasure that is proper to the judgment of taste.
If this is so, there is no need any more to ground the subjective univer-
sality of the judgment in the disinterestedness of the pleasure. Rather,
the fact that the pleasure is a pleasure we take in the universal commu-
nicability of our state of mind in judging the object is a primitive fact and
is itself a reason for defining the aesthetic pleasure as disinterested.
The passage is worth quoting at some length:
x9“Investigation of the question: whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of
pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the latter precedes the former.
The solution of this problem is the key to the critique of taste, and
hence worthy of full attention.
If the pleasure in the given object came first, and only its universal
communicability were to be attributed in the judgment of taste to the
representation of the object, then such a procedure would be self-
contradictory. For such a pleasure would be none other than mere
agreeableness of a sensation [die bloße Annehmlichkeit in der
Sinnesempfindung], and hence by its nature could have only private
validity, since it would immediately depend on the representation
through which the object is given.
Thus it is the universal communicability of the state of mind in the given
representation [my emphasis] which, as a subjective condition of the judg-
ment of taste, must serve as its ground and have the pleasure in the
object as a consequence. (v, 217)

Kant™s view here seems to be the following. If the pleasure we take in
the object were the ground of our aesthetic judgment (the judgment that
the object is beautiful), then the very claim that the judgment is univer-
salizable (ought to be shared by all) would be self-contradictory. For a
pleasure elicited by the object is a subjective feeling depending on the
particular constitution of particular subjects, namely the different ways
in which they can be causally affected by the object. Such a feeling can
thus only give rise to judgments such as ˜˜this is agreeable,™™ where the
implicit restriction is: ˜˜agreeable for me.™™ This being so, the only remain-
ing option is to reverse the relation between pleasure and universal
communicability or capacity to be shared, and to say that rather than
the pleasure being the source of the universal communicability of the
judgment, it is the universal communicability of the state of mind in
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276

judging the object that is, itself, the source of the pleasure. Here we
bypass altogether the problem that was raised by the attempt to ground
the universal communicability of the judgment on the disinterested
character of the pleasure: the universal communicability is itself the
source of a pleasure of a special kind, which grounds the judgment
˜˜this is beautiful.™™
Here one may object that aesthetic judgments are not the only kind of
judgments about an empirically given object that can make a claim to the
universal agreement of all judging subjects. Judgments of empirical
cognition, insofar as they are true and known to be true, must be
known to be true independently of the particular empirical state of the
judging subject. In a much discussed passage from the Prolegomena, Kant
tries to show what makes possible, in the case of empirical judgments, the
transition from a ˜˜judgment of perception,™™ which is true only ˜˜for me,
and in the present state of my perception,™™ to a ˜˜judgment of experi-
ence™™ which is true ˜˜for everyone, always.™™ He argues that such a transi-
tion is made possible by the a priori conditions grounding the possibility
of all empirical knowledge. These conditions can be called subjective
because they belong to the cognitive capacities of the conscious subject.
But they are transcendental and thus universally shared conditions,
which alone make possible knowledge of any empirical object whatso-
ever.12 So if judgments of taste make a claim to the agreement of all
judging subjects, they are certainly not the only judgments about
empirical objects to make such a claim. Why then are all empirical
judgments not accompanied by the same pleasure, and why are all
objects of empirical knowledge not judged to be beautiful?
The first part of the answer we can suppose Kant would give to this
question is that the comparison between aesthetic judgments of reflec-
tion and empirical judgments with respect to their universal commu-
nicability, or capacity to be shared, is indeed quite relevant. For aesthetic
judgments, just as empirical judgments of cognition, start with acts of
apprehending and reflecting on the object (looking for concepts under
which the particular object might fall). And the outcome of both acts of
judging (judgments such as ˜˜this rose is beautiful™™ in the case of aesthetic
judgments, judgments such as ˜˜this is a rose,™™ ˜˜this rose is in bloom™™ in
the case of empirical judgments of cognition) depend on the same
representational capacities, imagination and understanding, and their


12
See Prolegomena, xx18“22, AAiv, pp. 297“304.
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 277

agreement (imagination synthesizing in conformity to some concepts of
the understanding in the case of cognitive judgments; imagination being
in agreement with understanding without falling under the rule of any
particular concept in the case of aesthetic judgment). Indeed if we return
to the question Kant asks at the beginning of x9 (whether ˜˜in the judg-
ment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object or
the latter precedes the former™™), the ˜˜judging™™ which turns out to pre-
cede the feeling of pleasure should be understood as the act of reflecting
upon the object, which puts into play imagination and understanding
and elicits their mutual agreement.
But if this were the whole answer, we would be left with the question
stated above: why, then, are all empirical judgments of cognition not
accompanied with the same pleasure as that expressed in judgments of
the beautiful? Here comes the second part of the answer. In a judgment
of empirical cognition, the outcome of the agreement of the imagination
and the understanding is a concept that directs us to the object recog-
nized under the concept. Thus for example the agreement of the imagin-
ation (which provides the rule of synthesis by which I generate for myself
the image of a dog) with the understanding (which provides me with the
empirical concept of a dog) leads me to recognize, in the animal I have in
front of me, a dog. In aesthetic judgments, by contrast, the agreement of
imagination and understanding does not stop at a specific concept
(recognizing this as a dog, as a house, as a sunset). Although of course
the object judged to be beautiful can be recognized under concepts (e.g.
˜˜this rose is yellow,™™ ˜˜this rose is in bloom,™™ and so on), expressing an
aesthetic judgment (˜˜this rose is beautiful™™) is expressing something
different: the fact that in the mutually enhancing play of imagination
(apprehending the object) and understanding (thinking it under con-
cepts) no concept can possibly account for the peculiarity of my experi-
ence in apprehending the object. What remains in play to account for
this experience is only the mutually enhancing or enlivening agreement
of imagination and understanding itself, and its universal commu-
nicability (its capacity to be shared). This universal communicability
itself, or if you like, this feeling of communion with ˜˜the universal sphere
of those who judge™™ that transcends all determinable concepts is the
source of the peculiar kind of pleasure that leads us to describe the object
as ˜˜beautiful.™™
One may then want to make the reverse objection: how can the
comparison with empirical judgments of cognition be helpful at all? In
their case, the universal communicability (capacity to be shared,
THE CRITICAL SYSTEM
278

