. 3
( 12)


looking at the long list of current government agencies (contained in
the Appendix to this chapter) and listening to the seemingly boundless
promises of contemporary politicians nevertheless gives one pause.

18 Contained in Spencer™s The Man versus the State, pp. 123“66.
19 American sociologist William Graham Sumner (1840“1910) explicitly makes just this
claim in his 1901 essay “The Bequests of the Nineteenth Century to the Twentieth.”
Sumner writes there: “During the nineteenth century the state, as it was inherited from
the eighteenth century, has undergone great improvement. The nineteenth century
inherited from the eighteenth vague notions of political beati¬cation. To abolish kings
and get a ˜republic™ would, it was expected, bring universal and endless peace and
happiness. Then the idea was to get the ˜rights of man™ declared and sworn to. Then the
result was to come from universal suffrage in the republic. Then democracy was to be
the realizer of hope and faith. It was thought that a democracy never would be warlike or
extravagant in expenditure. Then faith was put in a constitutional government, whether
republican or monarchical. Next hope turned to representative institutions as the key to
the right solution. The century ends with despondency as to each and all of these notions.
Now [that is, in 1901] social democracy and state socialism seem to be the divinities which
are to beatify us. The faith that beati¬cation is possible and that some piece of political
machinery can get it for us seems to be as strong as ever” (On Liberty, Society, and Politics,
p. 377). For a penetrating contemporary discussion of this phenomenon, see Daniel
Klein™s “The People™s Romance.”
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 59

Welfare and Forced Labor
But let us ask whether a welfare state is compatible with respecting human-
ity™s personhood. The answer, I believe, is, again, no. Stripped to its essen-
tials, a welfare state is a merely partially realized socialistic state. It may not
claim its members™ entire lives to be under its proper purview, but it does
claim enough of their lives to impede, and thus be inconsistent with,
their personhood. Allowing you to have some, limited say over your life
is better, to be sure, than allowing you none at all, but it is still infe-
rior to allowing you full say. It is like using forced labor on your farm,
but allowing your wards to do what they want in the evenings and on the
weekends”and then defending the practice on the grounds that it strikes
the perfect balance between the extremes of total (tyrannical) control
and total (anarchistic) freedom. Actually, this comparison is more apt
than you might think. Economist Robert Lawson has estimated for me
that in 2004 Americans had to work nearly six months out of the year
to pay their total government burden, which includes federal, state, and
local taxes, costs of compliance with government rules, and costs of gov-
ernment regulation.20 In other words, almost 50 percent of America™s gross
national product is consumed by the state in its various guises. Indeed,
according to the Tax Foundation, Americans pay more in taxes than they
do for food, clothing, and shelter combined.21 How different is that from
a slavery in which you have to work for the slaveholder for only half the
year? Or in which you work for him from 8 a.m. to noon, and then, after
lunch, you can begin work for yourself? Even if it were true”which it is
not”that all that money you had to work for to pay your debt to the state
went to good ends?
A few considerations about likening paying one™s debt to the state to
slavery are in order.22 First, people who must labor to pay taxes are not
subject to the physical and emotional abuse that is often characteristic of
actual slave trades. So we should take care not to minimize or trivialize
the horrors of slave trading. Moreover, a taxed person in a welfare state
can, unlike the slave, move away if he objects to the taxation. (This is the
familiar “America: love it or leave it!” position.) That is a fair point, but

20 Lawson should know: he is the principal economist on the annually compiled Economic
Freedom of the World.
21 Http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxfreedomday.html (accessd December 12, 2005).
22 The following discussion of taxation and slavery draws on the discussions of several
others, including Feser, Haworth, Kymlicka, Michael, Nozick, Jonathan Wolff, and Robert
Paul Wolff.
Working Out the Position

I think it is often exaggerated. Consider this scenario. A large company
decides to buy your town lock, stock, and barrel; perhaps it™s discovered
that under your town are large oil reserves and the company wants to
capitalize on them. It approaches your town council, negotiates a price,
and, despite the protestations of you and a few other dissenting citizens,
closes the deal. The company promptly begins charging you a premium
for driving on “its” roads, shopping in “its” stores, and living in one of “its”
houses; it reorganizes “its” schools according to its lights and forces you
to pay for the schools whether your children go there or not; it develops
numerous rules about what kinds of businesses it will allow and what not;
it charges premiums on some businesses and gives subsidies (paid for by
you) to others; and so on. Naturally, you protest again: you did not agree
to the company buying your town, your land, your house, and the rest;
you do not (let us say) agree with much of what the company does with
its money, and hence you do not want to contribute to its pro¬ts; and you
never consented to pay the company™s premiums”indeed, you openly
and publicly refused your consent. Now suppose that, on hearing your
complaints, a fellow town citizen responds: “Look, this is just what the
company does. Everybody knows that. It™s done it in other towns for a very
long time. Anyway, I like sending my kids to their schools ˜for free.™ And
besides, if you don™t like it, you can always just move.” Consider what your
reaction would be. I suspect you would not feel particularly consoled. Yes,
you can, technically, move: if you have enough money, you can uproot
your family, sell your house (after paying another premium to the com-
pany), and move somewhere else”to another town that is also owned
by this same company or by another one in nearly exactly the same way.
That is the scenario that a person in America who objects to taxation
faces today. There is not the physical brutalization often involved in chat-
tel slave trade, but the extent to which people™s choices are constrained
in a contemporary welfare state such as America is often unappreciated.
A brief historical digression and elaboration on this point. The
seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke (1632“1704) had argued
in his 1690 Second Treatise of Government that a legitimate government
must rest on the consent of the governed. But consent can come in
two guises, Locke argued: express, which is clear enough, and tacit,
which presents, as Locke says, a “dif¬culty.”23 If a person expressly
consents to a government™s authority”by, say, taking a public oath of

