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to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end [ . . . ].™
° James Burnett, Lord Monboddo, Antient Metaphysics,  vols. (Edinburgh,
±··“), vol. ©, p. ±µ.
± Jacobi, preface, David Hume on Faith or Idealism and Realism: A Dialogue, ±±µ,
Main Philosophical Writings, p. µ·°.
 Burnett, Antient Metaphysics, vol. © , p. vii.
 Ibid., p. vi.
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, eds. James Engell and Walter
Jackson Bate,  vols. (Princeton University Press, ±), vol. © , pp. ±±“.
µ Charles and Mary Lamb, Letters, vol. ©, p. ±.
 William Wordsworth, The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, eds. W. J. B.
Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser,  vols. (Oxford University Press, ±·),
vol. ©© ©, p. ·±.
· Ibid., p. ·±.
 Isaiah Berlin, preface, The Mind of the European Romantics, by H. G. Schenk
(Oxford University Press, ±·), p. xv.
 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times
(London, ±·±±), vol. ©, p. °·.
° Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge University Press,
±), p. ·.
± See Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns (Princeton University Press, ±), p. ±±: According
to Plato™s Timaeus, the divine creator came to a universe already existent,
but in chaos. Thus, ˜¬nding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving
in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order,
considering that this was in every way better than the other™.
 Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Genius, ed. Bernard Fabian (Munich, ±),
p. ·.
 Cooper, Characteristics, vol. ©, pp. ±“·.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. °.
µ William Hazlitt, The Complete Works of William Hazlitt, ed. P. P. Howe, ± vols.
(London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd, ±°“), vol. © , p. .
 Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. © , p. .
± Notes to pages “±
· Geoffrey H. Hartman, Saving the Text (The Johns Hopkins University Press,
±±), p. .
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©© , p. ±.
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, ed. John Beer (Princeton Univer-
sity Press, ±µ), pp. µ“°.
° M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic
Literature (Oxford University Press, ±·±), p. ±.
± Mark Kipperman, Beyond Enchantment (University of Pennsylvania Press,
±), p. ±. For a thorough examination of Romantic myths of creation,
see Warren Stevenson™s Divine Analogy (Universit¨ t Salzburg, ±·).
a
 William James, Pragmatism (Longmans, Green and Co., Inc., ±°·),
pp. µ“·.
 Ibid., pp. µ“µ.
 See John Dewey, Experience and Nature ±µ (La falle: Open Court, ±µ),
p. µ±.
µ Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ±±.
 See Jonathan Bate, ˜The Literature of Power: Coleridge and De Quincey™,
Coleridge™s Visionary Languages: Essays in Honour of J. B. Beer, eds. Tim Fulford
and Morton D. Paley (D. S. Brewer, ±), p. ±.
· Thomas De Quincey, The Collected Writings of Thomas De Quincey, ed. David
Masson (Edinburgh, ±“°), vol.  , p. .
 Ibid., vol.  ©, p. .
 Percy Bysshe Shelley, Shelley™s Poetry and Prose, eds. Donald H. Reiman and
Sharon B. Powers (Norton, ±··), p. .
µ° Tilottama Rajan, The Supplement of Reading: Figures of Understanding in Romantic
Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, ±°), p. ±.
µ± Shelley, Poetry and Prose, p. .
µ Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism
(University of Chicago Press, ±), pp. , .
µ Friedrich Schlegel, ˜Athen¨ um Fragments™, The Origins of Modern Critical
a
Thought: German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism from Lessing to Hegel, ed. David
Simpson (Cambridge University Press, ±), p. ±µ; par. .
µ Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ±µ.
µµ Ibid., p. ±°.
µ Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. ±°.
µ· Tom Paulin, The Day-Star of Liberty: William Hazlitt™s Radical Style (Faber and
Faber, ±), p. .
µ I coin the term ˜will to value™, albeit with a slightly different emphasis for
the present purpose, from Laurence Lockridge. See The Ethics of Romanticism
(Cambridge University Press, ±), p. : ˜What I call a “will to value” is
the dominant ethical tendency in Romantic writers; it is their response to
a moment in history when concepts of value are seen to be reduced or
denuded.™
µ Richard Elridge, Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanti-
cism (University of Chicago Press, ±·), p. ·.
Notes to pages ±“± ±
° Wheeler, Romanticism, Pragmatism and Deconstruction, p. µ.
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. .
 Ibid., p. °.
 Ibid., p. ±.
 Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German
Literary Theory (Routledge, ±·), p. ·±.
µ Ibid., p. .
 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute ±·,
trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: SUNY, ±), p. ±·.
· Rorty, Mirror, pp. °“±.
 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Beacon Press, ±), p. .
 Stanley Cavell, foreword, Must We Mean What We Say? pp. xxiii, xxvi.
·° Ibid., pp. , µ.
·± Jacobi, Main Philosophical Writings, p. µµ.
· George di Giovanni, introduction, Main Philosophical Writings, by Friedrich
Jacobi, p. ±µ±.
· Marjorie Levinson, introduction, Rethinking Historicism, by Marjorie
Levinson, Jerome McGann, Paul Hamilton and Marilyn Butler (Basil
Blackwell, ±), pp. , ±.
· Alan Lui, ˜Local Transcendence: Cultural Criticism, Postmodernism, and
the Romanticism of Detail™, Representations  (±°), ±.
·µ See Jean-Fran¸ ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, ±·, trans. Geoff
c
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester University Press, ±),
pp. °“±. Lyotard claims that ˜the little narrative [petit r´cit] remains the
e
quintessential form of imaginative invention™, and that ˜it is now dissention
that must be emphasized. Consensus is a horizon that is never reached.™ In
her afterword to The Supplement of Reading, Rajan concludes that ˜demysti¬-
cation is not the ultimate horizon of our reading but must itself be inscribed
in the intertextual processes generated by the poem [ . . . ]™ (p. µ±). For a
critique of Jerome McGann and Paul de Man as trading, respectively, on an
explicit and a covert notion of the ˜empirical sublime™, see Frances Ferguson,
Solitude and the Sublime (Routledge, ±), ch. ·.
· Rorty, Contingency, p. µ·.
·· David Simpson, Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt Against Theory (Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, ±), p. .
· Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? p. ·.
· Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe,
eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
±), p. ±µ; par. ·.
° Ibid., p. ; par. µ.
± Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. °.
 John Keats, The Letters of John Keats ±±“±± , ed. Hyder Edward Rollins, 
vols. (Cambridge University Press, ±µ), vol. ©, p. ·.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±.
 Ibid., p. 
° Notes to pages ± “
µ Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Friend, ed. Barbara E. Rooke,  vols. (Princeton
University Press, ±), vol. ©, p. µ±.
 David Vallins discusses the same passage in Coleridge and the Psychology of
Romanticism (Macmillan, °°°), p. . He notes how it ˜involves the paradox
that while thought is progressing it is also limited “ that it is in a continuous
tension with the ¬xed forms of knowledge™.
· Coleridge, The Friend, vol. ©, p. µ±.
 Rorty, Contingency, pp. , µ, ±.
 Wheeler, Romanticism, Pragmatism and Deconstruction, p. .
° Michael Fischer, ˜Accepting the Romantics as Philosophers™, Philosophy and
Literature ± (±), ±.
± W. V. Quine, ˜Epistemology Naturalized™, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
(Columbia University Press, ±), p. ·.
 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. ; par. ·±.
 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn Books, ±°),
pp. “.
 Rorty, Contingency, pp. °“±.


± ¦   ©  ©  °©   ©    © ®:
  ©§  ®    ® µ 
± David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the
Principles of Morals, ±···, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rd edn, rev. P. H. Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±·µ), p. ±µ.
 See esp. James Engell, The Creative Imagination, Enlightenment to Romanticism
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, ±±).
 Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©© , p. µ·.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©©, p. ±±·.
µ Jeremy Bentham, ˜A Table of the Springs of Action™, Deontology, together with
A Table of the Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism, ed. Amnon Goldworth,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±), p. µ±; par. µ.
 Thomas Love Peacock, ˜The Four Ages of Poetry™, The Works of Thomas
Love Peacock, eds. H. F. B. Brett-Smith and C. E. Jones (London, ±“),
vol. ©© ©, p. ±±.
· [George Puttenham], The Arte of English Poesie (London, ±µ), p. .
 Ibid., p. ± (insertions added).
 Puttenham™s radical conclusion is that ˜[i]t is therefore of Poets thus to be
conceiued, that if they be able to deuise and make all these things of them
selues, without any subiect of veritie, that they be (by maner of speech) as
creating gods™ (ibid., p. ).
±° Philip Sidney, An Apologie for Poetrie (London, ±µµ), p. .
±± Ibid., p. .
± Ibid., p.  .
± Ibid., p. ¤.
Notes to pages “± ±
± Sidney acknowledges this in a mock-apology towards the end of the Apologie:
˜But what? me thinks I deserue to be pounded, for straying from Poetry
to Oratorie: but both haue such an af¬nity in this wordish consideration™
(ibid., p. ¬).
±µ Ibid., p.  .
± Ibid., p. © . Sidney™s replacement of this classical notion of inspiration with
something far more worldly looks towards its uneasy position in literary
theory over the following two centuries, with its connotations of enthusi-
asm and irrationalism. Davenant was later to complain to Hobbes about
the notion of ˜inspiration, a dangerous word which many have of late suc-
cessfully us™d™ (preface, Gondibert. Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, ed.
J. E. Spingarn (Oxford University Press, ±µ·), vol. © © , p. µ). Hobbes agreed,
comparing the inspired poet to a ˜bagpipe™ (˜The Answer of Mr Hobbes to Sr
Will. D™Avenant™s Preface Before Gondibert™, Critical Essays, vol. © © , p. µ). By
the end of the seventeenth century, Dennis is arguing ˜that this extraordinary
thing in Poetry which has been hitherto taken for something Supernatural
and Divine, is nothing but a very common Passion, or a complication of
common Passions™ (preface, Remarks on a Book Entituled, Prince Arthur. The
Critical Works of John Dennis, ed. Edward Niles Hooker (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, ±“), vol. ©, p. ). In the eighteenth century,
even an enthusiast like Young holds back from the claim that creative genius
has access to divine truth (Conjectures on Original Composition (London, ±·µ),
p. ), while Gerard endeavours to explain the fact that genius acts ˜as if it
were supernaturally inspired™ in terms of the effects of enthusiasm, by which
genius ˜gives vigour and activity to its associating power™ (Essay on Genius,
pp. “).