Mitteilbarkeit) of the agreement of imagination and understanding is the
communicability of the outcome, the subsumption of the object under a
concept, or concepts, and the possible agreement about that outcome.
Absent such an outcome, how can such agreement occur, or if it occurs at
all, how can it be manifest? Here the answer is that indeed the compar-
ison with the case of empirical judgments of cognition is not sufficient to
ground the assertion that aesthetic judgments do rest on an agreement
between imagination and understanding, or that the agreement in ques-
tion is universally communicable. All it shows is how those judgments
might rest on such an agreement or ˜˜free play™™ (unbound by concept).
I shall return to this point when discussing the fourth moment of
the Analytic of the Beautiful, where Kant addresses more explicitly
the relation between aesthetic judgments and empirical judgments of
cognition. For now let me just note that already in the context of the
second moment, Kant maintains that the universal communicability of
the state of mind in the judgment of taste is ˜˜postulated™™ as a ˜˜universal
voice™™ rather than expressed in a concept, as is the case for cognitive
judgments.
My suggestion, then, is the following: according to Kant, the pleasure
we experience in apprehending the object we judge to be beautiful is
twofold. It is a first-order pleasure we take in the mutual enlivening of
imagination and understanding in an act of apprehension and reflection
that is not bound by the rule of any universal or particular concept. That
is what Kant calls the ˜˜free play™™ of imagination and understanding. But
that pleasure on its own would not yet be sufficient to constitute our
experience of what we call aesthetic pleasure of reflection, pleasure in
the beautiful. Another constitutive feature of that aesthetic pleasure is
the sense that the mutual enlivening of imagination and understanding
in apprehending the object, and the first-order pleasure it elicits, could
and ought to be shared by all. This sense of a universal communicability
(capacity to be shared) of a pleasurable state of mutual enhancement of
imagination and understanding is the source of the second-order pleas-
ure that results in the aesthetic judgment: ˜˜this is beautiful.™™ This is why
the pleasure includes the peculiar kind of longing (the demand we make
upon others, to share in the pleasure we experience and to agree with
the judgment we ground on that pleasure, ˜˜this is beautiful!™™) that is
characteristic of the aesthetic experience.
In claiming that for Kant, consciousness of the universal commu-
nicability of the state of mind in apprehending the object is itself a source
of pleasure, I am in agreement with the view defended by Hannah
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 279

Ginsborg, pace other prominent interpreters of Kant.13 But my view
differs from hers in that for her the aesthetic pleasure is nothing but a
self-referential act of judging, where the whole content of the act is the
assertion of the universalizability of that very act of judging.14 In my
reading, according to Kant we take pleasure in the universal sharability
of the state of mind that is elicited in apprehending the object: the
˜˜free play™™ (the mutually enhancing agreement, without the rule of
a determinate concept) of our cognitive capacities, which is itself a
pleasurable state.
Thus without having to be derived from the first moment, the second
moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful is consistent with its initial
inspiration. The agreement of imagination and understanding,
unbound by a determinate concept, is a ˜˜free play™™ where each enhances
the activity of the other. The consciousness of that agreement is a source
of pleasure, and the consciousness of the universal communicability of
the free play and of the pleasure derived from it, is itself a source of
pleasure. The pleasure we take in the universal communicability of a
state of harmony, namely the combination of a second-order pleasure
(the pleasure of communicability) and a first-order pleasure (the pleas-
ure in the free play of imagination and understanding in apprehending
a particular object) is what is expressed in the predicate of an aesthetic
judgment of reflection, ˜˜this is beautiful.™™
Let me recapitulate. I have argued that the peculiarity of the judg-
ments of taste, as analyzed by Kant according to his ˜˜leading thread,™™ is
that an explicit judgment about the object supports an implicit judgment


13
See Paul Guyer, KCT, pp. 139“40. Henry Allison, KTT, pp. 110“18.
14
See Hannah Ginsborg, ˜˜On the key to the critique of taste,™™ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,
vol. 72 (1991), pp. 290“313. Also ˜˜Lawfulness without a law: Kant on the free play of
imagination and understanding,™™ Philosophical Topics, vol. 25, no. 1 (1997), pp. 37“81. In
the latter essay, Ginsborg seems to give more content to the aesthetic judgment than that of
being a self-referential judgment that asserts nothing beyond its own universal validity.
For what now seems to be universally valid (or, in her own words, what seems to be
exemplary of a rule that has universal validity) is the activity of imagination in apprehend-
ing a particular object. Nevertheless, it remains that the aesthetic judgment, which is no
other than the aesthetic pleasure itself, is the judgment that asserts this exemplary validity
of my act of apprehension, or asserts that my act of apprehension is ˜˜as it ought to be.™™ I
agree with her insistence on the consciousness of universal validity as a component in the
feeling of pleasure, but I disagree with her attempt to reduce the content of the judgment
to this self-referential assertion of universal validity. See also her discussion of Allison™s
view on this point in ˜˜Aesthetic Judging and the Intentionality of Pleasure,™™ Inquiry,
vol. 46, no. 2 (2003), pp. 164“81. And my own discussion of Allison™s view in ˜˜On KTT,™™
pp. 152“5.
THE CRITICAL SYSTEM
280

about the judging subjects. We have seen what this thesis means in the
case of the first two moments. According to the first moment, the pre-
dicate of the judgment of taste does not express a property that the
judgment asserts of the object; nor does it express a disposition of the
object to cause a state of pleasure in the subject. Rather, it expresses a
disposition of the judging subjects to elicit in themselves a state of
pleasure upon apprehending the object. According to the second
moment, the pleasure thus elicited actually has two components: the
first-order pleasure elicited by the ˜˜free play™™ or mutually enhancing
agreement of imagination and understanding; and the pleasure taken in
the universal communicability of the pleasure thus elicited. Kant™s strik-
ing thesis is that the consciousness of the universal communicability of
the state of mind in apprehending the object is itself the source of the
pleasure specific to a judgment of the beautiful. This is what is expressed
by the clause I suggested to find implicitly contained in the predicate of
the judgment of taste: ˜˜All judging subjects, upon apprehending this
object, ought to feel the same pleasure and to agree with my judgment.™™
This turning around, in Kant™s Analytic of the Beautiful, from the
manifest judgment about the object to the implicit judgment imbedded
in its predicate, finds its culminating point with the third title, ˜˜relation,™™
which I will now consider.


Relation in aesthetic judgment: the ˜˜purposiveness without
a purpose™™ of the apprehended object as the ground of the
˜˜purposiveness without a purpose™™ of the judging
subject™s state of mind; and vice versa
In order to understand the question Kant poses himself under the
heading of ˜˜relation™™ in judgment, we must recall the significance of
this heading in the table of logical functions in the first Critique.
What Kant calls ˜˜relation™™ in a judgment ˜˜S is P™™ is the relation of the
assertion of the predicate P (or more precisely, the assertion that an
object x belongs to the extension of the predicate P) to its ground or
reason (Grund). The ground or reason of a judgment is what, in the
subject S (in a categorical judgment) or in the condition added to the
subject S (in a hypothetical judgment), justifies attributing the predicate
of that judgment to all (or some, or one) object(s) X thought under S. For
example, the ground of the attribution of the predicate ˜˜mortal™™ to all
objects X falling under the concept ˜˜man™™ in the judgment ˜˜all men are
mortal™™ is that the subject-concept ˜˜man™™ can be analyzed into ˜˜animal™™
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 281