23 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, §119, p. 347. Other references to Locke™s Second
Treatise are to paragraph and page in this edition.
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 61

allegiance”then, Locke argues, there is no question as to the govern-
ment™s legitimate authority over him. On the other hand, Locke argued
that in the absence of such public declarations, one can also “tacitly”
consent to a government™s authority:

every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, or any part of the Dominions
of any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged
to Obedience to the Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any
one under it; whether this his possession be of Land, to him and his Heirs for
ever, or a Lodging only for a Week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on
the Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within
the Territories of that Government. (§119, p. 348)

This might capture the sentiment of the claim that if I enjoy the privileges
and immunities of living under a government™s jurisdiction, then I have
ipso facto given my consent, even if “tacitly,” to what that government
does. And thus I have no legitimate grounds to resist my government™s
actions, for example, when it taxes me. But that notion of consent is far
too broad”indeed, it is so broad as to lose all connection to anything
one might legitimately call “consent” at all. David Hume addressed the
Lockean argument in his essay “Of the Original Contract” and, to my
mind, refuted it. It is worth quoting at length:

Should it be said, that, by living under the dominion of a prince, which one might
leave, every individual has given a tacit consent to his authority, and promised
him obedience; it may be answered, that such an implied consent can only have
place, where a man imagines, that the matter depends on his choice. But where
he thinks (as all mankind do who are born under established governments) that
by his birth he owes allegiance to a certain prince or certain form of government;
it would be absurd to infer a consent or choice, which he expressly, in this case,
renounces and disclaims.
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave
his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day
to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man,
by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though
he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish,
the moment he leaves her. (p. 475)

Hume here reiterates the two central points in my argument above. First,
it seems implausible”Hume says “absurd””to claim that a person has
“consented” to a government to which he has never expressly given alle-
giance and whose authority over him he now expressly denies. Second,
the “love it or leave it” response is a Hobson™s choice, which is no choice at
all. In other words, if one of the options offered is not a realistic possibility,
Working Out the Position

then it is a mere pretense to claim that one™s taking the other option is
an act of free, voluntary consent.
To return, then, to the issue of taxation and slavery, perhaps one is
inclined to say that a better comparison would be between taxation and
theft, both being instances”so one might argue”of A taking away from B
what was rightfully B™s and not A™s to take. But the theft analogy does not
fully capture the situation, since paying taxes is something that one must
do continuously, with every transaction of goods, services, or commodi-
ties, and forever; it is not a one-time loss, as theft usually is. Moreover,
the notion of theft might presuppose a controversial notion of (natu-
ral?) property rights: A can only “steal” something from B if B rightfully
“owned” it in the ¬rst place. But an objector might argue that the state,
not individuals, owns everything, and hence that in taxation the state is
merely taking what was its own in the ¬rst place. Since paying one™s govern-
ment debt is enforced by coercion or the threat of coercion, however, and
since one™s ability to vote, if one has that ability, is negligible in altering
the governmental burden”each person™s vote is statistically insigni¬cant
in almost every election, and in any case the majority of people setting
and enforcing actual tax policy are unelected government employees
over whom no citizen has any direct control”perhaps the proper way to
think of people™s legal responsibility to pay the governmental burden is
as forced labor. However you decide to work, and however much work you
do, federal, state, and local governments in America will take about half
of whatever you make. They do this whether you agree they should or not
and whether you consent or not, and they have a considerable array of
coercive punitive measures they can bring to bear on you if you try not to
comply. Thus you are forced to give a portion of the fruits of your labor
to others against your will to serve their ends, not yours. That is virtually
the de¬nition of “forced labor.”
Most people are inclined to accept that forced labor is wrong, even if
they resist the suggestion that state taxation is relevantly similar to it. In
the next chapter I argue that despite the similarity to forced labor, the
state is still justi¬ed in taxing its citizens”but only for a narrow, specif-
ically limited purpose. That one purpose is a corollary to the argument
I wish to make here, which is that when you are forced to pay a por-
tion of what you earn to someone else, you are to that extent not free
to use your own judgment: you are not allowed to decide for yourself
to what uses or purposes your money or labor will be put, and you are
not allowed to decide for yourself whether the uses or purposes to which
that demanded portion of your money is put are worthwhile or justi¬ed.
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 63

Taking these decisions away from you therefore restricts the scope of
your judgment. And doing that, as I have argued, is an affront to your
personhood. My suggestion, then, is that to whatever extent the state
makes decisions about your life for you, to that same extent does it dis-
respect your personhood and thus your humanity. If it does that only
a little bit, then you are better off than many other people in the world
whose states are more oppressive; but it still does it that little bit. Just as you
would reject, and rightly so, forcing someone to work against his will even
for only “a little bit” of his day, for the same reasons you should reject
a state that substitutes its judgment for an individual person™s, even a
little bit.
As I mentioned, however, it is easy to underestimate the extent to which
welfare states such as America™s resemble in effect the socialistic state
more than a “middle road” between totalitarianism and anarchism. To
give an idea, consider ¬rst the description Alexis de Tocqueville (1805“
59) gave of the peculiar brand of “despotism” growing in America in the
Thus, after taking each individual by turns in its powerful hands and kneading
him as it likes, the sovereign extends its arms over society as a whole; it covers its
surface with a network of small, complicated, painstaking, uniform rules through
which the most original minds and the most vigorous souls cannot clear a way
to surpass the crowd; it does not break wills, but it softens them, bends them,
and directs them; it rarely forces one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to
one™s acting; it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not
tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and ¬nally
reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and industrious
animals of which the government is the shepherd.24

Moving forward in history only a few decades, consider next the list of
ten things that Marx and Engels claimed in the Communist Manifesto are
required to establish socialism:
1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land
to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.
4. Con¬scation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the banks of the state, by means of a
national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly.