±· It should be noted here that Sidney™s sense of ˜genius™ approximates
to the older, pre-Romantic sense of a characteristic disposition or qual-
ity of character, though that itself suggested further an innate ability or
capacity.
± Sidney, Apologie for Poetrie, p. ± (insertion added).
± Francis Bacon, The Two Bookes of Francis Bacon of the Pro¬cience and Advancement
of Learning Divine and Humane. The Works of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding,
Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath (London, ±µ·“), vol. © © ©,
p. .
° Ibid., p. .
± Ibid., p. .
 As Bacon puts it, ˜knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the basis
[ . . . ]™ (ibid., p. µ).
 Ibid., pp. “.
 Ibid., pp. “. For further discussion of this question, see, for example:
Murray Bundy, ˜Bacon™s True Opinion of Poetry™, Studies in Philology · (±°),
and John Harrison, ˜Bacon™s View of Rhetoric, Poetry, and the Imagination™,
The Huntington Library Quarterly ° (±µ·).
 Notes to pages ± “µ
µ See Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Soliloquy: or Advice to
an Author, Characteristics, vol. ©, p. °: ˜[t]he most ingenious way of becoming
foolish, is by a System™.
 In The Moralists, Philocles rhapsodizes to Palemon: ˜And of this Mind ™tis
enough to say, “That it is something which acts upon a Body, and has
something passive under it [ . . . ]” ™ (ibid., vol. ©© , pp. µ“µ). Later, Theocles
remarks that ˜™Tis Mind alone which forms™ (ibid., p. °µ).
· Ibid., pp. µ“.
 To Theocles in The Moralists, Beauty was ˜never in the Matter, but in the Art
and Design; never in Body it-self, but in the Form or Forming Power™ (ibid., p. °µ) “
a power which man retains in his nature as one of ˜the Forms which form™,
intermediate between the ˜dead Forms™ of matter and the ˜Order of Supreme
and Sovereign Beauty™ (ibid., p. °).
 Ibid., vol. ©©©, pp. ±“.
° Ibid., p. ±µ. He also goes as far as to claim that ˜E ® Conscience, I fear, such
as is owing to religious Discipline, will make but a slight Figure, where this
T  is set amiss™ (ibid., p. ±··).
± Ibid., vol. © , p. ±. The concept of ˜poetic truth™, indeed, becomes something
of a tautology in Shaftesbury.
 Ibid., p. °·.
 Ibid., pp. ±“µ.
 Ibid., vol. ©©©, p. .
µ Ibid., p. ·.
 Dennis, Critical Works, vol. ©, p. ±·.
· Ibid., p. .
 Compare Addison™s account of genius™s ability to ˜raise a pleasing kind of
Horrour in the Mind of the Reader, and amuse his Imagination with the
Strangeness and Novelty of the Persons who are represented in them™ (The
Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, ±µ), vol. © © © ,
pp. µ·°“±).
 Dennis, Critical Works, vol. © , pp. µ“.
° Edward Niles Hooker, introduction, Critical Works by John Dennis, vol. © ,
p. cxxiii.
± [Edmund Burke], A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime
and Beautiful, nd edn (Scolar Press, Ltd, ±·°), pp. ±µ“±.
 As Burke phrases it, ˜[w]hen we go but one step beyond the immediately
sensible qualities of things, we go out of our depth™ (ibid., p. ). However,
even Burke™s empirical method, as Walter Hipple Jr notes (The Beautiful,
The Sublime, and The Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory
(Carbondale: The Southern Illinois University Press, ±µ·), p. µ), is not
straightforward enumerative induction, but what John Stuart Mill labelled
the inverse deductive method, whereby empirical generalization is veri-
¬ed against provisional a priori principles (which are themselves subject to
revision).
 Burke, Philosophical Enquiry, pp. µ“°.
Notes to pages µ“ 
 See ibid., p. ·: ˜sublime objects are vast in their dimensions, beautiful ones
comparatively small [ . . . ]™.
µ Ibid., p. ±.
 Ibid., p. °.
· Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime, p. ±°.
µ° On the vexed question as to what Locke intended by ˜idea™, I see no rea-
son to disagree with Michael Ayers™s view as expressed in Locke: Epistemology
and Ontology (Routledge, ±) that ˜[d]espite the relative unpopularity of an
af¬rmative answer, the grounds for holding him [Locke] an imagist are con-
clusive™ (vol. ©, p. ). See, for example, Locke™s allusion to ˜[t]he Pictures drawn
in our Minds ( . . . ) laid in fading Colours™ (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford University Press, ±·µ), p. ±µ).
µ± Ibid., p. ±±.
µ Ibid., p. ±°µ.
µ Ibid., p. ±±.
µ Ibid., p. ±µ°. The rest of this passage has drawn much attention. However,
Locke™s claim that in the recollection of ideas, ˜the Mind is oftentimes more than
barely passive™, and that it is in this activity which ˜consists that which we call
Invention, Fancy, and quickness of Parts™, does not amount to a real defence of
creativity. The important point here is that even recollected ideas are ˜none
of them new ones™; nor do they constitute a discrete form of truth (ibid.,
pp. ±µ“).
µµ Ibid., pp. ±µ“·.
µ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Hackett, ±), p. .
µ· See ibid., pp. “: ˜  ® , in this sense, is nothing but reckoning (that is,
adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon
for the marking and signifying of our thoughts [ . . . ].™
µ Ibid., p. ±.
µ Ibid., p. .
° Ibid., p. ·.
± Locke, Essay, p. µ.
 Ibid., pp. µ“.
 See Locke, Essay, p. µ: ˜since consciousness always accompanies thinking,
and ™tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self ; and thereby
distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists
personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being [ . . . ]™.
 Examples of this legacy are Bolingbroke™s attack upon ˜imaginative™ philoso-
phers like Plato in his ¬rst essay to Pope: ˜all they have done has been to
vend us poetry for philosophy, and to multiply systems of imagination™ (Henry
St. John, The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, ±±),
vol. ©© ©, p. ·±) “ and his denigration of genius, ˜a blazing meteor, irregular
in his course, and dangerous in his approach; of no use to any system, and
able to destroy any™ (ibid., vol. ©©, p. ±·).
 Notes to pages “
µ Hume, Treatise, p. .
 Ibid., p. ±. However, Georges Dicker notes in Hume™s Epistemology and Meta-
physics (Routledge, ±) that Hume has ˜two different and incompatible
criteria for distinguishing between impressions of sensation and ideas: his
of¬cial criterion of “force and vivacity”, and the implicit and unacknowl-
edged criterion of objectivity™ (p. ).
· Hume, Treatise, p. .
 Ibid., pp. ±°“±±.
 Ibid., pp. ±°,  (emphasis added).
·° Ibid., p. µ.
·± Hume, Enquiries, p. µ.
· Hume, Treatise, p. .
· Ibid., pp. “.
· See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadology (±·±), Philosophical Writings, ed.
G. H. R. Parkinson (London: Dent, ±°), p. ±: ˜the principle of suf¬cient
reason, [is that] by virtue of which we consider that no fact can be real or
existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a suf¬cient reason,
why it should be thus and not otherwise [ . . . ].™
·µ Hume, Treatise, p. ·.
· Ibid., p. ±µ. See Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume
(Macmillan, ±±).
·· Robert J. Fogelin, Hume™s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature (Routledge
and Kegan Paul, ±µ), p. ±µ°.
· H. O. Mounce, Hume™s Naturalism (Routledge, ±), pp. ±±, .
· Hume, Treatise, p. .
° Donald Davidson, ˜On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme™, Post-Analytic
Philosophy, p. ±.
± Rorty, Mirror, p. ±.
 Roderick M. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press,±), p. ±.
 Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge University Press, ±±),
p. ±±°.
 See de Man, Blindness and Insight, p. ±: ˜what they call anthropology, linguis-
tics, psychoanalysis is nothing but literature reappearing, like the Hydra™s
head, in the very spot where it had supposedly been suppressed™.
µ Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue;
In Two Treatises, th edn (London, ±·), p. xii (emphasis added).
 Ibid., pp. xiii, xvi.
· Ibid., pp. ±“±µ.
 Ibid., p. °.
 In the Preface to the Inquiry, Hutcheson identi¬es, as well as the internal sense
of beauty, ˜another superior Sense, natural also to Men, determining them to be
pleas™d with Actions, Characters, Affections. This is the Moral Sense™ (ibid., p. xvi).
° Ibid., p. ±°.
± Ibid., p. .
Notes to pages “µ± µ
 More conservative or Neoclassical theorists saw in inner sense a possible
block to the sceptical effects of association. Kames, for instance, ranks
the senses according to a ˜principle of order™ (Henry Home, Elements
of Criticism, th edn (Routledge/Thoemmes Press, ±), vol. © , p. )
in perception based on re¬nement (p. ). Gerard, (An Essay on Taste, rd
edn (Gainsville: Scholars™ Facsimiles and Reprints, ±)) while occasion-
ally adopting the language of the ˜internal or re¬‚ex senses™ (p. ±), eventually
¬nds ˜that the internal senses are not ultimate principles, because all their
ph¦nomena can be accounted for, by simpler qualities of the mind [i.e.
external senses]™ (p. ±·). Later, Francis Jeffrey was to reject outright the
notion that the sense of beauty might be a single sensation, or a kind
of ˜sixth sense™ (Contributions to the Edinburgh Review (London, ±), vol. ©,
pp. “µ), arguing that it depends entirely upon ˜the accidental relations™ of
association (p. ±±).
 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense,
th edn (Bristol: Thoemmes, ±°), pp. iv“v.
 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, vol. ©, p. ±. To Shaftesbury, sensus communis is
a moral intuition linked to ˜the Love of Mankind™ (ibid., p. ±). Despite the
manifold differences between this position and that of Reid, Shaftesbury™s
wariness of the direction of Lockean empiricism, and its implications for
moral philosophy, is similar to that of the Scottish philosopher.
µ Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Edinburgh, ±·µ),
p. µ.
 Reid, Common Sense, p. vii. See also Intellectual Powers: ˜I believe ideas, take in
this sense, to be a mere ¬ction of Philosophers™ (p. ·).
· Ibid., p. µ.
 Reid, Common Sense, p. .
 Ibid., p. ·µ.
±°° Ibid., p. ·.
±°± Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp.  (emphasis added), ±.
±° Ibid., pp. µ°“±.
±° Reid, Common Sense, pp. ±±“±.