and ˜˜rational.™™ And ˜˜animal,™™ as containing ˜˜living,™™ also contains ˜˜mor-
tal.™™ Similarly, in the judgment ˜˜Caius is mortal,™™ the ground of the
attribution of the predicate ˜˜mortal™™ to the individual named ˜˜Caius™™ is
the concept ˜˜man™™ under which the singular object named ˜˜Caius™™ is
thought.15
When Kant examines judgments of the beautiful under the title of
relation, then, the question he asks himself is: what grounds the asser-
tion of the predicate ˜˜beautiful™™ in such judgments? Is it the subject S of
the judgment (for example, ˜˜this rose™™ in ˜˜this rose is beautiful™™), and if
so, what is it about this subject S that grounds the assertion of the
predicate P (˜˜beautiful™™)? Is it a character contained in the subject-
concept (in which case the aesthetic judgment would be analytic) or is
it something about the experience or perhaps even the mere intuition
falling under that concept?
That the ground of predication is what is under examination in this
third moment, is attested by passages such as this:
x11“ The judgment of taste has nothing but the form of the purposiveness of
an object (or of the way of representing it) as its ground [zum Grunde]. Every
end, if it is regarded as a ground of satisfaction, always brings an interest
with it, as the determining ground of the judgment about the object of
the pleasure. Thus no subjective end can ground the judgment of
taste. But further no representation of an objective end, i.e. of the
possibility of the object itself in accordance with principles of purposive
connection, hence no concept of the good, can determine the judgment
of taste, because it is an aesthetic judgment and not a cognitive
judgment . . . Thus nothing other than the subjective purposiveness in the
representation of an object without any end (objective or subjective) . . .
can constitute . . . the determining ground [der Bestimmungsgrund] of the
judgment of taste. (v, 221)

As we can see, what is at issue here is the Bestimmungsgrund of the
aesthetic judgment, namely the ground of the determination of the
subject with respect to the predicate, or the ground of the assertion
that the subject falls under the predicate. Since the judgment is cate-
gorical, the ground of predication is to be found in the subject S of the
judgment, ˜˜S is P.™™ Now, as we have seen under the title of quantity, the
subject of an aesthetic judgment is always singular (this rose). So
the ground of the assertion of the predicate is the intuition by way of
which the singular object is given. But according to the first moment

15
On the example cited, see A321“2/B378.
THE CRITICAL SYSTEM
282

(that of quality), the pleasure expressed in the predicate is disinterested:
it is not caused by the existence of the object, nor does it depend on a
moral interest we might take in the existence of that object. Rather, it is a
pleasure elicited by our own mental activity in apprehending the object.
In other words, it is a pleasure we derive from the form of the object
insofar as this form lends itself, when we apprehend it, to the mutually
enhancing agreement of our imagination and our understanding.
Now this feature of the object, that its form is such that apprehending
it or synthesizing it is beneficial to the mutual enhancement of our
imagination and understanding, is what Kant calls, in the text just
quoted, the ˜˜subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object,
without any purpose either subjective or objective.™™ The ground of the
predication, then, in the judgment ˜˜this rose is beautiful,™™ is the intuited
form™s disposition to elicit the mutually enhancing agreement of imagi-
nation and understanding in their apprehension of this form. The form
of the object satisfies a subjective purpose “ the agreement of the imagi-
nation and the understanding, and the pleasure thus elicited. But this
subjective purposiveness of the form does not in any way justify us in
supposing that an intention has actually presided over the creation of
this form, with a view to satisfying this purpose. So the object is formally
purposeful (its form satisfies a purpose: the mutually enhancing play of
imagination and understanding), although we have no concept at all of
how such a purpose might actually have been at work in producing this
object.
Moreover, the purposiveness of the object “ the fact that it satisfies an
immanent purpose of the human mind, that of enhancing its own
pleasurable life “ is also a purposiveness of the mind itself. For again,
what elicits pleasure is the free play and thus the mutual enhancement of
the cognitive capacities (imagination and understanding) in the appre-
hension of the object, together with the feeling that such a free play, and
the feeling it elicits, can be shared by all. The judging person™s state of
mind is therefore itself ˜˜purposive, without the representation of a
purpose.™™ The mental activity at work in apprehending the object
judged to be beautiful is accompanied by the feeling that a purpose is
satisfied by it: the purpose that the mind be precisely in the state it is in.
And yet, here again we have no concept of how such a purpose is
satisfied. Like the form of the object, the state of mind is ˜˜purposive™™
(it satisfies a purpose, that of maintaining the mind precisely in the state
it is in) without the representation of a purpose (i.e. without any deter-
minate concept of this purpose).
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 283

This twofold purposiveness “ of the object, of the mental state itself “
explains, I think, the title of the third moment of the Analytic of the
Beautiful: ˜˜Third moment of judgments of taste, according to the relation
of the purposes which in them are taken into consideration.™™ The relation
expressed in an aesthetic judgment is that of the purposiveness expressed
in the predicate to the purposiveness expressed in the subject. A pur-
posiveness is expressed in the predicate because the predicate ˜˜beautiful™™
expresses the fact that a pleasure is elicited by the universal commu-
nicability of the mutually enhancing play of the imagination and the
understanding. This purposiveness has its ground in the purposiveness
of the subject of the judgment: the ˜˜purposiveness without a purpose™™ of
the apprehended (synthesized) form of the intuited object.
If this is correct, then the judgment of taste is the culminating point of
the Copernican revolution that began with the first Critique. For the
ground of the assertion of the predicate in the judgment of taste is the
intuited form of the object, precisely insofar as it is synthesized by
the subject. So in the object, what grounds the assertion of the predicate
˜˜beautiful™™ are just those features that depend on the synthesizing
activity of the subject.
This point is confirmed if we now consider the implicit judgment
imbedded in the predicate of the judgment of taste. I suggested earlier
that the predicate ˜˜beautiful™™ might be explained in the following way:
˜˜beautiful™™ means ˜˜such that apprehending it elicits in me a pleasure such
that all judging subjects, in apprehending this same object, ought to agree
with my judgment.™™ The implicit judgment imbedded in the predicate
(˜˜all judging subjects, in apprehending this same object, ought to agree
with my judgment™™) is a categorical judgment: the ground of predication
is to be found in the subject of the judgment, ˜˜all judging subjects.™™ And
yet that ground is not to be found in the concept of a judging subject: it is
not by virtue of a character I know to belong universally to all judging
subjects that I claim that all of them ought to agree with my judgment.
Nor is the ground of the predication to be found in my empirical know-
ledge of judging subjects. Rather, the ground for attributing the predicate
˜˜ought to agree with my judgment™™ to all judging subjects (or, in Kant™s
terms, to ˜˜the whole sphere of those who judge™™), is the capacity I attribute
to all of those who judge, to experience the very same feeling I presently
experience. And my only ground for attributing to them this capacity is
the feeling itself, as I experience it.
Let me recapitulate again. I have argued that according to the moment
of ˜˜relation,™™ the ground of the assertion of the predicate ˜˜beautiful™™ is the
THE CRITICAL SYSTEM
284

˜˜purposiveness without a purpose™™ of the form of the apprehended
object. This purposiveness consists in the form™s capacity to elicit the
mutually enhancing play of imagination and understanding in the appre-
hending subject. But the form of the object elicits such a mutually enhanc-
ing play of cognitive capacities only because it is a synthesized form, a form
that is apprehended as the particular form it is only by virtue of the mental
activity of the apprehending subject. Thus what in the representation of
the object grounds the assertion of the predicate ˜˜beautiful™™ is its depen-
dence on the mental activity of the subject. I have also argued that the
implicit judgment imbedded in the predicate of the aesthetic judgment (˜˜all
judging subjects, upon apprehending this object, ought to experience the
same feeling and thus agree with my judgment™™) is grounded on the
capacity I postulate in all judging subjects (and indeed, as we shall see,
demand of them) to experience the free play of their cognitive capacities
I myself experience in apprehending the object, and thus to share my
feeling and agree with my judgment.
We will have to keep these two features in mind to understand Kant™s
view of the modality of judgments of taste, to which I now turn.