24 Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 4, chap. 6, p. 663. Be sure to read the rest of Tocqueville™s
chapter, too.
Working Out the Position

6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in
the hands of the state.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the
state; the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and the improve-
ment of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal obligation of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies,
especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; grad-
ual abolition of all the distinction between town and country by a
more equable distribution of the populace over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of chil-
dren™s factory labor in its present form. Combination of education
with industrial production, & c., & c.25

The United States currently fully embraces 2 and 10, and it has gone some
considerable way toward realizing 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9. Consider, ¬nally, all
the departments, agencies, of¬ces, and bureaus, listed in the Appendix to
this chapter, that the American federal government currently comprises.
You may be surprised to see just how many departments of the federal
government there are that are dedicated to monitoring, recording, regu-
lating, and controlling so many areas of human life.26 This gives, I think,
a strong”and indeed sobering”indication of just where we fall on the
spectrum between totalitarianism and anarchism.27
My claim is not that all of these state programs and agencies are bad
in themselves, that they have only bad effects, or that they do no good.
My argument here is rather that whatever their consequences, they dis-
respect people™s personhood. Their effects, whether good or bad, are
irrelevant to that claim”in the same way that it would be irrelevant if
a thief defended his practices on the grounds that he helps the econ-
omy by spending his stolen money or circulating his pilfered goods.
Now, a thief does not in fact help the economy. It is an old fallacy, still
unfortunately widely believed, that mere circulation of goods or spend-
ing of money helps the economy, regardless of how it is spent or cir-

25 In Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, p. 490.
26 See Brian Finegan™s The Federal Subsidy Beast for details.
27 Consider also the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. New London
(http://straylight.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-108.ZS.html, accessed December 12,
2005), which grants local governments the legal right to seize people™s private property
by eminent domain and transfer ownership of it to other private interests whenever the
local government believes it would be a good idea to do so. See Jeff Jacoby™s “Eminent
Injustice in New London.”
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 65

culated. The fallacy was brilliantly exposed by the nineteenth-century
French economist Fr´ d´ ric Bastiat (1801“50) in his 1850 essay “What Is
Seen and What Is Not Seen.”28 Bastiat there entertains, and then demol-
ishes, the proposition that someone who breaks other people™s windows
helps the economy by making work for the glazier. As Bastiat explains,
the new work for the glazier is “what is seen”; “what is not seen,” how-
ever, and thus is usually forgotten, is the lost opportunity represented by
what the window™s owner would have otherwise spent his money on”which,
since he would rather have done that than pay for a new window, would
have led to better opportunity and thus satisfaction for him. This has
become known as the “broken window fallacy,” and a version of it lies
behind the thief™s supposed rationalization of his own destructive prac-
tices. But suppose, contrary to fact, that the thief did help the economy:
his practice would still be theft and therefore unjust. Similarly, I claim,
with government programs. I think most of them are in fact demonstra-
tively counterproductive, but even if they were not, they would still disre-
spect the personhood of those whose personal judgment they distrust and

“negative” and “positive” liberty
Bastiat wrote elsewhere that the state “is the great ¬ctitious entity by which
everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else.”29 In this he was
echoing the French philosophe Voltaire (1694“1778), who had said in the
eighteenth century that the state is merely a device for taking money out
of one set of pockets and putting it into another.30 Oh, come on! you might
think. Those remarks might make for provocative rhetorical ¬‚ourishes,
but they cannot be taken literally”or if they are taken literally, then they
are either exaggerated or outright false. Right? Well, just how exaggerated
are they?
Let us try to get a handle on this by looking at some in¬‚uential recent
discussions. In a seminal 1969 essay entitled “Two Concepts of Liberty,”
political theorist Isaiah Berlin distinguished what he called negative from
positive liberty. The “negative” concept of liberty is usually associated with
what John Locke defended in his Second Treatise of Government, which

28 Contained in his Selected Essays on Political Economy, pp. 1“50.
29 In his essay, “The State,” contained in Selected Essays on Political Economy, p. 144. Compare
the surprisingly similar sentiments expressed by V. I. Lenin in his 1918 The State and
Revolution, chap. 1.
30 Quoted in Albert Jay Nock™s “Anarchist™s Progress,” pp. 40“1.
Working Out the Position

holds that the government should be strictly limited in the scope of its
power to defending person and private property, enforcing voluntary
contracts, and punishing violations of person, private property, or con-
tracts. On this conception, liberty is the “negative” freedom to do as one
pleases with one™s person or private property, as long as one does not
violate the similar freedom of everyone else. This conception of freedom
is essentially the General Liberty principle I defended in chapter 1. The
“positive” concept, on the other hand, holds that a person is truly free
only when he has the resources required to enable him to be what he wants
and can be. This conception requires the state or others to take “posi-
tive” action to provide people who otherwise would not have the relevant
means with whatever they need. This may require state-provided health
care, education, unemployment insurance, business loans, monopolies,
or other goods, services, or guarantees.
This second, “positive” freedom sounds to me rather more like capacity
or power, as in the distinction between saying that you are free to outrun
a horse, but you are not capable of it: it strikes me as a confusion to say
that because you are not able to outrun a horse, you are not “free” to
do so. (Of course you are: go ahead and try.) And if you really wanted
to be able to go faster than a horse, and I could provide you with the
means”suppose I have a motorcycle right here that you could use”still
it would seem a confusion to say that I am limiting your freedom by not
lending you my motorcycle. I may be acting sel¬shly or ungenerously, but
I am not coercing you; so I have not limited your freedom. A concrete
recent example also makes the point. In 2001, President George W. Bush
issued an Executive Order limiting federal funding for stem-cell research
on the grounds that the federal government should not fund something
that many people have deep moral reservations about. (On that criterion,
an awful lot of what the government does would be unacceptable, but put
that to one side for now.) For this decision Bush was widely criticized as
having restricted stem-cell research itself, or for having ˜tied one hand
behind the backs™ of researchers.31 Without judging Bush™s decision itself,
it seems that this criticism displays the same confusion between power or
capacity, on the one hand, and freedom, on the other. Bush did not ban
the research or ban private donations to support it; hence he did not