±° For example, Coleridge™s articulation of the concept of inner sense in
Biographia Literaria needs to be read in the context of his debt to the
German philosophy of freedom. Philosophy, he argues, ˜is employed on
objects of the ©® ® ® , and cannot, like geometry, appropriate to ev-
ery construction a correspondent outward intuition™ (Biographia Literaria, vol. © ,
pp. µ°“±). Without this schema, inner sense is determined only by ˜an act
of freedom™ in the mind.
±°µ Elridge, Human Life, p. µ.
±° Martin Kallich, The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory in Eighteenth-Century
England: A History of a Psychological Method in English Criticism (The Hague:
Mouton, ±·°), p. .
±°· In Leviathan, Hobbes had identi¬ed the ˜Consequence, or T© ® of thoughts™
which constitutes ˜mental discourse™, appearing as either a ˜wild ranging of
 Notes to pages µ± “µ
the mind™ (p. ±) or as ˜regulated by some desire, and design™ (p. ±). Locke,
however, condemned association in the Essay as ˜a Weakness to which all men
are so liable™ (p. µ). As Kallich observes (Association, p. ), it is something
of a paradox that while Hobbes™s is the more tolerant view, it was Locke™s
analysis of the processes of association that was to in¬‚uence later positivists
like Hartley.
±° Hume, Treatise, p. ±°.
±° This is the distinction deployed by Coleridge in his attack on Hartley in
chapter  of Biographia Literaria. By making the contemporaneity of ideas a
constitutive condition of knowledge, Hartley turns reason and will into the
mere ˜creatures™ of association (Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±±°).
±±° Theodore Huguelet, introduction, Observations on Man, His Frame, His
Duty, and His Expectations, by David Hartley (Gainesville, Florida: Scholars™
Facsimiles and Reprints, ±), vol. © , p. viii.
±±± The eighth ˜proposition™ of Observations is that ˜Sensations, by being often
repeated, leave certain Vestiges, Types, or Images, of themselves, which may
be called, Simple Ideas of Sensation™ (p. µ).
±± Ibid., p. µ.
±± See ibid., p. : ˜It may be proper to remark here, that I do not, by thus as-
cribing the Performance of Sensation to Vibrations excited in the medullary
Substance, in the least presume to assert, or intimate, that Matter can be
indued with the Power of Sensation.™
±± Ibid., p. .
±±µ See the tenth proposition of Observations: ˜Any Sensations A, B, C, &c. by
being associated with one another a suf¬cient Number of Times, get such a
Power over the corresponding Ideas a, b, c, &c. that any one of the Sensations
A, when impressed alone, shall be able to excite in the Mind, b, c, &c. the
Ideas of the rest™ ( p. µ).
±± Ibid., p. .
±±· Ibid., pp. ·°“± (emphasis added).
±± Not every commentator has taken this view, arguing that Hartley uni¬ed
perception through the notion of ˜coalescence™. See, for example, Walter
Jackson Bate, From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth-Century
England (New York: Harper and Row, ±±), pp. ±±“°, and Stephen
H. Ford, ˜Coalescence: David Hartley™s “Great Apparatus” ™, Psychology and
Literature in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Christopher Fox (New York: AMS, ±·),
pp. ±“. However, what Hartley designates as ˜the highest Kind of In-
duction, and as amounting to a perfect Coincidence of the Effect concluded
with those from which it is concluded™, he con¬nes to mathematics alone
(Observations, vol. ©, pp. ±“).
±± Ibid., p. .
±° Ibid., p. ·±.
±± Ibid., p. µ°±.
± Locke, Essay, p. ±±·.
± Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. .
Notes to pages µ“µ ·
± One notable opponent of Hartley was Burke, who in the Philosophical Enquiry
argued that ˜it would be absurd [ . . . ] to say that all things affect us by
association only™ (p. µ).
±µ William Davenant, preface, Gondibert. Critical Essays, vol. © © , p. ·.
± John Dennis, ed., Letters Upon Several Occasions (London, ±), p. µµ.
±· Kames, Elements of Criticism, vol. © , pp. ±“±.
± Adam Smith, ˜Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are
called The Imitative Arts™, The Works of Adam Smith, LL.D. (London, ±±±“±),
vol. , p. .
± Joshua Reynolds, The Works of Sir Joshua Reynolds, [ed.] Edward Malone
(London, ±··), vol. ©, pp. ±°°“±.
±° Thomas Rymer, preface, Re¬‚ections on Aristotle™s Treatise of Poesie. The Critical
Works of Thomas Rymer, ed. Curt A. Zimansky (New Haven: Yale University
Press, ±µ), p. . Compare Henry Felton, for example, who wrote that even
the ancients ˜knew every good Genius would write and judge by Nature,
whether any Rules had been set or no™ (preface, A Dissertation on Reading the
Classics (London, ±·±µ), p. ix).
±± Dennis, Critical Works, vol. ©©, p. ±°. See, also The Impartial Critick (±):
˜Poetry in general, being an imitation of Nature, Tragedy must be so too™
(ibid., vol. ©, p. ±±), and ˜The Causes of the Decay and Defects of Dramatic
Poetry™ (±·µ): ˜all poetry is an Imitation of nature™ (ibid., vol. © © , p. µ).
± The Spectator, vol. ©©, pp. ±“·.
± Ibid., pp. ±“°.
± Young, Conjectures, p. .
±µ Ibid., pp. “.
± Ibid., pp. , ±.
±· The ambiguity of the term remained, however. Compare Abram Robertson,
An Essay on Original Composition (n.p., ±·), p. : ˜[n]ovelty is the most certain
proof of originality in the productions of a re¬ned people. Every suspicion
of imitation must vanish, when we behold truth before unknown to man,
sentiment not before expressed™ “ and Robert Wood, An Essay on the Orig-
inal Genius of Homer (London, ±·), p. vi: ˜however questionable Homer™s
superiority may be, in other respects, as a perfect model and standard for
composition, in the great province of Imitation he is the most original of all
Poets, and the most constant and faithful copier after Nature™.
± Young, Conjectures, pp. ±, “·. As well as using the model of vegetable
growth, Young writes of how ˜Genius implies the rays of the mind concen-
ter™d, and determined to some particular point [ . . . ]™ (ibid., pp. “µ).
± Henry More, An Antidote Against Atheism (London, ±µ), p. ±·.
±° William Sharpe, A Dissertation upon Genius (London, ±·µµ), pp. , .
±± Ibid., p. ±.
± Ibid., pp. ±, “.
± See Locke, Essay, pp. ±“.
± George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric,  vols. (Edinburgh, ±·),
vol. ©, p. .
 Notes to pages µ“
±µ Adam Ferguson, Principles of a Moral and Political Science,  vols. (Edinburgh,
±·), vol. © , p. .
± Dugald Stewart, Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind,  vols. (London
and Edinburgh, ±·“±·), vol. © , p. ±µ.
±· James Beattie, Dissertations Moral and Critical (London, ±·), p. ±µ.
± Isaac D™Israeli, An Essay on the Manners and Genius of the Literary Character (Lon-
don, ±·µ), p. .
± Bacon, Works, vol. ©©© , p. .
±µ° Hobbes, Leviathan, p. ±.
±µ± See Locke, Essay, p. ±µ: ˜ ™Tis the business therefore of the Memory to
furnish to the Mind those dormant Ideas, which it has present occasion for,
and in the having them ready at hand on all occasions, consists that which
we call Invention, Fancy, and quickness of Parts.™
±µ John Dryden, preface, De Arte Graphica. Prose ±± “±: De Arte Graphica and
Shorter Works, eds. A. E. Wallace Maurer and George R. Guffey (Berkeley:
University of California Press, ±), pp. ±“.
±µ Rymer, preface, Re¬‚ections on Aristotle™s Treatise of Poesie, by R. Rapin. Critical
Works, p. ±.
±µ William Temple, ˜Of Poetry™, Critical Essays, vol. ©© © , p. ±.
±µµ The Spectator, vol. ©© , pp. µ“·.
±µ Two Dissertations Concerning Sense and the Imagination, with an Essay on Consciousness
(London, ±·), pp. ·“. This work continues mistakenly to be attributed
to Zachary Mayne (±±“). See Tim Milnes,˜On the Authorship of Two
Dissertations Concerning Sense and the Imagination, with an Essay on Consciousness
(±·)™, Notes and Queries ·. (°°°), ±“.
±µ· Joseph Warton, An Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope, µth edn,  vols.
(London, ±°), vol. © , p. ±°.
±µ Ibid., p. ±±µ.
±µ Ibid., p. ·.
±° Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, eds. W[alter] J[ackson] Bate and Albrecht B.
Strauss (Yale University Press, ±), vol. ©© , p. °°.
±± Samuel Johnson, Lives of the English Poets, ed. George Birkbeck Hill (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, ±°µ), vol. © , pp. ±, ±.
± Johnson attributed many other qualities to the imagination, most of which
are listed by Raymond Havens in his article, ˜Johnson™s Distrust of the
Imagination™, English Literary History ±° (±), “µµ. Most importantly,
however, as Havens notes, ˜he did not believe the imagination creates™
(p. ), or that it stood for ˜a means of insight into truth™ (p. ).
± Samuel Johnson, The Idler and the Adventurer, eds. W[alter] J[ackson] Bate,
et al. (Yale University Press, ±), p. ±·.
± Johnson, Lives, vol. ©©© , p. ·.
±µ Gerard, Essay on Taste, p. ±.
± Gerard, Essay on Genius, p. ·.
±· William Duff, An Essay on Original Genius, ed. John L. Mahoney (Florida:
Scholars™ Facsimiles and Reprints, ±), p. ·.
± Gerard, Essay on Genius, pp. ±, .
Notes to pages “·± 
± Ibid., pp. “.
±·° Ibid., p. ·±.
±·± Ibid., pp. µ, ·“·, .
±· See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, ed. Paul Guyer,
trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge University Press, °°°),
pp. ±“·: Since originality is genius™s primary quality, and ˜there can also
be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e. exem-
plary, hence, while not themselves the result of imitation, they must yet serve
others in that way, i.e. as a standard or a rule for judging™.
±· Duff, Essay on Original Genius, pp. ·“.
±· Gerard, Essay on Genius, pp. , ± (emphasis added).
±·µ Ibid., pp. , ±°±.
±· Ferguson, Principles, vol. © , pp. “.
±·· Stewart, Elements, vol. © , pp. , ±°.
±· See Ferguson, Principles, vol. ©, p. : ˜Mere efforts of ingenuity, which are
thus made to adorn what is otherwise useful and necessary, or to gratify an
original disposition of the mind to fabricate for itself on the models of beauty
presented in nature, are commonly termed the ¬ne arts.™
±· Stewart, Elements, vol. ©, pp. ·µ, ±µ, ±.