The subjective necessity of judgments of taste
The modality of a judgment of taste, says Kant, is that of necessity. But
what is ˜˜necessary™™? Is it the connection between the predicate and the
subject in the manifest judgment about the object (˜˜this rose is beauti-
ful™™)? Or is it rather the connection between the predicate and the
subject in the implicit judgment about the judging subjects (˜˜all judg-
ing Subjects, upon apprehending this same object, ought to experience
the same pleasure and thus agree with my judgment™™)? If the former,
what is said to be necessary is the connection between the object
considered in its form, and the pleasure I feel in apprehending it. If
the latter, what is said to be necessary is the connection between the
obligation implicitly assigned to all judging subjects (they ˜˜ought to
agree with my judgment™™) and these judging subjects, considered
simply as such.
I submit that Kant wants to assert the necessity of both connections.
He asserts at the outset that the relation between the object and the
satisfaction it elicits is necessary: ˜˜Of the beautiful . . . one thinks that it
has a necessary relation to satisfaction™™ (v, 237). But he then immediately
goes on to assert the necessity of the agreement of all judging subjects
with my judgment, taken as the example of a rule:
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 285

[The] necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment . . . can only be
called exemplary, i.e. a necessity of the assent of all to a judgment that is
regarded as an example of a universal rule that one cannot produce.
(v, 237)

Note that the situation here is not parallel to that of quantity. The
quantity of the manifest judgment about the object was different from
that of the implicit judgment about the judging subjects (the former was
singular, the latter universal). In contrast, here the necessity of the latter
(the implicit judgment about the judging subjects) seems to ground the
necessity of the former (the manifest judgment about the object):
because all judging subjects ought to judge as I do, the relation of the
predicate ˜˜beautiful™™ to the subject of the manifest judgment can legiti-
mately be asserted as necessary. We can understand why this is so: what
is beautiful is the object as apprehended, and being beautiful is the same
as being judged to be beautiful. To say that all judging subjects ought
necessarily to agree with my judgment is to say that the object ought
necessarily to be judged beautiful, or that the connection between the
predicate ˜˜beautiful™™ and the object is necessary.
This still does not tell us, however, how we should understand this
modality of necessity. Is the necessity of the connection between ˜˜all
judging subjects™™ and ˜˜ought to agree with my judgment™™ to be under-
stood on the model of the subjective necessity of judgments of experience
(because I claim objective validity for my judgment, I claim that all judg-
ing subjects ought to agree with my judgment)? Or is it to be understood
on the model of a moral imperative: ˜˜All rational beings ought to act in
such and such a way™™ (under the categorical imperative of morality)?
Kant™s response, I suggest, is that both models are relevant. Indeed,
both serve to clarify the crucial notion of a sensus communis on which Kant
will later base his deduction of judgments of taste, namely his justifica-
tion of their claim to (subjective) universality and necessity.
Already in x20 of the fourth moment, Kant states that the subjective
necessity of the judgment of taste is affirmed only under the condition
that there be a common sense, Gemeinsinn. By ˜˜common sense™™ he means
˜˜not any external sense, but rather the effect of the free play of our
cognitive powers™™ (x20, v, 238), that is to say, the feeling that we have of
this free play and of its universal communicability. This is in direct
continuity with what was said in the first two moments of the Analytic
of the Beautiful. As we saw, according to the first moment, the aesthetic
pleasure is a disinterested pleasure elicited in the mind by its own activity
THE CRITICAL SYSTEM
286

in apprehending the object. According to the second moment, this
activity is one of ˜˜free play™™ of imagination and understanding and the
pleasure expressed by the predicate ˜˜beautiful™™ is both a first-order
pleasure taken in this free play, and a second-order pleasure in the
universal communicability of the feeling thus elicited. The agreement
of imagination and understanding in cognition and the universal com-
municability of that agreement provide an argument for at least suppos-
ing the possibility of a similar universal communicability of the state of
mind in the free play of imagination and understanding, and thus a
sensus communis aestheticus as the ground for the aesthetic pleasure
expressed in the predicate ˜˜beautiful.™™ In this context, the obligation
assigned to ˜˜all judging subjects™™ to agree with my judgment is not
analogous to a moral obligation. Rather, it is analogous to the obligation
to submit oneself to the norm of truth (the rule-governed agreement
between imagination and understanding) in cognitive judgments. And
indeed, it is by drawing on the a priori agreement of imagination and
understanding in cognition that Kant initially justifies the supposition of
a common sense as the ground of aesthetic judgments:
One will thus with good reason be able to assume a common sense [so
wird dieser mit Grunde angenommen werden konnen], and without appealing
¨
to psychological observations, but rather as the necessary condition of
the universal communicability of our cognition, which is assumed in
every logic and every principle of cognitions that is not sceptical. (v, 239)

But there is something surprising about this justification. For as we
saw in discussing the second moment, what grounds the subjective
universality and thus also the subjective necessity of cognitive judgments
in the first Critique is not the free agreement of imagination and under-
standing, but their agreement for the production of concepts, that is to
say, according to the rules imposed by the understanding. The fact that
there is such an agreement (not free, but ruled by the understanding)
may perhaps give us reason to believe in the possibility of a similar
agreement even without a concept. But that does not give us sufficient
grounds for affirming that such an agreement exists, and still less that it
necessarily exists. Indeed Kant is more cautious when he writes:
This indeterminate norm of a common sense is really presupposed by
us: our presumption in making judgments of taste proves that. Whether
there is in fact such a common sense, as a constitutive principle of the
possibility of experience, or whether a yet higher principle of reason
only makes it into a regulative principle for us first to produce a common
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 287

sense in ourselves for higher ends, thus whether taste is an original and
natural faculty, or only the idea of one that is yet to be acquired and is
artificial, so that a judgment of taste, with its requirement [Zumuthung] of
a universal assent, is in fact only a demand of reason to produce such
unanimity in the manner of sensing, and whether the ought, i.e. the
objective necessity of the convergence of everyone™s feeling with that of
each, signifies only the possibility of such agreement, and the judgment
of taste only provides an example of the application of this principle “
this we neither want nor are able yet to investigate here; for now we have
only to resolve the faculty of taste into its elements and to unite them
ultimately in the idea of a common sense. (v, 239“40)