31 Here is a typical example: http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/07/stem.cell.
ap/index.html (accessed March 15, 2005). See also Ronald Bailey™s “Do We Really
Need the Feds? Funding Stem-Cell Research without Uncle Sam,” http://www.reason.
com/rb/rb082405.shtml (accessed December 12, 2005).
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 67

limit the freedom of the researchers or the potential donors or other
supporters. He only removed one source of ¬nancial support for it”and
even then only partially, since there is still some federal support for it.
Regardless, whatever else we might think of Bush™s actions or the reasons
for them, I suggest that although researchers might now be less able to do
what they want, they are still free to do so if they choose and can ¬nd the
means. “Positive freedom,” then, seems more accurately called “capacity”
than “freedom”; “negative freedom” has I think the stronger claim to
being rightly called “freedom.”
Nevertheless, the defenders of “positive” freedom have claimed that
they are in fact advocating the only real freedom, namely, the freedom
to do things. What good does it do a pauper, they ask rhetorically, to be
“free” to start a business? True freedom, they contend, requires that the
state provide people with the background, training, and other resources
necessary to make it in fact possible for anyone to start a business. Indeed,
some defenders of “positive” freedom have argued that the provision of
certain basic needs or “necessary goods” is actually required by a proper
respect for personhood.32 So where I have suggested that it violates per-
sonhood to limit people™s choices about how to work, what to do with
their money, and so on, several thinkers have turned the focus away from
those who pay the money and provide the goods to those who receive them
and argued that respect for their (that is, the recipients™) personhood
entails providing them with “basic needs” such as food, clothing, shelter,
education, and health care if we are able to do so.33 I disagree and argue

32 See, for example, Joseph Raz™s The Morality of Freedom and the collection of essays
contained in Gillian Brock™s edited collection Necessary Goods (see especially Copp™s,
Goodin™s, O™Neill™s, and Sterba™s contributions).
33 Exactly what counts as a “basic need” is a subject of discussion. Here is David Copp™s
fairly typical de¬nition, which he adapts from David Braybrook: “Any credible analysis
of the concept of a basic need would imply that all or most of the following are either
basic needs or forms of provision for a basic need: the need for nutritious food and
water; the need to excrete; the need otherwise to preserve the body intact; the need for
periodic rest and relaxation, which I presume to include periodic sleep and some form
of recreation; the need for companionship; the need for education; the need for social
acceptance and recognition; the need for self-respect and self-esteem; the need to be
free from harassment” (in Necessary Goods, p. 124). Copp says that his list “is perhaps
not complete, and it may contain some redundancy,” and he adds that although the
state cannot directly provide citizens with several of these things (such as self-respect
and companionship), its duty nevertheless is to enable citizens to meet their basic needs,
if not provide them the needs outright (ibid.). Cf. the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, which, in addition
to the standard life, liberty, and property, includes among everyone™s “universal rights”
such things as “a right to social security” (Article 22), “the right to . . . periodic holidays
Working Out the Position

to the contrary that having the state provide even “basic” or “necessary”
goods”rather than, or in addition to, having the state secure ˜justice™ as
described in chapter 1”is an infringement, and thus disrespecting, of
the personhood both of the person who is called on to provide the goods
and the recipient of the goods. To make that case, I turn now to examine
in a bit more detail one recent attempt to argue that a proper respect for
persons™ freedom entails the provision of a substantial range of goods.

A “Third” Concept of Liberty?
Samuel Fleischacker has recently offered what he calls a “third concept
of liberty,” which he argues successfully navigates between the Scylla of
Berlin™s “positive” liberty and the Charybdis of his “negative” liberty, enjoy-
ing the bene¬ts of both but the liabilities of neither. In his thus aptly
named Third Concept of Liberty, Fleischacker argues that his “third” concept
is a prudent middle way: it requires the government to provide citizens
with basic necessities to free them for leading lives with ample oppor-
tunity for activities that are “phronetic””that is, judgment-developing,
named after phronesis, Aristotle™s word for judgment; but it also requires
the government to limit itself by not making all decisions for its citizens,
in this way allowing scope for citizens to exercise their phronesis.
Fleischacker argues that “phronetic activity” is an essential element of
leading a ¬‚ourishing, truly human life”that without it no person can be
happy or, as Fleischacker puts it, have a life ¬lled with “proper pleasures.” I
think he is right about that, and his argument bears a striking similarity to
the one I developed in this and the previous chapter about ˜personhood™
and what it entails. But the political conclusions Fleischacker reaches do
not follow from the premises, and indeed, as I shall try to show, they are
inconsistent with those premises. It is important to spend this time on
Fleischacker™s argument because his is a particularly sophisticated and

with pay” (Article 24), and “the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and his family” (Article 25); and it declares, “Everyone has
the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and funda-
mental stages” (Article 26). Several other “fundamental human rights” are included;
see the entire list at http://www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm (accessed December 12,
2005). For criticism, see, for example, Antony Flew™s short essay “The Arti¬cial In¬‚ation
of Natural Rights,” http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=3297
(accesssed December 12, 2005), and Max Hocutt™s Grounded Ethics, chap. 15. For another
recent list of “basic needs” that the author believes the state should provide for everyone,
see Cass Sunstein™s The Second Bill of Rights. For criticism, see Max Hocutt™s “Sunstein on
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 69