±° Ibid., vol. © ©©, p. °.
±± Ernest Lee Tuveson, The Imagination as a Means of Grace: Locke and the Aesthetics
of Romanticism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
±°), p. ±µ.
± Archibald Alison, Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste (Edinburgh, ±·°),
pp. , µ, .
± Ibid., pp. °“±, ±°.
± See James Engell, Forming the Critical Mind: Dryden to Coleridge (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, ±), p. : ˜The controversy surround-
ing ideas of progress and decline in English literary culture fascinates the
strongest minds [ . . . ].™
±µ Ferguson, Principles, vol. ©, p. ±.
± Beattie, Dissertations, pp. ±±“.
±· Young, Conjectures, pp. ±“±.
± D™Israeli, Essay, p. xv.
± ¯
Francis Jeffrey, rev. of De la Lit´rature conside´´e dans ses Rapports avec les Inst±tutions
e re
Sociales, by Mad. de Sta¨ l-Holstein, Contributions, vol. ©, p. ±°°.
e
±° Thomas Pfau, Wordsworth™s Profession: Form, Class, and the Logic of Early Romantic
Cultural Production (Stanford University Press, ±·), p. µ.
±± Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, rd edn
(London: John Murray, ±·), vol. ©, p. µµ.
± Stewart, Elements, vol. ©© , p. .

     ¦ ¬§©: · ¤ ·  ™ °
± William Wordsworth, The Prelude (±°µ), © © , ·“.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © © , p. ±µ.
° Notes to pages ·± “··
 Kenneth R. Johnston, Wordsworth and The Recluse (Yale University Press,
±), p. ±µ.
 Aubrey de Vere, ˜Recollections of Wordsworth™, The Prose Works of William
Wordsworth, ed. Alexander B. Grossart (London: Edward Moxon, Son, and
Co., ±·), vol. ©©© , p. .
µ Geoffrey H. Hartman, Wordsworth™s Poetry ±··“±±, ± (New Haven: Yale
University Press, ±·±), p. .
 Paul de Man, ˜Wordsworth and the Victorians™, The Rhetoric of Romanticism
(New York: Columbia University Press, ±), p. ·.
· Richard Elridge, ˜Wordsworth and “A New Condition of Philosophy” ™,
Philosophy and Literature ±.± (±), µ, µ. See also Johnston, p. ±±.
 John Barrell, introduction, Poetry, Language and Politics (Manchester University
Press, ±), p. ±µ.
 Alan Bewell, introduction, Wordsworth and the Enlightenment: Nature, Man, and
Society in the Experimental Poetry (Yale University Press, ±), pp. ±, ±.
±° Rajan, The Supplement of Reading, pp. ±, ±µ.
±± See Hartman, Wordsworth™s Poetry, p. ±: In Wordsworth, Hartman claims, ˜it
is the evidence of the poems which is decisive; the prose, in fact, depends for
its sense on the poetry™.
± Johnston, preface, Wordsworth and The Recluse, p. xiv.
± James Chandler, Wordsworth™s Second Nature (University of Chicago Press,
±), pp. , ·.
± Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©©© , p. .
±µ John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, ed. J. M. Robson,
 vols. (University of Toronto Press, ±·“), vol. ©, p. ·.
± W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Harvard University Press, ±°), p. ±.
±· Ibid., p. ±.
± Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©© , p. .
± Quine, Pursuit of Truth, p. °.
° W. V. Quine, Word and Object (The MIT Press, ±°), p. µ.
± Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ±.
 Ibid., vol. ©©© , p. ·±.
 Henryk Skolimowski, ˜Quine, Ajdukiewicz, and the Predicament of °th
Century Philosophy™, The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn
and Paul Arthur Schlipp (Open Court, ±), p. ·±.
 Wordsworth, ˜Essay, Supplementary to the Preface™, Prose Works, vol. © © ©,
p. .
µ See, for example, Engell, Forming the Critical Mind, p. : ˜Wordsworth™s
primary distinction, and what is most representative about the Preface for
romanticism as a whole, is not between forms of writing but forms of knowing.
The difference is ¬rst a philosophical one.™ Mark Kipperman notes that ˜the
epistemology of post-Kantian idealism [ . . . ] seems to take as its central topic
the same question that drives the psychological quest of English romantic
poetry: what does it mean for a subject to conceive himself as the maker of his
own circumstances?™ (Beyond Enchantment, p. ix). Keith Thomas, meanwhile
Notes to pages ··“° ±
(Wordsworth and Philosophy: Empiricism and Transcendentalism in the Poetry (Ann
Arbor: UMI Research Press, ±)), argues that ˜[t]he project Coleridge and
Wordsworth set themselves in ±··“ is essentially epistemological, for at
the center is the interaction of self with nature™ (p. ).
 Wordsworth, preface, Lyrical Ballads. Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ± (emphasis
added).
· Wordsworth, The Prelude (±°µ), © © , °±“, °·“±.
 Wordsworth, [˜Reply to “Mathetes” ™], Prose Works, vol. © © , p. °.
 Ibid., vol. ©, p. ±.
° Wordsworth, ˜To William Matthews™,  May ±·, letter ° of The Letters of
William and Dorothy Wordsworth, ed. Alan G. Hill, nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, ±·), vol. © , p. ±±.
± Pfau, Wordsworth™s Profession, pp. ±±“±.
 Young, Conjectures, p. ±.
 D™Israeli, Essay, p. xvi.
 John Keats, ˜To J. H. Reynolds™,  April ±±, letter · of Letters, vol. ©,
p. ·. Keats had already written that ˜I have not the slightest feel of humility
towards the Public or to any thing in existence, but the eternal Being, the
Principle of Beauty, and the Memory of great Men™ (ibid., p. ). Lamb™s
advice to an aspiring author is similar in outlook: ˜Trust not to the Public, you
may hang, starve, drown yourself, for anything that worthy Personage cares™
(˜To Richard Barton,™  Jan ±, letter µ of Letters (±µ), vol. © ©, p. ).
µ Wordsworth, ˜To Lady Beaumont™, ± May, ±°·, letter ·µ of Letters, vol. © © ,
p. ±µ°.
 Wordsworth, ˜To Sir George Beaumont™, [Feb. ±°], letter  of Letters,
vol. ©©, p. ±.
· Lamb, ˜Readers against the Grain™, The Works of Charles and Mary Lamb,
ed. E. V. Lucas (London: Methuen and Co., ±°), vol. © , p. ·.
 Pfau, Wordsworth™s Profession, p. ±.
 Jerome J. McGann, The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago
University Press, ±). See also: Paul Hamilton, Wordsworth (The Harvester
Press, ±). Hamilton sees it as a feature of Wordsworth™s conservatism
that he makes ˜alternative, richer conceptions of people™s worth a matter of
poetic rather than political endeavour™ (p. ). Richard Bourke, meanwhile, in
Romantic Discourse and Political Modernity (Harvester Wheatsheaf, ±), notes
how Wordsworth™s theory after ±·· ˜increasingly came to identify authority
with the inner resourcefulness of the individual™, and after ±° took ˜the
elected or chosen individual as its point of departure™. In doing so, ˜political
validity is substituted by aesthetic credibility, that the rules of pleading are
con¬ned to a speci¬c register the aesthetic dimension in relation to which one
can argue only as one of the unbelievers or as one of the converted™ (p. ±).
A similar tack is taken by Terry Eagleton, who observes in The Ideology of the
Aesthetic (Basil Blackwell, ±°) that the birth of aesthetics in the eighteenth
century ˜coincides with the period when cultural production is beginning to
suffer the miseries and indignities of commodi¬cation™ (p. ).
 Notes to pages ± “·
° Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ±µ.
± Ibid., vol. ©©, p. ·.
 Ibid., vol. © , p. ±.
 For a discussion of the connection of the idea of ˜genius™ with Jacobinism,
see Simon Schaffer, ˜Genius in Romantic Natural Philosophy™, Romanticism
and the Sciences, eds. Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine (Cambridge
University Press, ±°).
 Wordsworth, ˜To William Rowan Hamilton™,  July ±, letter  of
Letters, vol. , pp. “·.
µ Wordsworth, [˜Preface to the Edition of ±±µ,™] Prose Works, vol. © © ©, pp. “·.
 Ibid., vol. © , p. ±.
· Ibid., vol. ©©, p.  (emphasis added).
 Ibid., vol. © © © , pp. ±“.
 It is noteworthy that any potential lawlessness in imagination™s creativity is
attributed by Wordsworth to the type of materials with which it works, as it
˜recoils from every thing but the plastic, the pliant, and the inde¬nite [ . . . ]™.
These, together with its ˜different purpose™, constitute its distinctness from
fancy “ not the nature of the imaginative process itself, which is likewise
˜ “aggregative and associative” ™ (ibid., vol. ©©© , p. ).
µ° Ibid., vol. ©© ©, pp. “·.
µ± Ibid., p. .
µ Ibid., vol. ©, p. ±°.
µ Indeed, Bewell claims that since the essay ˜was originally drafted as part of
a preface explaining why Wordsworth was taking up moral issues in verse™
(Wordsworth and the Enlightenment, p. ±°), the ˜Essay on Morals™ fragment should
be renamed ˜Against Moral Inquiry™.
µ Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, pp. ±“.
µµ Ibid., p. ± (emphasis added).
µ Jacobi, Main Philosophical Writings, p. µ.
µ· Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. © , p. ± (emphasis added).
µ Sidney, Apologie for Poetrie, p.  .
µ See Wordsworth™s letter to Joseph Kirkham Miller in ±±, which implicitly
attacks Benthamite utilitarianism, with its interpretation of right action ac-
cording to a system of ends based upon notions of what is useful to human
well-being. Wordsworth counters that ˜means, in the concerns of this life, are
in¬nitely more important than ends, which are to be valued mainly accord-
ing to the qualities and virtues requisite for their attainment.™ (˜To Joseph
Kirkham Miller™, ±· Dec. ±±, letter µ of Letters, vol.  , pp. “µ).
° Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, pp. ±“.
± On one side, hedonistic act-utilitarianism is distinguished from rule-
utilitarianism by its claim that an action should be judged according to
the consequences of the particular action itself, rather than according to the
consequences of that action being adopted as a rule by any individual in simi-
lar circumstances. On the other side, a hedonistic utilitarian like Bentham is
distinguishable from a non-hedonistic or ˜ideal™ utilitarian like G. E. Moore
Notes to pages ·“ 
in that he evaluates an action™s outcome simply in terms of the net pleasure
produced, rather than other criteria such as knowledge or virtues of char-
acter. For a succinct discussion of these positions, see J. C. C. Smart, ˜An
Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics™, Utilitarianism: For and Against, by
J. C. C. Smart and Bernard Williams (Cambridge University Press, ±·),
pp. “·.
 Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ±°.
 Ibid., p. ±.
 Ibid., p. ±.
µ Hazlitt, ˜Coriolanus™, Works, vol. , p. .
 Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. © , p. ± (emphasis added).
· Ibid., pp. ±°“±.
 Ibid., pp. ±°“±.
 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
eds. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (University of London: The Athlone
Press, ±·°). Bentham argues that of all the species of pleasure, ˜the only
difference there is among them lies in the circumstances that accompany
their production™ (p. ).
·° Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. © , p. ±µ°.
·± Ibid., p. ±.
· Ibid., p. ± (emphasis added).
· Ibid., p. ±±.
· Ibid., p. ± (emphasis added).
·µ Ibid., vol. © © , p. .
· Elridge, ˜Wordsworth™, ·.
·· Wordsworth, The Prelude (±·), © , ±.
· Wordsworth, The Prelude (±°µ), © , ±.
· Cooke, Acts of Inclusion, p. °.
° Wordsworth, The Prelude (±°µ), © , ·“µ, ·“.
± For example, line , containing the reference to the ˜charm of logic™,
is dropped between the  -stage (±°µ“) and  -stage (±±“°) versions
of the text. See William Wordsworth, The Thirteen-Book Prelude, ed. Mark
L. Reed,  vols. (Cornell University Press, ±±), vol. ©, p. , and vol. © ©,
p. °.
 Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ± (emphasis added).
 Wordsworth, ˜To William Mathews™, [] June [±·], letter  of Letters,
vol. ©, pp. ±“µ.
 Wordsworth, ˜To Sir George Beaumont™, [Feb. ±°], letter  of Letters,
vol. © ©, p. ±µ.
µ Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ±.
 Ibid., vol. ©©© , p. .
· Ibid., p. µ.
 Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., vol. ©©, pp. µ±“.
° Ibid., p. µ.
 Notes to pages “±°µ
± Cf. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, p. ±: For Kant, the ˜modality
of aesthetic judgements, namely their presumed necessity [ . . . ] makes us
cognizant of an a priori principle in them, and elevates us out of empiri-
cal psychology, in which they would otherwise remain buried among the
feelings of enjoyment and pain [ . . . ]™.
 Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©© , p. µ°.
 Ibid., p. µ·.
 Ibid., p. µ.
µ Ibid., pp. µµ“·.
 Ibid., vol. ©©©, p. .
· Ibid., p. .
 The eighteenth-century genius was a colonizer, discovering, appropriating
and assimilating new lands by force of imagination. Campbell writes of the
modern genius in the arts that ˜it may be said to bring us into a new country,
of which, though there have been some successful incursions occasionally
made upon its frontiers, we are not yet in full possession™ (Philosophy of
Rhetoric, vol. ©, p. ±).
 Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©©© , p. .
±°° Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. ; par. ·±.
±°± Wordsworth, ˜To Lord Lonsdale™,  Nov. ±±, letter µ of Letters,
vol. © ©© , p. µ°.
±° Wordsworth, ˜To Sir William Rowan Hamilton™,  Jan. [±], letter ±±·
of Letters, vol. ©, µ°. However, Wordsworth™s output of essays in the
years following the ¬rst Preface suggests, as Stephen Gill notes, that he
˜cared more than a straw about theory™ (William Wordsworth: A Life (Oxford
University Press, ±), p. ±·).
±° Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ±.
±° Marjorie Levinson, Wordsworth™s Great Period Poems: Four Essays (Cambridge
University Press, ±), pp. ±·, .
±°µ Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©©© , p. °.
±° Ibid., vol. ©©, p. µ· (emphasis added).
±°· Louis Althusser, ˜Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses™, Lenin and
Philosophy, trans. B. Brewster (New Left Books, ±·±), p. ±.

   ¤   ®  :  ¬ © ™ ©® ®  © ¤¬©  
± Hazlitt, Works, vol. © , p. ·.
 See W. P. Albrecht, Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination (Lawrence: University
of Kansas Press, ±µ); Roy Park, Hazlitt and the Spirit of the Age: Abstraction
and Critical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±·±); John Kinnaird, William
Hazlitt: Critic of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, ±·);
John L. Mahoney, The Logic of Passion: The Literary Criticism of William
Hazlitt (Salzburg, ±·), and David Bromwich, Hazlitt: The Mind of a
Critic (Oxford University Press, ±). Superseded, but still valuable, is
Elisabeth Schneider™s pioneering The Aesthetics of William Hazlitt: A Study of the
Philosophical Basis of his Criticism (Philadelphia, ±).
Notes to pages ±°µ“±° µ
 See, for example, M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. ±µ: In Abrams™
view, with Hazlitt, ˜[w]e are well on the way to critical impressionism
[ . . . ]™; an opinion echoed by Marilyn Butler in Romantics, Rebels and
Reactionaries (Oxford University Press, ±±), p. ±·°.
 For a defence of Hazlitt as a sustained thinker who draws upon materialist
analogies for his theory of mind, and who ˜uses the methods of empiricism
to achieve a criticism that combines sensitive observation with inductive
inference™ (p. µµ), see James Mulvihill, ˜Hazlitt and “First Principles” ™,
Studies in Romanticism  (±°), ±“µµ. A persuasive case for Hazlitt as
a psychologist and a philosopher of personal identity ˜whose insights and
perspectives are so far ahead of his own times that they drop through the
cracks of history™ (p. µ) is assembled by Raymond Marin and John Barresi,
˜Hazlitt on the Future of the Self ™, Journal of the History of Ideas µ. (±µ),
“±.
µ See Thomas McFarland, Romantic Cruxes: The English Essayists and the Spirit of
the Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±·), p. µ: McFarland describes Hazlitt™s
imagination as ˜coarctive™, by which he means ˜a tendency, restricted to
Hazlitt alone, to express his sympathy or antipathy with the claims or merits
of others in two different and discrete ways rather than in one uni¬ed way™.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. ±±·.
· Hazlitt, ˜Madame de Sta¨ l™s Account of German Philosophy and Literature,™
e
The Morning Chronicle,  March ±±, Works, vol. , p. .
 See, for example, Hazlitt™s preface to the Abridgement of the Light of Nature
Pursued. Works, vol. ©, p. ±°: Tucker, Hazlitt claims, ˜believed with professor
Kant in the unity of consciousness, or ˜that the mind alone is formative™
[ . . . ].™ A. F. M. Willich™s Elements of the Critical Philosophy was published in
London in ±·.
 In ˜The Literature of Power™, for example, Jonathan Bate distinguishes De
Quincey™s Wordsworthian, affective notion of power from Hazlitt™s more
˜sinister™ and ˜political™ sense, adding that ˜[t]he fact that for one hundred
and ¬fty years it was De Quincey™s, not Hazlitt™s, sense of “power” which
held sway in literary criticism goes a long way to explain the ardour of recent
attacks on criticism™s claims to be above ideology™ (p. ±).
±° Uttara Natarajan, Hazlitt and the Reach of Sense: Criticism, Morals and the
Metaphysics of Power (Oxford University Press, ±), pp. , ·.
±± Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. ±°.
± Tom Paulin, in The Day-Star of Liberty, notes that ˜[t]he word “dry” [ . . . ] is
a signi¬cant critical term in Hazlitt™s writing [ . . . ]™ (p. ±), expressing at
times ˜his detestation of all that is ¬xed [ . . . ] concrete, or literal™ (p. ±µ±) and
yet at others ˜an af¬rmation of physicality, a sort of worked thingness in prose
[ . . . ]™ (p. ±).
± Hazlitt, ˜Coriolanus™, Works, vol. , p. ·.
± Ibid., vol. ©, pp. “·.
±µ See Paulin, Day-Star of Liberty, p. ±.
± Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , pp. “·.
±· Ibid., vol. , p. ·±.
 Notes to pages ±±°“±±
± Locke, Essay, p. µ.
± George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. The
Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, eds. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, ±), vol. ©© , p. .
° Ibid., p. .
± Ibid., p. ·.
 Hume, Treatise, p. ±.
 Ibid., pp. ±µ“.
 Ibid., p. ±·.
µ Ibid., p. µ··.
 See Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©, p. ±: ˜Abstraction is a trick to supply the defect
of comprehension. The moulds of the understanding may be said not to be
large enough to contain the gross concrete objects of nature, but will still
admit of their names, and descriptions, and general forms, which lie ¬‚atter
and closer in the brain, and are more easily managed.™
· Hazlitt™s debt to Hume has been a hotly contested issue over the years.
Elizabeth Schneider™s contention that to Hume ˜he owed a good deal in
general outlook, though probably not in speci¬c points™ (Aesthetics of William
Hazlitt, p. °), is supported by David Bromwich™s claim that the critic ˜argues
as a thinking disciple of Hume™ (Mind of a Critic, p. ±). John Mahoney,
meanwhile, notes that Hazlitt was reading the Treatise while in the process
of composing the Essay (Logic of Passion, p. °), adding that Hazlitt™s basic
philosophical outlook ˜is on the one hand solidly grounded in [ . . . ] the
British empirical tradition, and yet on the other a sharp rejoinder to that
tradition™ (ibid., p. ). My own position is that what Hazlitt inherited from
Hume was a predicament or a dilemma rather than a creed.
 Hazlitt, ˜On Abstract Ideas™, Works, vol. ©© , p. ±±.
 Ibid., p. °.
° Ibid., p. ±.
± Ibid., vol. ©, p. ±·.
 See ibid., vol. ©©, p. °: ˜The knowledge upon which our ideas rest is general,
and the only difference between abstract and particular, is that of being more
or less general.™
 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (±µ) (Harvard University
Press, ±·), p. ·.
 Sellars, Empiricism, p. ±.
µ See John Horne Tooke, The Diversions of Purley, ed. Richard Taylor, rev. edn,
 vols. (London, ±), vol. ©, p. : ˜The business of the mind [ . . . ] extends
no farther than to receive impressions, that is, to have Sensations or Feelings.
What are called its operations, are merely the operations of Language.
A consideration of Ideas [ . . . ] will lead us no farther than to Nouns: i.e.
the signs of these impressions, or names of ideas.™
 Natarajan, Reach of Sense, p. ±.
· Ibid., pp. , °.
 Davidson, ˜On the Very Idea™, p. ±µ.
Notes to pages ±±“± ·
 Sellars, Empiricism, p. .
° Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. .
± Paulin, Day-Star of Liberty, p. µ.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. © , p. .