As we can see, here the model for the subjective necessity of the
judgment of taste is no longer the claim to necessary agreement proper
to a judgment of experience, but rather the demand of moral duty. The
a priori agreement of imagination and understanding in cognition
allows us only to accept as possible the ˜˜common sense™™ which would
ground aesthetic judgment; but the request of a universal agreement of
rational agents under the moral law now appears to be a ground to
demand that we cultivate in ourselves the capacity to develop a ˜˜com-
mon sense.™™ As we saw, already in the course of the second moment Kant
maintained that we postulate the ˜˜universal voice™™ under which we
formulate a judgment of taste (cf. v, 216).
Kant does not always clearly distinguish between the mere possibility
of an agreement of everyone with my own evaluation, based on the free
play of imagination and understanding, and the postulated existence of
this agreement, as a capacity which each judging subject has an obliga-
tion to develop in himself and demand of others. But it is important to
keep this distinction in mind in order to free Kant of the burden of an all
too evident objection, which we have already encountered in our exam-
ination of the second moment: if the sensus communis, understood gen-
erically as the universally communicable agreement of imagination and
understanding, is the common ground of cognitive judgments and
aesthetic judgments, why is every cognitive judgment not the occasion
of aesthetic pleasure? On the other hand, if there is merely a kinship, not
a generic identity, between the sensus communis that grounds judgments
of taste (a universally communicable free play and mutual enhancement
of imagination and understanding in apprehending the object and
reflecting upon it, known by feeling) and the sensus communis that
grounds judgments in empirical cognition (a universally communicable
agreement of imagination and understanding in apprehending the
THE CRITICAL SYSTEM
288

object and reflecting upon it, known by virtue of the concepts that
express it, and thus not ˜˜free,™™ but rule governed), why would the latter
be a sufficient ground for admitting the existence of the former? This
objection falls if Kant™s argument for the existence of a sensus communis
grounding aesthetic judgments has the two distinct steps mentioned
above: (1) the universal communicability of the state of mind in cognition
shows that it is possible that the agreement of the imagination and the
understanding, even when it is not ruled and reflected by concepts
(when it is a ˜˜free play™™ eliciting a feeling of pleasure), be universally
communicable; (2) we demand that this agreement should be universally
communicable, and because we demand it, we make it ˜˜as if a duty™™ to
bring it about in ourselves and in others.
These two steps are expressed in the form of a question in the text
quoted above: should we consider the sensus communis as a natural
capacity, or rather as the object of a higher demand of reason that we
develop this capacity in ourselves and in others? The two steps will be
confirmed and amplified in the deduction of the judgment of taste
(although again somewhat ambiguously). In the very short paragraph
entitled ˜˜Deduction of the Judgment of Taste™™ (x38), Kant asserts again that
the claim to subjective universality and necessity of our judgments of taste
has the same ground as the claim to subjective universality and necessity of
judgments of empirical cognition, justified in the first Critique. This is the
first step in the two-step argument summarized above. In x40, Kant adds:

If one was allowed to assume that the mere universal communicability of
his feeling must in itself already involve an interest for us (which, how-
ever, one is not justified in inferring from the constitution of a merely
reflective power of judgment), then one would be able to explain how it
is that the feeling in the judgment of taste is required of everyone as if it
were a duty [ gleichsam als Pflicht jedermann zugemutet werde]. (v, 296)

Here is how I understand this passage: by itself, the ˜˜merely reflective™™
use of the power of judgment, namely the use in which the play of
imagination and understanding does not lead to a concept, would not
suffice to explain why we demand of everyone, as if it were a duty, that
they share our pleasure in the object we judge to be beautiful. Something
else is needed in order to explain this demand, something that would
make the sensus communis not only a Gemeinsinn (a common sense) but a
gemeinschaftlicher Sinn: a sense by virtue of which we take ourselves to
belong to a community of judging subjects. This something else is an
interest which we take not in the object of the judgment (that possibility
ANALYTIC OF THE BEAUTIFUL 289

has been excluded in the course of the first moment), but in the very fact
of the universal communicability of the judgment, that is to say in the
very fact that through this shared judgment we progress toward a com-
munity of judging subjects.
Indeed in the next two sections Kant sets about explaining successively
(1) that there is an empirical interest attached to the judgment of taste,
that of developing sociability in ourselves; and (2) that there is an ˜˜intel-
lectual™™ interest (an interest we have insofar as we are rational) in
recognizing in nature and in ourselves the sensible sign of a common
supersensible ground. In recognizing this supersensible ground, it is our
own moral nature that we also recognize, and this makes the ˜˜ought™™ in
˜˜all judging subjects ought to agree with my judgment™™ closer to a moral
˜˜ought™™ than to the obligation assigned to cognitive subjects, to yield to the
norms of truth in empirical judgments.
There is a caveat here. Only the beautiful in nature can give rise to
such an intellectual interest. For only judgments about nature serve the
interest of morality by pointing to the supersensible ground common to
nature and to us. As for the beautiful in art, at most it serves the interest
we have in the development of our natural tendency toward sociability,
which is an empirical interest, grounded in the empirical characteristics
of humanity as a natural species (v, 296“7). Does this mean that only
judgments of beauty in nature have the modality of necessity Kant tries
to justify in his deduction of judgments of taste? This would be sur-
prising, for all the examples Kant gives to illustrate the demand of a
universal agreement with our judgments of taste concern the beautiful
in art (see xx32“3, v, 281“5). How are we to understand this apparent
inconsistency? I think there are two answers.
The first can be found in the relation between sensus communis and
Aufkla ¨rung. Kant emphatically endorses the three mottos he attributes to
Aufkla ¨rung (Enlightenment): to think for oneself, to think by putting one-
self in the position of all other human beings, to think always consistently
(see v, 294). Now, the universal communicability of judgments of taste,
whether they apply to nature or to art, makes them uniquely apt to satisfy
the first two maxims of the Aufkla ¨rung. And in their case, the third maxim is
irrelevant: any singular aesthetic judgment carries its own exemplary norm
and thus is in no need of ˜˜consistency™™ with other judgments. In short, in
the case of aesthetic judgments the mere possibility of universal com-
municability of a feeling becomes the normative necessity of a duty to
create the conditions of such universal communicability. And this applies
to our experience of beauty in art just as much as in nature.
THE CRITICAL SYSTEM
290