powerful defense of a commonly held position”namely, that a welfare
state is justi¬ed or even required by a proper conception of human per-
sonhood. Thus if I can show that Fleischacker™s argument is problematic,
then I hope to have also cast doubt on other arguments claiming to sup-
port similar conclusions.34
Fleischacker argues that if judgment is crucial to personhood and
that certain circumstances”such as leisure time, health care, and
education”are necessary to cultivate judgment, then it follows that the
state ought to look after those circumstances. But that does not follow.
Grant, for example, that I should exercise more, or that we should all
exercise more, or even that exercising more is crucial to everyone™s over-
all well-being: it does not follow from any of that that the government
must take over direction of everyone™s exercising. Or grant Plato™s belief
that what children read (or listen to) has considerable in¬‚uence on the
kind of adults they become; grant even that what children read (or lis-
ten to) is of greater in¬‚uence on them than any other single factor: still
it does not follow that the state must therefore take over direction of
what children read (or listen to).35 Another argument is required to link
the two. One would need to show that what is crucial for human judg-
ment must therefore be provided by the state. But I suggest that there is
no such argument, at least not one that does not simultaneously entail
disrespecting people™s personhood.
Fleischacker™s argument makes a transition that is common in argu-
ments defending the welfare state, but the transition masks a problem.
“A minimal condition for participation in a sphere of phronetic activ-
ity, especially if one™s work life lacks any interesting tasks,” Fleischacker
writes, “is that one have the time to discover, and develop the skills for,
such a sphere. It follows that from the importance of judgment and its
proper pleasures we can resuscitate the old liberal idea that government
needs to ensure adequate leisure for its citizenry.”36 As I showed above,

34 My discussion here is based in part on my “Private Judgment, Individual Freedom, and
the Role of the State” in the Journal of Social Philosophy and my review of Fleischacker™s
book in the Review of Metaphysics.
35 For an attack on “rock music” in the spirit of Plato, and thus contrary to my argument,
see Allan Bloom™s chapter “Music” in his The Closing of the American Mind.
36 A Third Concept of Liberty, p. 116 (emphasis in orginal). All other references to Fleischacker
are to this book, on the page given in parentheses. Incidentally, Fleischacker claims that
contemporary Americans have increasingly less leisure time, basing his claim on Juliet
Schor™s The Overworked American. But Schor™s conclusions must be compared with the
contrary (and to my mind convincing) evidence found in Robinson and Godbey™s Time
for Life and in Cox and Alm™s Myths of the Rich and Poor.
Working Out the Position

however, that conclusion does not follow. Here is another example of the
non sequitur: “More active [as opposed to “passive”] preferences use and
therefore develop our capacity for choice itself”for intelligent, which is
to say phronetic, choice. So the political powers that be must guarantee us
substantial opportunities to satisfy these preferences because otherwise
we will lose our freedom” (p. 118). And again:

As a society, we are obligated to put every resource we can muster into prevent-
ing and overcoming the circumstances that make children unable to grow up
with good characters, and to provide insurance to adults against events that “dis-
lodge” them from so much as having control over their own characters, from
retaining the virtues that enable them to handle and appreciate luck at all. . . .
[I]t is not appropriate to let luck provide whatever it takes to insure that peo-
ple not get entrenched in starvation, in slavery, in illness or despair suf¬cient to
“corrupt . . . desire, expectation, and thought,” in miseries suf¬ciently “crushing
and prolonged” to break their self-command. The material security to prevent
such disintegration of virtue is the “guaranteed minimum” of political economists.
This minimum we as a society must supply, must distribute to each, not expect
each to earn for himself. (pp. 234“35)

Finally, Fleischacker concludes: “To hold each responsible for his or her
own acts, to expect people to work for their own ends, we must provide
them with the means that allow for responsibility: the means of health,
leisure, and education by which they can judge intelligently of their lives
and their conditions” (p. 235). As Fleischacker makes clear, when he
says “we” must provide such things, he means that the state must do it.
But why the state? Why not families? Why not churches? Why not other
voluntary organizations?37 Any of these might be called for, depending
on the circumstances. Indeed, depending on the circumstances of a par-
ticular case, perhaps what is called for is precisely no help from anyone:
perhaps the individual needs to face this hardship on his own. This last
consideration provokes perhaps the most important question: Shouldn™t
we expect individuals themselves to ¬gure out ways to provide for their
needs”especially given the importance of their having opportunities to
develop their phronesis? Barring exceptional cases, such as children and
in¬rm adults, the default expectation should be that a ˜person™ is both
capable of and responsible for directing his own life, for facing and sur-
mounting challenges, and for pursuing cooperative arrangements with

37 We should not underestimate or discount what voluntary clubs and organizations can
do. See David Beito™s From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State and The Voluntary City and Fred
Foldvary™s Public Goods and Private Communities for extensive descriptions of actual cases.
See also Flew™s Social Life and Moral Judgment, chap. 3.
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 71