 A. C. Grayling, The Quarrel of the Age: The Life and Times of William Hazlitt
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, °°°), pp. “.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©, p. .
µ Ibid., p. µ.
 Ibid., pp. ·±“.
· Ibid., p. ±.
 Roy Park argues that Hazlitt™s theory of abstraction breaks new ground by
denying, pace Locke and Hume, that all abstraction is a result of generalization
(Spirit of the Age, p. ). Instead, Park claims, Hazlitt adopts a particularist
view which, like that of Blake, stemmed from his concrete experience as a
painter: ˜In Hazlitt™s view, as indeed in the view of most painters, no two
leaves, no two grains of sand are alike. Each is composed of an in¬nity of
parts™ (ibid., p. ±°°). Yet Hazlitt™s epistemology depends upon the premise
that, as he puts it, the ˜knowledge upon which our ideas rest is general, and
the only difference between abstract and particular, is that of being more or
less general™ (˜On Abstract Ideas™, Works, vol. © © , p. °). While it is certainly
true that Hazlitt retained a corpuscularian view about reality, it is the very
gap between this atomistic, indeterminate ˜external™ world, and the uni¬ed
world of consciousness ˜within™ which his theory of abstraction is designed
to bridge; that is, how the ˜manifold™ forms of things in nature ˜become
one by being united in the same common principle of thought™ (ibid., vol. ©,
p. ·±).
 Ibid., vol. , p. .
µ° Ibid., p. .
µ± Ibid., p. µ.
µ Ibid., vol. © , pp. ±“.
µ Ibid., vol. © ©, p. ±±·.
µ Hazlitt, ˜On Locke™s “Essay on the Human Understanding” ™, Works, vol. © © ,
p. ±µ±.
µµ A. F. M. Willich, Elements of the Critical Philosophy (London, ±·).
µ See Preface to an Abridgement of the Light of Nature Pusued: Tucker, according
to Hazlitt, ˜believed with professor Kant in the unity of consciousness, or
“that the mind alone is formative” ™ (Works, vol. ©, p. ±°). See also his review
of Madame de Sta¨ l for The Morning Chronicle: the necessity of the ˜super-
e
intending faculty™ (ibid., vol. , p. µ) of understanding for the unity of
experience demonstrates that ˜[t]he mind alone is formative, to use the expres-
sion of Kant™ (ibid., p. ). However, Hazlitt™s belief in ±°· that Tucker™s
notion of the coalesence of association might be suf¬cient for the unity of
mental representations was not a secure one.
µ· Ibid., vol. © ©, p. ±.
µ Ibid., p. ±±·.
 Notes to pages ±“±°
µ Ibid., vol. , p. .
° Ibid., vol. © , p. ±·.
± Park argues that Hazlitt™s work differs radically from that of Coleridge inso-
far as it forgoes the attempt to distinguish poetry from (empirical) science;
removing it instead from all forms of knowledge, and marking it as
non-af¬rmative: poetry has no truth-value, because it does not make state-
ments. Instead, it offers the reader or listener a ˜middle way™ (Spirit of the Age,
p. µ), and gives one a feeling for the ineffable aspects of existence; or, as Park
puts it, the ˜experiential™ (ibid., p. ·).
 Hazlitt, ˜Prejudice™, Works, vol. , p. ±.
 Ibid., vol.  ©©, p. .
 Ibid., vol. ©©©, p. .
µ Ibid., vol. ©, pp. ±“.
 Reid, Inquiry, p. .
· Ibid., p. .
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©, pp. ±“µ.
 See Jacobi, supplement, David Hume on Faith (±··), Main Philosophical Writings,
p. ±: Jacobi complains, with regard to Kant™s postulation of noumena, that
˜I must admit that I was held up not a little by this dif¬culty [ . . . ] viz. that
without that presupposition I could not enter into the system, but with it
I could not stay within it.™
·° Hazlitt, ˜Common Sense™, Works, vol. , pp. “°.
·± Ibid., vol. ©© ©, pp. µ“.
· Ibid., vol. ©© , p. ±±·.
· Hume, Treatise, pp. ±°“±±.
· Hartley, Observations, vol. ©, pp. µ“.
·µ Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©, p. µ.
· Ibid., pp. µ±“.
·· Ibid., p. ±·.
· Ibid., p. . He adds, in a typically candid moment, that ˜[i]f I am asked if
I conceive clearly how this is possible, I answer no: “ perhaps no one ever
will, or can. But I do understand clearly, that the other supposition [i.e.,
associationism] is an absurdity™ (ibid., p. ·°).
· Ibid., p. °.
° Ibid., p. µ.
± Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. © , p. .
 Ibid., pp. ±“±µ.
 Ibid., p. µ±.
 Hartley, Observations, vol. ©, pp. ±“.
µ Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. ©, p. .
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. µ±.
· Ibid., p. .
 Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. © , p. ±.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. µ°.
° Ibid., vol. , p. °±.
Notes to pages ±± “± 
± Ibid., vol. © ©, pp. ±±“±·.
 See ibid., vol. © , p. .
 Ibid., vol. ©© , p. ±·.
 Ibid., p. ±.
µ Ibid., pp. ±µ“.
 Ibid., p. ±±.
· Prior to Natarajan, John Kinnaird had claimed in William Hazlitt: Critic of
Power that Hazlitt™s notion of power ˜is the informing vision of all his criticism™
(p. viii).
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. © , p. ±.
 Ibid., p. ±°.
±°° Ibid., vol. , pp. ±“±.
±°± [Hazlitt?], ˜Coleridge™s Literary Life™, Works, vol. © , p. ±. In an editorial
note, P. P. Howe (ibid., p. µ) points out that Jeffrey claimed the authorship
of all of ˜Coleridge™s Literary Life™, even though parts of it were republished
by Hazlitt elsewhere, and argues that ˜[f]ew, if any, articles in the present
volume are entirely free from Jeffrey™s editorial touches™ (ibid., p. °).
±° Ibid., vol. , p. ± (emphasis added).
±° Hazlitt™s misunderstanding of the signi¬cance of ˜Kant™s notions a priori™ has
been discussed before, most notably by Ren´ Wellek in Immanuel Kant in
e
England ±·“± (Princeton University Press, ±±), pp. ±“·.
±° This does not remove Hazlitt™s epistemic ambivalence, merely inverts it. As
W. P. Albrecht notes, ˜[w]hereas the Essay and Hazlitt™s political writings
stress the moral, sympathizing quality of the imagination, his critical essays
emphasize its creative, truth-¬nding power™ (Creative Imagination, p. ·). Yet at
the same time, in his writing on aesthetics and art Hazlitt is less concerned
to curb the notion of power as such.
±°µ Park, Spirit of the Age, p. ±.
±° Natarajan, Reach of Sense, p. . In ˜Power and Capability: Hazlitt, Keats
and the Discrimination of Poetic Self ™, Romanticism .± (±), Natarajan
notes the ˜bigotry™ which Hazlitt attributes to genius; an innate bias or
predisposition to view the world in a given way which is singular and
exclusive, guaranteeing in itself no access to knowledge (pp. µ·“). Instead, it
is a form of power which represents ˜a kind of tyranny: the colonisation and
subjection of lesser understandings by the powerful assertion of an individual
ego™ (ibid., p. µ).
±°· Hazlitt, Works, vol.  ©©© , p. .
±° Ibid., vol. , p. °.
±° Ibid., vol. ©©©, p. .
±±° Ibid., p. ±.
±±± Ibid., p. .
±± Ibid., vol. , p. ·.
±± Ibid., p. .
±± Ibid., vol.  , pp. ±“µ.
±±µ Ibid., p. .
° Notes to pages ±·“±·
±± Ibid., vol. , p. .
±±· Ibid., vol.  , p. .
±± Ibid., p. ° (emphasis added).
±± Ibid., p. ±.
±° Ibid., pp. ·“.
±± Ibid., vol. , pp. “°.
± Ibid., vol.  , p. .
± Ibid., vol. © ©©, p. ·.
± Ibid., pp. “.
±µ See Harold Bloom, Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism (Oxford University
Press, ±), p. ±·: ˜I have come to a conviction that the love of poetry is
another variant of the love of power, a conviction in which I am happy to
note I have been preceded by Hazlitt.™
± Hazlitt, Works : ±.
±· Ibid., p. µ.
± Ibid., p. ·.
± See ibid., vol.  ©© , p. °: ˜Burke was so far right in saying that it is no
objection to an institution, that it is founded in prejudice, but the contrary, if
that prejudice is natural and right; that is, if it arises from those circumstances
which are properly subjects of feeling and association, not from any defect
or perversion of the understanding in those things which fall strictly under
its jurisdiction.™
±° Hazlitt, Works, vol. © , p. ±.
±± Ibid., vol. ©© , pp. ±±“±.
± Ibid., vol. ©©©, p. .
± Ibid., vol. © , p. µ.

  ¬© ¤§  ® ¤   ®· ¦µ ®¤ ©®¬© 
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, pp. “·.
 Bowie, Romanticism, p. ±.
 See Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism, p. : Abrams represents Wordsworth™s
˜high argument™ as a way of communicating the power of mind ˜to create
out of the world of all of us, in a quotidian and recurrent miracle, a new
world which is the equivalent of paradise™.
 Coleridge, ˜To Thomas Poole™, ± March ±°±, letter · of Letters, vol. © © ,
pp. ·°“·.
µ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±.
 Coleridge, Logic, ed. J. R. de J. Jackson (Princeton University Press, ±±),
p. ±.
· In particular, G. N. G. Orsini, Coleridge and German Idealism (Carbondale and
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, ±).
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © ©, p. .
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lectures ±±“±±: On the History of Philosophy, ed.
J. R. de J. Jackson (Princeton University Press, °°°), vol. © © , p. µ.
Notes to pages ±“±µ ±
±° I say ˜ungenial™ to distinguish this view from Seamus Perry™s ˜third course™
for Coleridge scholarship, presented in Coleridge and the Uses of Division
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±), which despite ˜accepting his failure as
just that™ (p. ) sees Coleridgean ambiguity and indecision as ˜an example of
muddle in its nobler aspect, a whole-hearted dealing with intractables™ (p. ).
±± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±.
± Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (Basil Blackwell, ±), p. ·°.
± Coleridge, Logic, p. ±.
± Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±±.
±µ Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Gary
Hat¬eld (Cambridge University Press, ±·), p. ±·.
± Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin, nd edn
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, ±µ), p. vi.
±· Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±.
± Ibid., p. ±µ.
± Kant, Prolegomena, p. ·.
° Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±µµ.
± Coleridge, Lectures ±°“±± On Literature, ed. R. A. Foakes,  vols. (Princeton
University Press, ±·), vol. © , p. ±.
 Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, p. .
 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, nd edn, ± (Penguin Books, ±°),
p. .
 Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, nd edn (University of Chicago Press,
±µ), p. .
µ Quine, Word and Object, p. .
 W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, nd edn (Harvard University Press,
±°), p. ·.
· See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, nd edn, trans. G. E.
M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, ±µ), p. µ±; par. ±, ˜There is not a phil-
osophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different
therapies.™
 Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts (Blackwell, ±±), pp. xiv“xv.
 Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Harvard University
Press, ±µ), p. ±µ.
° Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism (The MIT Press, ±), p. ±±.
± Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Schriften und Fragmente ±“ (Paderborn: Ferdinand
Sch¨ ningh, ±), vol. ©© , p. ±µ. Quoted in Bowie, Romanticism, p. µ.
o
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, p. °.
 Coleridge, The Friend, vol. © , pp. ±“.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©©, p. .
µ Ibid., vol. © , p. °. As the editors note here, by this Coleridge probably had
in mind the work he was to take up later in the ˜Logic™ and ˜Opus Maximum™
manuscripts.
 Ibid., p. .
 Notes to pages ±µ“±µ
· See Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, ±), p. ±: ˜Coleridge™s connexion with Kant only becomes
meaningful in terms of the counter-pull of Spinoza [ . . . ].™
 Orsini, Coleridge, p. °µ.
 For a reading of Biographia Literaria as re¬‚exively and ironically enacting
its own imaginative metaphysics, and thereby executing ˜a transcendental
deduction of mind in aesthetic terms™, see Kathleen Wheeler, Sources, Pro-
cesses and Methods in Coleridge™s Biographia Literaria (Cambridge, ±°), p. ±µ·.
Paul Hamilton has claimed in Coleridge™s Poetics (Oxford, ±), however, that
Coleridge™s ˜ideas on desynonymy, repressed in Biographia, are the clue to
his missing theory [ . . . ]™ (p. ±). More recently Tim Fulford has argued
in Coleridge™s Figurative Language (London, ±±) that Coleridge saw ¬gura-
tive language as an embodiment of intellectual intuition. Additionally, for
a thorough defence of the logos as forming the apex of Coleridge™s phil-
osophy after ±°µ, see Mary Anne Perkins, Coleridge™s Philosophy. The Logos
as Unifying Principle (Oxford, ±). Perkins™s view that ˜Coleridge™s thought
is, taken as a whole, integrated and coherent™ (p. ±°) is similar to Nicholas
Reid™s contention in ˜Coleridge and Schelling: The Missing Transcendental
Deduction™, Studies in Romanticism,  (±), that ˜a stable, coherent and sys-
tematic philosophy is evident in his writings from September ±± onwards™
(µ), in that both continue the attempt made over the past quarter of a
century to repair the damage in¬‚icted upon Coleridge™s philosophical rep-
utation by Kantian-orientated critics such as Ren´ Wellek in Immanuel Kant
e
in England ±·“± (Princeton, N.J., ±±), and (more damagingly still)
by accusations of plagiarism; for which, see Norman Fruman, The Damaged
Archangel (New York, ±·±).
° Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. µ.
± Ibid., vol. ©© , p. ±µ.
 Ibid., pp. “.
 Ibid., p. .
 Thomas Pfau, ˜Excursus: Schelling in the Work of S.T. Coleridge™, Idealism
and the Endgame of Theory, by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, trans.
and ed. Thomas Pfau (State University of New York Press, ±), p. ·µ.
µ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism
(±°°), trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia,
±·), p. °.
 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philos-
ophy, trans. and ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge University Press, ±),
pp. ±µ“.
· Schelling (History, p. ±µ) maintains that the ˜¬rst declaration in philosophy
(which even precedes philosophy) can in fact only be the expression of a
wanting™.
 Schelling, History, p. µ.
 Elridge, Human Life, p. µ.
µ° McFarland, Coleridge, p. ±·.
Notes to pages ±µ“± 
µ± See, for example, John A. Hodgson, Coleridge, Shelley, and Transcendental Inquiry
(University of Nebraska Press, ±). Hodgson applies the term ˜transcen-
dental™ indifferently to Freud, Coleridge and Shelley, and ˜to arguments and
tropes of mind no less than of God, to querying of inner no less than of outer
noumena™, as a ˜practice [ . . . ] genuinely and broadly Romantic [ . . . ]™
(p. xv).
µ Transcendental argument returned to prominence during the ±°s and
™·°s, largely due to its anti-sceptical use in P. F. Strawson™s Individuals
(London: Methuen, ±µ). It has also been used by Wittgenstein, Austin and
Davidson.
µ Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , pp. “.
µ Ibid., p. ·.
µµ This is a far more telling difference between the positions of the two than
it might at ¬rst appear: Coleridge™s idea of what our ˜intellectual faculties™
are capable of outreaches Kant™s limitation of what can possibly constitute
experience.
µ Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, p. .
µ· Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±.
µ Ibid., p. ±±.
µ Ibid., p. ±.
° Ibid., p. ±·.
± See ibid., p. ±: ˜The real problem of pure reason is now contained in the
question: How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?™
 Robert Paul Wolff, Kant™s Theory of Mental Activity (Harvard University Press,
±), p. µ°. Similar arguments have been made against Strawson. See, for
example: T. E. Wilkerson, ˜Transcendental Arguments™, Philosophical Quarterly
° (±·°), °°“±.
 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press,
±·), p. .
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. , µ.
µ Guyer, Claims of Knowledge, p. µ.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. µ±.
· Ibid., pp. ·°“.
 Ibid., p. ±.
 See Elinor S. Shaffer, ˜The “Postulates in Philosophy” in the Biographia Lit-
eraria™, Comparative Literature Studies · (±·°), ·“±. Shaffer argues that
the issue of philosophical postulates in Biographia marks the point at which
Coleridge shares more ground with Kant™s critical epistemology than the
˜aesthetic usurpation™ of Schelling (°).
·° Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±. Cf. The Friend, vol. © , p. ±·: ˜the
eye must exist previous to any particular act of seeing, though by sight only
can we know that we have eyes™.
·± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , pp. ±±“.
· Coleridge, Logic, p. ±·.
· Ibid., p. °µ.
 Notes to pages ±“±
· Ibid., p. °. For J. H. Muirhead™s view of this issue, see Coleridge as Philosopher
(London: George Allen and Unwin, ±°), p. .
·µ Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. .
· Cf. Kant™s footnote in the preface to the second edition of the ¬rst Critique,
in which he likens his method to that of Copernicus, beginning with a
˜hypothesis [ . . . ] in a manner contradictory to the senses™ which will later
˜be proved not hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution
of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts
of understanding™ (Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±±).
·· Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ˜On Poesy or Art™, Biographia Literaria, ed.
J. Shawcross (Oxford University Press, ±°·), vol. © ©, pp. µ“µ.
· Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lectures ±°“±± on Literature, vol. ©© , p. ±.
· Coleridge, ˜On Poesy™, Shawcross, vol. ©© , p. µ·.
° Ibid., p. µ.
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © © , pp. ±µ“±.
 Pfau, Idealism, p. ·µ.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©©, pp. “µ.
 Coleridge, ˜Essays on the Principles of Genial Criticism™, Shorter Works,
vol. © , p. µ.
µ Ibid., pp. ··“°.
 See Hume, ˜On the Standard of Taste™, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary
±·±“··, ed Eugene F. Miller, rev. edn (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, ±µ),
p. °: ˜It is evident that none of the rules of composition are ¬xed by
reasonings a priori [ . . . ].™
· Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, p. ±.
 See ibid., pp. ±“·: Kant maintains that ˜genius (±) is a talent for producing
that for which no determinate rule can be given [. . . and] consequently
that originality must be its primary characteristic. () That since there can
also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models,
i.e., exemplary, hence, while not themselves the result of imitation, they must
serve others that way, i.e., as a standard or rule for judging. () That it cannot
itself describe or indicate scienti¬cally how it brings its product into being,
but rather that it gives the rule as nature [ . . . ].™
 Ibid., p. .
° Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , pp. ±“µ.
± See Kant™s ˜Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgement™, Critique of the
Power of Judgement, p. : ˜But that things of nature serve one another as
means to ends [ . . . ] for that we have no basis at all in the general idea of
nature as the sum of the objects of the senses.™
 See Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
p. ±: To Bentham, the principle of utility ˜approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question
[ . . . ]™.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, p. .
Notes to pages ±“±· µ
 As Kant puts it, ˜beautiful art cannot itself think up the rule in accordance
with which it is to bring its product into being™: ˜[g]enius is the inborn
predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to
art™ (ibid., p. ±).
µ Guyer sees this as a virtue rather than a problem in Kant and the Claims of Taste
(Harvard University Press, ±·), p. ±°: ˜the analysis of aesthetic judgement
without the explanatory theory of the harmony of the faculties would be
empty, though the explanation without the analysis would surely be blind™.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, p. .
· Ibid., p. °.
 J. G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John
Lachs (Cambridge University Press, ±), pp. ±±±“±.
 These have been discussed extensively in McFarland, Coleridge, esp. ch. .
±°° Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans.
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford University Press,
±·), p. µ.
±°± Friedrich Schlegel, ˜From “Critical Fragments” ™, Origins of Modern Critical
Thought, p. ±°.
±° Bowie, Romanticism, p. ±µ.
±° See Coleridge, The Friend, vol. ©, p. µµ: Coleridge maintains that all sound
method supposes ˜a staple, or starting-post, in the narrator himself; [ . . . ]
the leading Thought, which, borrowing a phrase from the nomenclature of
legislation, we may not inaptly call the © ®© ©  ©™.
±° See ibid., p. µ·: ˜The term, Method, cannot [ . . . ] otherwise than by abuse,
be applied to a mere dead arrangement, containing in itself no principle of
progression.™
±°µ See ibid., pp. µ“°: ˜we contemplate it [i.e., law] as exclusively an attribute
of the Supreme Being, inseparable from the idea of God: adding, however,
that from the contemplation of law in this, its only perfect form, must be
derived all true insight into all other grounds and principles necessary to
Method, as the science common to all sciences [ . . . ]. Alienated from this
(intuition shall we call it? or stedfast [sic] faith?) ingenious men may pro-
duce schemes, conducive to the peculiar purposes of particular sciences,
but no scienti¬c system.™ Reconciling the claims of science/knowledge
and religion/faith was to become the chief project of Coleridge™s later
career.