The second answer lies in Kant™s conception of genius as a state of mind
in which ˜˜nature gives the rule to art™™ (v, 307). Relating artistic creation to
genius defined in this way means giving judgments of taste applied to
works of art their full share in the relation to the supersensible which is the
ground of the subjective universality and necessity of aesthetic judgments
applied to nature. This point is confirmed in the dialectic of the critique of
taste, where Kant describes genius as the ˜˜faculty of aesthetic ideas™™ (v,
344). An aesthetic idea, he says, is a sensible presentation of the super-
sensible, of which we neither have nor can have any determinate concept.
Despite Kant™s very Rousseauian suspicion of art and its relation to the
ends of self-love, it remains that the beautiful in art, insofar as art is the
creation of genius, lends itself to the same demand for the universal and
necessary agreement of all judging subjects, as the beautiful in nature.
Now we may well find that this is too much. To have to suppose a
consciousness of the supersensible ground common to the object and to
ourselves, as the ground of the subjective universality and necessity of
the aesthetic judgment, is more than most of us can swallow. However,
Kant™s analysis of the two judgments present in the judgment of taste “
the manifest judgment about the object, the implicit judgment about the
judging subjects “ may lend itself to a lighter reading. One might accept
the striking combination of a normative judgment about the judging
subjects (expressed in the predicate of the judgment of taste as I have
proposed to develop it) and a descriptive judgement about the object
considered in its form (expressed in the manifest judgment of taste, ˜˜this
X is beautiful™™), while rejecting Kant™s appeal to the supersensible as the
ultimate ground of the judgments of taste. One would then no longer
have any reason to grant any privileged status to the beautiful in nature
over the beautiful in art, since the main reason for that privilege seems to
be that nature, not human artefact, is a direct manifestation of the
supersensible that grounds aesthetic experience. In accounting for the
specific features of aesthetic experience and judgment of taste one may
still maintain that the mere possibility of universally sharing aesthetic
pleasure becomes a normative necessity, an obligation made to all
human beings to take their part in the common effort to constitute
humanity as a community of judging subjects, beyond the particular
limitations of each historically and biographically determined sensing,
feeling, emotional access to the world of sensory objects. This is, I think,
the lasting legacy of Kant™s view.
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INDEX OF CITATIONS




Critique of pure reason B113: 196
A90/B123: 37
Bviii: 98
A111: 216“19
Bxii: 61
B128: 23, 191, 192, 201
Bxiii: 61
n. 23, 202
B5: 149
B129: 28
B15/16: 51
B131: 33 n. 24
B39“40: 49
B134n: 22
A25/B39: 36 n. 28
B136n: 34 n. 25
A32/B48: 36 n. 28
B137: 31, 34 n. 25
A51/B76: 93
B140: 34 n. 25
A52/B76: 89
B144“5: 32
A53/B77: 90
B152: 41, 53
A54/B78: 90
B159: 32
A66/B91: 42
B160: 34, 36 n. 27, 68
A68/B93: 19 n. 5, 92
B160n: 68
A69/B94: 18, 95, 96
B161: 37
A70/B95: 19 n. 5
B161n: 34, 35
A72/B97: 217
B167“8: 29
A73/B98: 188, 217
A142/B182: 36 n. 28, 44
A74/B100: 99
A144/B183: 59, 61, 104 n. 32
A76/B102: 21
A158/B197: 219
A77/B102: 101
A164/B205: 51
A78/B103: 102
A165/B206: 49
A78/B104: 103, 191, 192
A169/B211: 48
A79/B104“5: 94, 104
A171/B212: 50
A79/B105: 21, 22
A189: 58, 158
A80/B106: 105
A189“95/B234“9: 178“9
B112: 194

297
INDEX OF CITATIONS
298

A192“3/B237“8: 163 205: 268
A194“5/B239“40: 179“80 215: 272, 273
A195/B240: 135 n. 26 217: 275
A195“6/B240“1: 60 221: 281
A197/B242“3: 163 231: 269
A198/B243: 167 237: 284“5
A198“201/B243“6: 180“1 238: 285
A199“200/B244“5: 174“5 239: 286
A201“2/B246“7: 181“2 239“40: 286“7
A213/B260: 206 296: 288
A218/B265: 219 307: 290
A247/B303: 83 344: 290
B232: 158 n. 20
Critique of the Power of Judgment,
B232“4: 182“3
First Introduction,
B256: 198
AAxx
B257: 201 n. 23
209: 230
A262/B318: 224
211: 231
A264/B320: 195
212“13: 231“2
A266/B322: 226
A267/B323: 71 n. 15, 213 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals,
A267“8/B323“4: 227“8 AAiv
A269/B325: 224, 230 397“400: 247
A292/B348: 36 n. 28, 73 402: 241
A429/B457n: 36 n. 28 404: 238
B457n: 36 415: 244,
A572/B600: 211, 216 415“16: 240
A572/B600n: 230 416: 245
A574/B601: 216 417: 241 n. 7
A581/B609: 211 n. 1, 221 418: 243 n. 10
A581“2/B609“10: 126 n. 13 420“1: 250“1
A582/B610: 220, 221 421: 236, 250, 252
A663/B681: 58 423: 258, 258 n. 22
A766/B794: 60 424: 257 n. 21
429: 236, 259 n. 23
Other texts 434: 236
436: 239 n. 4
Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative
Magnitude into Philosophy, AAii Inaugural Dissertation, AAii
202“4: 84 393: 91, 224
202: 130
Ja
¨sche Logic, AAix
203: 139
51: 126 n. 13, 137
Critique of Practical Reason, AAv 91: 226
9n: 249, 268“9 99: 214“15
19: 253, 101: 226
20: 253 n. 16, 254 105“6: 152
27: 255 106: 153
68: 239 n. 5 108: 193
120: 270 121: 226
129: 154
Critique of the Power of
139: 227
Judgment, AAv
Letters, AAx
204: 268
INDEX OF CITATIONS 299

Letter to Herz, February 1772 223: 28
131: 23
˜˜On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic
Metaphysics of Morals, AAvi Motives,™™ AAviii
227: 262 425: 260
230: 262 426: 260
Metaphysik-Herder, AAxxviii-1 The Only Possible Argument in Support of a
Demonstration of the Existence of God,
12: 129
AAii
New Elucidation of the First Principles of
83“4: 126 n. 13
Metaphysical Cognition, AAi
Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, AAiv
391: 120
x18“20: 24“5
392: 122
x38: 71
393: 121, 123
394: 125, 257: 84, 149
412“13: 127 n. 14 304: 156 n. 17
On a Discovery whereby any New Critique of Reflections, AAxviii
Pure Reason is to be made superfluous by 6289: 228“9
an earlier one, AAviii
Reflections, AAxxvii
193“4: 138 n. 30
3753: 130
202: 75
¨
˜˜Uber Kastners Abhandlungen,™™ AAxx
¨
202“3: 74
68 n. 8, 76 n. 24
203: 75
INDEX OF SUBJECTS