others to help secure his ends. Thus state action is neither the necessary
nor the only possible implication of the importance of human phronesis.
When Fleischacker turns, then, to make his political recommenda-
tions, he faces the further, more substantial problem that the wish to
extend private phronesis is incompatible with the endorsement of an
expansive welfare state.
To allow for “the judgment that we need for truly free choices,” Fleis-
chacker argues that the state must do all of the following (pp. 238“9):
(1) provide “good information about the options among which one is
choosing,” (2) provide “a thorough education in the skills of interpreta-
tion and the assessment of evidence,” including education in “the skills
of aesthetic interpretation” and in applying “those skills to the deci-
sions [people] need to make about running their own lives,” (3) pro-
vide “access to rich, clear, and clearly organized facts about products and
jobs,” and (4) provide “centralized computer services open to everyone”
where such information will be available at no cost to the user. So far
Fleischacker™s list is not very different from some of what federal, state,
and local governments routinely do, or attempt to do, in America today.
But Fleischacker is not ¬nished yet. To alleviate problems he believes
economic markets lead to, the state must also ensure (5) that all citi-
zens are raised “from childhood on with adequate nutrition, shelter, and
health care,” (6) that citizens know “they would receive considerable aid
in unemployment,” (7) that they know they “could take any job in the
country because funds [are] available to transport them there,” (8) that
they are “well trained in evaluating evidence and [have] easy access to a
large amount of information about their opportunities,” and (9) that they
have “suf¬cient leisure to re¬‚ect on their lives and alter them if necessary,”
on the order of “six weeks a year, or a several-month sabbatical every few
years.” (Duty (8) might be encompassed by some combination of (1)“
(3); if so, we can eliminate it from the list. On the other hand, duties (1)
and (3) require not only that the state provide information, but also that
it procure or generate it; and duties (6) and (7) require not just that the
state notify citizens of services, but also that it actually provide the services.
That suggests that we should perhaps increase Fleischacker™s list.)38
The government that could undertake to do all that is a large one
indeed, and it thus seems Fleischacker™s “third,” “true” concept of

38 I should note that Fleischacker™s description of what the state should provide its citizens
is not particularly unusual among contemporary political theorists. For another recent
version, see Cass Sunstein™s The Second Bill of Rights.
Working Out the Position

freedom would be considerably closer to the socialist model than to any
classical liberal model. For consider what would be required to actu-
ally effect the tasks Fleischacker believes the state must undertake. It
would require extensive state-supported educational programs, nation-
alized health care, nationalized information and transportation systems,
and systematic national oversight of businesses™ vacation policies, bene-
¬ts packages, retirement offerings, employment contracts, and working
conditions. Moreover, the requirements to provide adequate overall con-
ditions for all children would require extensive central planning of eco-
nomic resources and educational policies. And all this state apparatus
would have to be supported by taxation, entailing large-scale redistribu-
tion of wealth, and be executed and directed by an extensive information-
gathering agency, entailing the procurement of a great deal of detailed
information about all citizens.
The problem is that all this state action would compromise the protec-
tion of human judgment”which was the initial, and indeed paramount,
concern. Consider what Fleischacker says about the importance of
the freedom to judge, which entails freedom from governmental and
other third-party interference. One thing he argues that recent demo-
cratic theorists have gotten right is the importance of autonomy and
independence. “Still,” says Fleischacker, “in the end what matters is inde-
pendence itself, not the mode of reaching it, and it is far from clear
that participation in government is the only way to develop that quality”
(p. 248).39 Part of the reason for Fleischacker™s skepticism here is the
kind of people who are in government:

Arrogant, self-deluded, and otherwise morally incompetent people abound who
participate well in communal government. Political activists, kibbutz leaders,
school and church board members”anyone who has spent a signi¬cant amount
of time with such people knows plenty who are shallow, ambitious, and vain,
whose service to their cause or community is a means of self-promotion or, at
best, a distraction from personal failings. (pp. 248“9)

Fleischacker concludes”tellingly”that it “is indeed quite possible that,
in modern societies, we develop and exercise our communally oriented
virtues better by ˜private™ than by ˜public™ activities” (p. 249; emphasis in
original). Fleischacker goes on to claim, even more strongly: “We legis-
late most successfully for ourselves, we govern our own lives most fully,

39 For a criticism of democracy based on an argument similar to Fleischacker™s here, see
Gordon Graham™s The Case against the Democratic State.
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 73

by controlling how we individually run our most important individual
decisions, not by participating in group attempts to coordinate human
actions” (p. 251). He elaborates, “It should be clear that the condition
˜not being coerced by anyone else™ [which Fleischacker endorses] rules
out any use of judgment to coerce others. So it is the government™s busi-
ness, of course, to stop killing, theft, rape, assault, and the like: the whole
libertarian program for government action is brought in by that condi-
tion.” But note well his next sentence: “The point of my list of conditions is
to go beyond the libertarian program” (p. 325 n. 26; emphasis in original).
That, I suggest, is the problem in a nutshell.
To make clearer the problem I see, let me focus for a moment on this
single sentence of Fleischacker™s: “As soon as judgment is recognizably in
place”the person has her basic biological needs met, has the experience
and mental training to re¬‚ect on ends as well as means, and is not being
coerced by anyone else”what one does with one™s judgment is none of
any government™s business” (p. 264). Here we see both of Fleischacker™s
concerns: enabling judgment, on the one hand, and allowing scope for
its practice, on the other. But we also see the seeds of the position™s undo-
ing. For there is no way, I suggest, that the state can do all the things
Fleischacker has argued are necessary for making sure that “judgment
is recognizably in place” in every citizen while simultaneously allowing
for all citizens to use that judgment however they see ¬t. The state can-
not, after all, produce the education, health care, food, transportation,
information, and so on ex nihilo: rather, it can provide them only indi-
rectly, by drawing on the labor, services, and money of others. And of
course the labor, services, and money of others must be produced by the
people themselves. Thus in calling for “the government” to provide these
things for those who do not already have them, one is actually calling on
the state to make one group of people provide them for another. If the
state taxes or demands the labor of some to provide for others, the for-
mer are to that extent no longer free to use their judgment as they see
¬t. The alternative”allowing people to provide such services to others
as they privately judge proper”is precisely not what Fleischacker argues
for; he is rather arguing for whichever group of people is running the
relevant branch of the state to override others™ judgments and make them
pay or labor as the group sees ¬t. Perhaps Bastiat and Voltaire were on to
something after all.
One might respond here that perhaps Fleischacker™s argument is that
although the government may not poke its nose into what I do with
my judgment privately, it may justi¬ably concern itself with what I do
Working Out the Position