±° See ibid., p. : Coleridge is relatively brief on Theory, ˜in which the
existing forms and qualities of objects, discovered by observation or exper-
iment, suggest a given arrangement of many under one point of view [ . . . ]
for the purposes of understanding, and in most instances of controlling,
them. In other words, all    supposes the general idea of cause and
effect.™
±°· Ibid., p. .
±° Ibid., p. µ.
±° Ibid., pp. ·“··.
 Notes to pages ±·“±·
±±° See ibid., p. : ˜Hence too, it will not surprise us, that Plato so often
calls ideas ¬© ©®§ ¬· , in which the mind has its whole true being and
permanence [ . . . ].™
±±± See ibid., pp. µ±µ“±. Namely, that unity which ˜is absolutely one, and that
it © ,and af¬rms itself  , is its only predicate. And yet this power,
nevertheless, is! In eminence of Being it IS! [ . . . ].™ The manifestation of
this is ˜¬ ©®™: ˜[a]nd the manifesting power, the source and the
correlative of the idea thus manifested “ is it not GOD?™
±± See ibid., pp. µ±“°: ˜But here it behoves us to bear in mind, that all true
reality has both its ground and its evidence in the will, without which as its
complement science itself is but an elaborate game of shadows, begins in
abstractions and ends in perplexity.™
±± Ibid., p. µ·.
±± See Schelling, History, p. ±: Hegel identi¬es knowing with what is within
the concept, Schelling claims, but ˜cognition is the Positive and only has
being (das Seyende), reality (das Wirkliche), as its object, whereas thinking just
has the possible [ . . . ]™. For Schopenhauer, however, knowledge must be
forsaken, not reconstructed: ˜For in everything in nature there is something
to which no ground can ever be assigned, for which no explanation is
possible [ . . . ]™ (The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New
York: Dover, ±), vol. ©, p. ±).

µ   ® ¤  ¦ « ® ·¬¤§ : ¬ © ¤§  ® ¤  ° 
± Coleridge, ˜To John Kenyon™,  Nov. ±±, letter µ of Letters, vol. © © ©,
p. µ.
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Table Talk, ed. Carl Woodring (Princeton
University Press, ±°), vol. ©, p. .
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed.
Kathleen Coburn,  vols. to date (Routledge and Kegan Paul, ±µ·“ ),
vol. © , note µ°.
 It was such a doctrine as this that Coleridge repeatedly forecast in Biographia,
as when he claims that ˜[i]n the third treatise of my Logosophia [ . . . ] I shall
give (deo volente) the demonstrations and constructions of the Dynamic
Philosophy scienti¬cally arranged™ (Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, p. ).
µ Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, vol. © , p. ·.
 Ibid., pp. µ“°.
· In a letter to Hugh Rose, for instance, Coleridge outlines his plans ˜from
Philosophy to derive a Scientia Scientiarum, and by application of its
Principles and Laws a reversed arrangement of the Sciences: namely by
Descent instead of the hitherto plan by Ascent. ±. Theology. . Ethics. .
Metaphysics or Constructive Logic [ . . . ]™ (˜To Hugh J. Rose™,  May ±±,
letter ±± of Letters, vol. © , p. ).
 Perry, Uses of Division, p. .
 Coleridge, Table Talk, vol. © , p. ±.
Notes to pages ±·“±± ·
±° See Nigel Leask, The Politics of Imagination in Coleridge™s Political Thought
(Macmillan, ±), p. ±, for how this idea coincided with Coleridge™s
increasing interest in mystery cults.
±± Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher, p. ±±°. See also James D. Boulger, Coleridge as
a Religious Thinker (Yale University Press, ±±) for a description of Coleridge
as an Anglican ˜voluntarist traditionalist™ (p. ), and Raimonda Modiano,
Coleridge and the Concept of Nature (Macmillan, ±µ) for a discussion of
˜Coleridge™s voluntaristic philosophy™ (p. ±µ). Mary Anne Perkins observes
that ˜[h]is philosophy, despite its emphasis on Reason, cannot, owing to the
primacy which he attributes to the Will, be adequately categorized as idealist
or rationalist™ (p. ±±). However, Jerome Christensen notes in Coleridge™s Blessed
Machine of Language (Cornell University Press, ±±) that because of this ˜the
will never settles anything for Coleridge “ least of all its own recklessness™
(p. µ).
± S.V. Pradhan, ˜The Historiographer of Reason: Coleridge™s Philosophy of
History™, Studies in Romanticism µ.±: (±), p. µ.
± Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Shorter Works, vol. ©© , p. ±µ. In this passage, written
for Joseph Henry Green, Coleridge also claims that ˜The Ground of Man™s
nature is the Will in a form of Reason™ (vol. ©© , p. ±).
± See Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, (Cambridge
University Press, ±): ˜the concept of a being that has free will is the con-
cept of a causa noumenon [ . . . ]™. ˜But because no intuition, which can only
be sensible, can be put under this application, causa noumenon with respect to
the theoretical use of reason is, though a possible, thinkable concept, nev-
ertheless an empty one™ (p. ±). Kant argues that concepts which cannot
be schematized in intuition, such as objective freedom “ which is simply
˜unconditioned causality™, ˜which for theoretical purposes would be transcen-
dent (extravagant)™ (p. ) “ can only be realized through the moral law, and
thus practically.
±µ See Kathleen Wheeler, ˜Coleridge™s Theory of Imagination: a Hegelian
Solution to Kant?™ The Interpretation of Belief: Coleridge, Schleiermacher and
Romanticism, ed. David Jasper (London, ±).
± Anthony J. Harding™s Coleridge and the Idea of Love (Cambridge University Press,
±·), p. ±, Stephen Prickett™s Coleridge and Wordsworth: The Poetry of Growth
(Cambridge University Press, ±·°), p. ±, and Modiano, Concept of Nature,
p. °, have each argued that combining the Christian idea of love to his
metaphysics of polarity provided Coleridge with a more sophisticated, value-
based model for solving such problems as the nature of personal identity and
divine activity. In Coleridge™s Philosophy, Perkins maintains that the same idea
takes Coleridge™s thought beyond both Kantian and Hegelian philosophy
(p. °).
±· Schelling, History, p. ±.
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©© , p. .
± Coleridge, ˜To Thomas Poole™, ± Oct. [±·]·, letter ±° of Letters, vol. © ,
p. µ.
 Notes to pages ±“±
° Coleridge, ˜To Robert Southey™, ° Sept. [±·], letter  of Letters, vol. ©,
p. µ.
± Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. © , note µµ.
 Ibid., vol. © ©© , note ·µ.
 Biographia frames Spinoza and Jacob Boehme as united in opposition to
the mechanistic philosophy of ˜¤  ™, and denies that Spinoza™s Ethics
is ˜in itself and essentially [ . . . ] incompatible with religion, natural or
revealed™ (Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, p. ±µ). However, by ±± Schelling and
Spinoza have jointly been implicated in the error of considering ˜Ens and
Non-Ens as having no possible intermediates or degrees™ (Notebooks, vol. © © © ,
note µ).
 Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. © , note ··.
µ Schelling, History, pp. ±“°.
 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics. The Collected Works of Spinoza, trans and ed. Edwin
Curley (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, ±µ), vol. © , p. .
· Ibid., p. ·.
 Ibid., p. .
 Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. © , note .
° See Spinoza, Collected Works, vol. ©, p. µ: ˜the human Mind is part of the
in¬nite intellect of God™.
± To a coherentist like Quine, indeed, ˜[w]hat the empirical under-
determination of global science shows is that there are various defensible
ways of conceiving the world™ (Pursuit of Truth, ±°).
 Spinoza, Collected Works, vol. ©, pp. ·“.
 See ibid., pp. ··“: knowledge derived from ˜opinion or imagination™ is ˜the
only cause of falsity [ . . . ]™. The highest form of knowledge, meanwhile, is a
kind of intuitive reason, which ˜proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal
essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence
of things™. For further discussion of Spinoza™s theory of knowledge, see
G. H. R. Parkinson, Spinoza™s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford University Press,
±µ), pp. ±·“°, and E. M. Curley, ˜Experience in Spinoza™s Theory of
Knowledge™, Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene
(University of Notre Dame Press, ±·), pp. µ“µ.
 See Coleridge, The Friend, vol. ©, p. ±. Coleridge here de¬nes genius ˜as
the faculty which adds to the existing stock of power, and knowledge by new
views, new combinations, &c.™
µ Ibid., p. ·.
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lay Sermons, ed. R. J. White (Princeton University
Press, ±·), p. .
· Coleridge, Table Talk, vol. © , p. .
 Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, vol. ©, p. ·.
 Ibid., vol. ©©, p. µ±.
° Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. ©© , editorial note ±.
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±µµ.
 Coleridge, Shorter Works, vol. ©©, p. ±°.
Notes to pages ±“±± 
 Coleridge, ˜To Mr. Pryce™, April ±±, letter ±± of Letters, vol. © , p. µ±.
 This has already been noted by at least one commentator. See D. M.
MacKinnon, ˜Coleridge and Kant™, Coleridge™s Variety: Bicentenary Studies, ed.
John Beer (Macmillan, ±·). MacKinnon observes that Coleridge ˜was
very wrong to regard the Dissertation as a summary of the ¬rst Kritik™ (ibid.,
p. ±), but ¬nds the misinterpretation understandable in view of the ˜extent
to which he found in the Dissertation an attempt to formulate the kind of
pure unfettered intellectual ascent to the ultimate which he desired™ (ibid.,
p. ±·).
µ Immanuel Kant, On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible
World [˜Inaugural Dissertation™], Theoretical Philosophy, ±·µµ“±··°, trans. and
ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge University Press, ±),
p. .
 Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, p. ·.
· Ibid., pp. °·“.
 See Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, pp. “.
 Coleridge, ˜To Thomas Poole™, ± March ±°±, letter · of Letters, vol. © © ,
p. ·°.
µ° Coleridge, ˜To Hugh J. Rose™,  May ±±, letter ±± of Letters, vol. © ,
p. .
µ± Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. °°.
µ Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, p. ·.
µ Coleridge, Logic, pp. ±µ“°.
µ Leibniz, ˜Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Reason™, Philosophi-
cal Writings, p. ±·.
µµ Leibniz, ˜Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis™, Philosophical Writings, p. ±°.
µ Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, vol. © ©, p. µµ.
µ· Coleridge, ˜To Mr. Pryce™, April ±±, letter ±± of Letters, vol. © , p. µ.
µ Descartes, Principles of Philosophy. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans.
and ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony

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