aesthetic judgment, 12: and (empirical) Aristotle, 63 n. 25, 98, 101; see also
cognitive judgments, 266, 276“8, Newtonian science, and
287“8; modality (necessity) of, Aristotelianism; logic
284“7; relation in, 281“2, 283; Arnauld, Antoine and Nicole, Pierre, 89
quality of, 267 n. 2, 267“8; quantity Aufklarung; see Enlightenment
¨
of, 272“3; supersensible ground of,
289, 290; and synthesis, 283, 284; Bacon, Francis, 60“1
universal communicability of, 271, beauty, predicate of, 267, 268, 272, 283;
272“4, 275“7, 277“9, 283, 284“9; see also aesthetic judgment
See also community, of judging Beck, Lewis White, 160 n. 24
subjects; pleasure, aesthetic; sensus Berkeley, George, 163
communis body, our own, 206
Allison, Henry, 5, 17, 19, 20, 26, 30, 31, 31 Brandom, Robert, 208 n. 33
n. 22, 34, 36, 36 n. 27, 37, 144, Brandt, Reinhard, 94 n. 24
144 n. 1, 170, 175“176 n. 38, 274 n. 11 Buchdahl, Gerd, 144, 170, 175“176 n. 38,
aggregate and quantum, 50; see also 233 n. 24
number; quantity
Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection, capacity to judge (Vermogen zu urteilen),
¨
194“6, 197, 204 n. 26, 212“13, 223“8, 18 n. 2, 18 n. 3, 18“20, 19 n. 5, 95“6,
233; see also logic, and ontology (or 186; see also understanding
rationalist metaphysics) Cassirer, Ernst, 62“3, 66 n. 5, 69, 116,
analysis, 21, 192; see also synthesis and 116 n. 52
analysis categories, 42“3: application of, 23, 37;
analytic and synthetic unity, 22 concepts of the unity of synthesis, 42,
appearance, affinity of, 230 43; and logical functions/forms of
apperception, 30“1: unity of, 36, 218; judgment, 5, 20“1, 30“1, 42, 105“6;
objective unity of, 131 original acquisition of, 28“9, 40“1, 42;
apprehension; see synthesis two roles of, 24“6, 42“3; universal

300
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 301

representation of synthesis, 25, 103“4, reciprocal; see community; of
192; see also cause and effect; succession, 132“3, 159, 161“3, 165“6;
community; concept, pure, of the see also judgment, determinative and
understanding reflective; reason (ratio, Grund),
cause and effect, 25, 58“62, 125, 134, determining; reason (ratio, Grund),
202, 207: schema of, 59, 104 n. 32; principle of sufficient (determining)
temporal relation of, 173; strict duties: narrow and wide, 258, 259 n. 23;
universality of a rule, 149“51, 150 perfect and imperfect, 258, 259 n. 23
n. 12, 154“5; see also experience,
analogies of; Hume, ˜˜Hume™s Eberhard, 64 n. 1
problem™™; reason (ratio, Grund) Enlightenment (Aufklarung), 289
¨
change, 54, 137 epigenesis, 29, 29 n. 20; see also categories,
Cohen, Hermann, 22, 51, 52, 109“10 original acquisition of; original
common sense; see sensus communis acquisition
community, 203“4, 207: and disjunctive experience, analogies of, 53“4, 54“6, 58“9,
judgment, 57“8, 193“8, 195 n. 16, 201 127 n. 14, 199: argument of the
n. 23; of judging subjects, 187, 206“7, Second Analogy, 158“83; second
270, 271; reciprocal determination, analogy of, 9“10, 55 n. 15, 118, 119,
56“7, 202; see also experience, third 127 n. 14, 132“5, 136; third analogy
analogy of of, 10, 127 n. 14, 198“204, 199 n. 21
comparison, 26“8, 225: and logical form of
judgment, 28 Fichant, Michel, 5, 65, 67, 68 n. 8, 71, 73,
complete determination, principle of, 10, 75, 76, 77
126“7, 211“12, 216“19, 219 n. 10 Fichte, J. G., 37, 65, 66
concept, 86, 93, 95, 187: in aesthetic form: of intuition, 34, 89, 205; and formal
judgment, 277; formation of, 62“3, intuitions, 34“6, 67“72, 71 n. 15; and
187; mathematical, 23, 63, 102; pure, matter, 35, 71 n. 15, 72, 212, 213 n. 6,
of the understanding, 87; see also 226“8; see also judgment, logical forms
categories of; space and time
conscience, common moral, 238, 247“8, Frankfurt, Harry, 253
Frede, Michael and Kruger, Lorenz, 45
¨
249, 261
Constant, Benjamin, 260“1 freedom; see will, freedom of
continuity; see magnitudes, continuous; Frege, Gottlob, 44, 112 n. 45, 112“16,
space and time, as continuous 113 n. 48
magnitudes Friedman, Michael, 5, 40, 43, 45, 48, 50,
contradiction, in conception and in 51, 52, 55, 59, 116 n. 52, 141, 144,
will, 257 n. 21, 257“61, 258 n. 22, 170“1, 231 n. 21
263 n. 26, 264 function; see judgment, forms and
Copernican revolution, 283 functions of
counsel of prudence; see rule, of skill and
counsel of prudence genius, 290
Crusius, Christian August, 127, 129 n. 17 genus (genera) and species, 57“8, 197
Ginsborg, Hannah, 278, 279 n. 14
deduction: metaphysical, 22; see also God, 125“6, 139“40, 222 n. 12, 262; see also
transcendental deduction transcendental ideal
´
Descartes, Rene, 120 n. 5, 163 Grier, Michelle, 212 n. 4, 213 n. 5,
desire, faculty of, 249“50, 251, 268 219 n. 10
determination, 214“16: of predicate or of Guyer, Paul, 146, 167 n. 32, 168 n. 33,
subject with respect to predicate, 120; 274 n. 11: translation with Allen
principle of complete; see complete Wood, 88 n. 13, 167 n. 32, 213 n. 5,
determination, principle of; 215 n. 8
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
302