with my goods and services. In other words, it may regulate my (public)
economic activity, even as it respects my (private) judgment about other
matters. This response founders on two problems. First, it relies on an
untenable distinction between public actions and private judgment. My
goods and services are produced by my labor, and my labor is inherently
connected with my private judgment. They cannot be separated, since
the former are simply products or extensions of the latter. So granting
the state oversight of my goods, services, and labor is in effect granting
it oversight of a large part of the functioning of my judgment, and since
judgment just is deciding for oneself, that is in effect to damage my
judgment itself. Second, this reply overlooks the full scope of the range
of activities that Fleischacker, as well as other theorists defending similar
positions, actually say falls within the proper purview of the state, as well
as what would be required to provide for those activities. They could not
be created except by extensive impingement on the private judgment of
Using language drawn from Immanuel Kant, Fleischacker says that it is
the free play of the deliberative faculties culminating in passing judgment
that chie¬‚y de¬nes who we are and makes our lives worth living. Remove
or limit the opportunities to do this and human life correspondingly
suffers. I agree: to the extent that one person or one group substitutes
its notion of the good life for that of others, then to that same extent
the others™ opportunities for phronetic activities are curtailed, thereby
diminishing free choice and imperiling human ¬‚ourishing. I conclude,
therefore, that it is inconsistent to ask the state both to provide such an
extensive list of services to its citizens and to give them a wide scope of
private space in which to exercise their phronetic powers.
One ¬nal way of making this point is by pointing out that people™s
actions under “negative” liberty are compossible, meaning that every person
can fully exercise his negative freedom simultaneously with everyone else,
and no one will be interfering with anyone else™s similar exercise. This
is the sentiment captured in Adam Smith™s remark that one can “ful¬l
all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing.”40 On the other
hand, “positive” liberty is not compossible: it is not possible for everyone to
exercise “positive” liberty, because such exercise by some will necessarily
be at the expense of others. This is a fundamental contradiction involved
in the welfare state, what makes it inherently inimical to a true respect
for personhood.

40 Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 82.
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 75

The Judgment of Recipients of Aid
The contradiction is also made apparent by considering not only the ways
in which a welfare state limits the phronetic activity of those it requires to
provide services”by not allowing them the opportunity to judge whether
to provide the service, and if so how much, in what way, and so on”but
by considering how it limits the phronetic activities of the recipients of
these services”by depriving them of the opportunity to make important
life decisions on their own. Depending on how extensive the ¬nal list of
the state™s tasks is, there may in fact turn out to be embarrassingly little
scope for people™s private phronesis. Individuals would not judge the
structure or content of their or their children™s education, for example,
which doctors to see or which medical treatments to pay for, or which
information is important or proper or necessary to know; they may not
have ¬nal say in which foods to eat, which exercises or sports or hobbies
to engage in or refrain from, or even, perhaps, whether or how many
children to have.
If you ¬nd it implausible to suggest that such matters might come
within the ambit of a Fleischackerian state™s authority, consider to what
lengths government programs have gone in the American welfare state
once they have been implemented. A critic of the 1990 Americans with
Disabilities Act, to take one recent example, would have been laughed
out of court had he suggested that it might lead to overweight people
suing movie theaters and airlines for not providing seats big enough to
accommodate the “disability” of being obese; yet there have been such
cases.41 Another example, taken at random: when the United States For-
est Service was founded in 1905 to “improve and protect the forests” of
America, it is safe to say that no one then dreamed that by 1991 the service
would have constructed 360,000 miles of roads (eight times the length
of the entire American Interstate Highway System, making it the largest
single road-construction agency in the world), that its 2001 budget would
total $5.3 billion, and that it would employ some 38,000 people.42 Some
other facts. According to the Congressional Budget Of¬ce, the total bud-
get of the U.S. federal government has increased signi¬cantly in recent
decades: in 1962, total outlays were $106.6 billion (18.8% of gross domes-
tic product); in 1970, $195.6 billion (19.3%); in 1980, $590.9 billion
(21.6%); in 1990, $1,253 billion (21.8%); in 2000, $1,789 billion (18.4%);

41 See, for one example, “Woman Says Dairy Fired Her over Weight,” New York Times,
February 18, 1999.
42 See Bethell™s The Noblest Triumph, chap. 18, and O™Toole™s Reforming the Fire Service.
Working Out the Position

and in 2003, $2,158 billion (19.9%).43 Total spending on federal reg-
ulatory activity alone (that is, not including other areas of spending)
increased from $1.9 billion in 1960 to $30.1 billion in 2003 in constant
1996 dollars, a real increase of 1,584 percent. Federal employees staf¬ng
the regulatory agencies went from 70,080 in 1970 to 195,284 in 2003, an
increase of 279 percent.44 And total pages in the Federal Register, where all
federal regulations are listed, increased from 12,792 in 1960 to 75,795
in 2003, an increase of 593 percent.45 A ¬nal indicator: the number of
people holding “executive titles” in the federal government (that is, peo-
ple who report “directly to the Senate-con¬rmed positions of secretary,
deputy secretary, undersecretary, assistant secretary and administrator”)
was seventeen in 1960, then grew to thirty-three in 1992, ¬fty-one in
1998, and sixty-four in 2004: almost a quadrupling.46 According to the
U.S. Census Bureau, however, from 1960 to 2000 the American popu-
lation increased from 180,671,158 to 272,690,813”a mere 50 percent
increase.47 So the increase in population cannot nearly account for the
huge growth in American federal government staf¬ng, spending, and
regulation. A look at other aspects of the federal government reveals
remarkably similar trajectories.
My suggestion, then, is that the inevitable drift of such government
programs is almost always to extend, not limit, their scope. Once agencies
are created with the express but quite general purpose of making sure
that all people have whatever is required for proper phronesis, I do not
think there is any way we can say in advance which areas of life they would
consider outside their legitimate purview.