happiness, 243, 243 n. 10 perception and of experience, 24“5,
Harman, Gilbert, 89 n. 14 156“7, 276; power of (Urteilskraft), 18,
Hegel, G. W. F., 33 n. 24, 37, 107“9, 19 n. 5, 95; and proposition, 119 n. 3;
207“8, 263, 263 n. 26, 270, and syllogism, 95, 98, 154, 166, 187,
270 n. 8 188“90; table of, 96“100, 107, 107“8,
Heidegger, Martin, 69, 111“12 187“91, 266 (see also modality; quality;
Hill, Thomas E., 241 n. 7 quantity; relation); of taste; see
human standpoint, 3“4, 10, 12, 205“7: of aesthetic judgment; see also capacity to
agent and of spectator, 238“9 judge
Hume, David, 143 n. 1, 147“8, 148“149 n. 9, Jungius, Joachim
163: ˜˜Hume™s problem,™™ 84, 130,
Kastner, 64 n. 1
¨
149“51, 157
Korsgaard, Christine, 257 n. 21, 259 n. 24
identification, 165“6; see also synthesis, of Kruger, Lorenz; see Frede, Michael and
¨
recognition Kruger, Lorenz
¨
imagination, 74, 276: free play of with
`
understanding, 268, 277, 278, 282“3; Lachieze-Rey, Pierre, 33 n. 24, 65
in perception, 133, 161 n. 25; see also language, 260“1; see also judgment, and
space and time, as ens imaginarium; language
synthesis law: juridical, 259“63, 263 n. 26; moral
imperative: and aesthetic judgment, (practical), 139“40, 236“7, 248, 250“1,
285“9; categorical, 236, 241, 252“4 (see also imperative, categorical);
256“7 (see also contradiction, in and freedom, 129 n. 17, 139
´
conception and in will); hypothetical, Lebrun, Gerard, 126 n. 13
241 n. 7, 241“6, 242 n. 9“243 n. 9, Leibniz, G. W. (Leibnizian philosophy), 85,
250, 252, 254, 254 n. 18; see also 99, 117, 127, 194, 197, 215, 216, 225
rule, of skill and counsel of life, 268“9, 269 n. 6, 270“1
prudence Locke, John, 163
imputation and retribution, 262“3 logic, 18 n. 2, 84, 89“91, 112“16, 185, 204:
induction, 58“62 general and particular, 90, 91 n. 18;
intuition, 85“6, 86 n. 9, 165 n. 30: and ontology (or rationalist
determination of, 215“16; form of ; see metaphysics), 84, 90“1, 109, 121, 136,
form, of intuition 194“6 (see also ontology); and the
principle of sufficient reason, 140“1;
judgment: aesthetic; see aesthetic judgment; pure and applied, 90; transcendental,
analytic and synthetic, 84 n. 5; 91, 101, 116, 217
categorical, 188, 246 (see also relation, Lovejoy, Arthur, 164
of judgment); determinative and
reflective, 18, 230, 231 n. 21, 234, 237, McDowell, John, 141 n. 41
237“238 n. 3, 288; disjunctive, 98“9, MacFarlane, John, 89 n. 14
189“90, 190 n. 10, 193, 203, 217 magnitude, continuous, 48“51: discrete,
(see also reflection; relation, of 50; extensive and intensive, 49
judgment; community); forms and mathematics, 49, 85, 185; see also concept,
functions of, 5, 8, 19 n. 5, 20“1, 41, 89, mathematical
92“4, 187, 187 n. 6, 232, 239“40, 266, maxim, 252“5
267; hypothetical, 84 n. 5, 98, 115, measurement, 44, 45“6
149“51, 150“1, 151“4, 189, 242, 242 metaphysics, 85, 102; see also ontology
n. 9, 243 (see also modus ponens); modality, of judgment, 99, 114, 190“1:
infinite, 188, 206, 217“18; and schemata of, 173
language, 94, 94 n. 24; moral, 236“40, modus ponens, 84, 130, 150, 151 n. 13, 174:
249 (see also imperative; law, moral); of and modus tollens, 124 n. 10, 153
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 303

Newtonian science, 5, 7, 43, 58, 109“10, regulative use of, 233“4 (see also
141, 171, 185: and Aristotelianism, transcendental ideal); theoretical and
52“3, 54, 55, 55 n. 14, 55 n. 15, 62“3; practical use of, 233“4, 239, 263
Third Law of Motion and universal (see also imperative; judgment,
gravitation, 56“7, 171 moral)
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 263, 263 n. 26 recognition; see synthesis, of recognition
noumenon, and phenomenon, 139 reflection, 41, 42, 223“4, 225“6: concepts
number, 43“5, 50“1; see also magnitude; of, 223“5 (see also Amphiboly of the
measurement; quantity Concepts of Reflection); and
schematism, 232; see also judgment,
object, 31“2 determinate and reflective
O™Neill, Onora, 257 n. 21 Reich, Klaus, 23
ontology, 82“3; see also logic, and ontology relation, in judgment, 97“9, 188“90, 226
original acquisition, 28, 29 n. 20; see also n. 16, 280“1
categories, original acquisition of right; see law, juridical
rule: of action; see maxim; of apprehension,
Parsons, Charles, 86 n. 9 26; and condition, 189“90; of skill and
permanence, 136 n. 27; see also experience, counsel of prudence (precept), 243“6,
analogies of; simultaneity and 254, 254 n. 18; of synthesis, a priori
succession and empirical, 26“7
pleasure, 268“71, 270 n. 7: aesthetic
(disinterested), 268, 269“71, 273“6, schema, 26“7, 232: see also cause and effect,
schema of
278“80, 282, 284
possibility, 219“20, 227; see also modality Schopenhauer, Arthur, 134
principle: practical, 252; of sufficient Schulthess, Peter, 93 n. 22, 116 n. 52
(determining) reason; see reason, Sedgwick, Sally, 17, 22, 28, 37
principle of sufficient (determining); Sellars, Wilfrid, 38
see also imperative; law, moral; sensibility, 88“9: mere formal ground of,
maxim 70; and understanding, 68 n. 8; see also
proposition; see judgment intuition; space and time
sensus communis, 197, 285“9
quality, of judgment, 96“7, 188 simultaneity and succession, 55“8, 127, 160
quantity, of judgment, 96“7, 188: order of n. 24, 202: phenomenology of, 132“3,
list in table of categories and table of 159“60, 200, 203 n. 25; see also
judgment forms, 45“6; and quantum, experience, analogies of; cause and
76, 76 n. 24; schema of, 44, 45; see also effect; community
number, magnitude Sluga, Hans D., 113 n. 46
space and time, 6, 31“2, 33, 34, 54, 63, 66,
Rawls, John, 259 n. 24 86: and abstraction, 74“5; as
reality, and negation, 220 continuous magnitudes, 48“51; as ens
reason (ratio, Grund), 118 n. 2, 119: imaginarium, 73“6; infinity of, 47“8,
antecedently and consequently 76“7; original acquisition of the
determining, 120“1, 124 n. 10, representation of, 70; see also form,
136, 137; determining , 119“21; and formal intuitions, of intuition;
essendi, fiendi, existendi, cognoscendi, intuition
117, 120, 135“6, 139; principle of Spinoza, Benedict, 125
sufficient (determining), 8“9, 83, 123, Strawson, Peter F., 7“8, 113 n. 47, 141,
126“7, 130“1, 140; real and logical, 145, 164“5, 176“7
129 n. 17, 129“30 subjective purposiveness, 282“3
reason (Vernunft), 137: illusions of, 10, substances, permanence of, 53“4: universal
212, 222 (see also transcendental ideal); interaction of, 55“8
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
304

subsumption, 93, 95: and subordination, transcendental ideal, 212 n. 3, 235:
188, 205; see also judgment, and reasoning of, 212, 212 n. 4; totum
syllogism realitatis (unlimited whole of reality),
succession: principle of, 127, 130; and ens realissimum, 212, 219“23, 222
subjective and objective, 158“64; n. 12, 227“9, 233“4
see also simultaneity and succession
sufficient reason, principle of; see reason, understanding, 18, 19“20, 102, 186:
principle of sufficient (determining) distributive use of, 220; free play of
syllogism; see judgment with imagination; see imagination, free
synthesis, 5, 7, 42, 77, 86, 101, 101 n. 30: play of (with understanding); logical
and analysis, 21“3, 84“5, 101, 191“2; use of, 91“6, 224; pre-discursive,
of apprehension, 159, 161“3; 68“9; real use of, 91“2; see also capacity
figurative (synthesis speciosa), 32, 34“5, to judge; synthesis
47, 66, 75 (see also form, and formal
intuitions); mathematical and Waxman, Wayne, 29 n. 20, 33 n. 24
dynamical, 103; pre-discursive, 26, 69; Wiggins, David, 140 n. 38
of recognition will, 242, 250: contradiction in; see
system, 187, 206“7, 232, 234 contradiction, in conception and in will;
freedom of, 127“8, 138“9, 247 n. 13,

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