43 See http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1821&sequence=0#table1 (accessed De-
cember 12, 2005). Economist Robert Higgs argues that federal expenditures are
substantially higher than the Budget Of¬ce™s estimates, both in real terms and as
a percentage of American wealth; see Higgs™s “Lies, Damn Lies, and Conventional
Measures of the Growth of Government,” http:/ /www.independent.org/tii/media/
pdf/tir 09 1 9 higgs.pdf (accessed December 12, 2005).
44 See Dudley and Warren, “Regulatory Spending Soars,” http:/ /wc.wustl.edu/Reg Bud-
get ¬nal.pdf (accessed December 12, 2005). See also Higgs, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Con-
ventional Measures of the Growth of Government,” and Crews, Ten Thousand Command-
45 The number of pages increases almost daily. For running updates, see http:/ /www.
access.gpo.gov/su docs/fedreg/frcont03.html (accessed December 12, 2005).
46 See “Agencies Getting Heavier on Top,” Washington Post, July 23, 2004, http:/ /www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7590-2004Jul22.html (accessed December 12,
47 See http:/ /eire.census.gov/popest/archives/pre1980/popclockest.txt (accessed De-
cember 12, 2005).
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 77

Might such an agency decide that a person™s nutrition, for exam-
ple, is a critical factor affecting whether he is able to exercise his
phronesis properly”a bad diet can incapacitate a person, after all”
and thus that it must specify which foods and medicines and supple-
ments each person must eat or take? This is not too far from where
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration now stands: the FDA™s 2005
budget is $1.8 billion, and it now claims oversight over all foods and
drinks consumed by human beings; all medicines, medications, biolog-
ics, and nutritional supplements taken epidermally, orally, anally, intra-
venously, or otherwise; all devices, packages, or utensils for the adminis-
tration of foodstuffs, medicines, medications, biologics, or supplements;
as well as animal feed and drugs, cosmetics, radiation-emitting products
(such as cell phones, lasers, and microwave ovens), and “combination
Or might such an agency decide that parents within a certain range of
income can only properly care for their children”and hence properly pro-
vide the necessary environment for cultivating phronesis in them”if they
are limited to having, say, only two children? Consider, to take one exam-
ple among many that might be chosen, what the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) of Illinois describes as among the services it
provides in just one branch of its activities: “therapeutic intervention and
support, homemaker services, psychological evaluations, attending to the
child™s personal needs of clothing and special equipment if needed, pro-
grams transitioning teens to self-suf¬ciency, alcohol and substance abuse
diagnosis, pregnant and parenting teen services.”49 The Illinois DCFS
describes one of its programs, called “Wraparound,” as providing “coun-
seling, advocacy, mentoring, psychological or psychiatric services, ther-
apeutic recreation, and other services” for children and their families.
Here is a further description of Wraparound:

Oftentimes children and their families have needs that cross agency boundaries.
Interagency cooperation is an integral part of the wraparound planning process.
It is essential that all services are developed cooperatively and are coordinated
in a child and family team. The team shares responsibility, expertise, and mutual
support while designing creative services that meet an individual™s strengths and needs
across home, school, and community. A wraparound plan is continually reviewed and
modi¬ed based on the child and family™s developing strengths and evolving needs.

48 For the FDA™s budget, see http:/ /www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/documentation.
htm; for its claimed oversight, see http:/ /www.fda.gov/default.htm (both accessed
December 12, 2005).
49 Http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/otherServices/index.shtml (accessed December 12, 2005).
Working Out the Position

Wraparound interventions are ¬‚exible because the approach is multifaceted,
taking all aspects of the child™s history and current life situation into account. (emphasis

The Illinois DCFS elaborates that it achieves Wraparound™s aims with
“planning and services [that] are comprehensive, addressing needs in
three or more life domain areas. These life domains are: family, living
situation, educational/vocational, social/recreational, psychological/
emotional, medical, legal, and safety/crisis.”
I do not mean to single out the Illinois DCFS, as it is typical among
similar agencies in other states. And I also do not mean to insinuate that
its agents are evil or underhanded or have sinister intentions. Not at all:
I am sure they have only the best intentions. My point rather is simply to
illustrate the scope of this one branch of this one state agency™s authority
and the range of services and resources it is prepared to engage, and to
suggest that if it were given the charge of protecting all children™s phrone-
sis or judgment, as well as the authority and means to back up its decrees
coercively, then I think things like one day mandating how many children
people may have, or any number of other similarly intrusive mandates,
are very real possibilities. Given numerous historical precedents, partic-
ularly in the twentieth century, it seems na¨ve, even dangerously so, to
think that the state would instead voluntarily limit its authority to what
the theorist antecedently believes would be appropriate.

betraying personhood
An inde¬nite encroachment of state decision making into areas otherwise
left to individuals™ own phronesis is not a problem, however, if one thinks
that people are not ˜persons™ and that their choices therefore may be cir-
cumscribed to ensure that they do not choose badly or incorrectly. But
that is not the view I have argued for here. I believe instead that people are
˜persons™ and should be treated as such. And as I argued in the previous
chapter, it is a crucial part of taking individual judgment seriously that one
allow people to make bad choices and to suffer the consequences. That
is, after all, the only way one can learn. How can one develop, adjust,
and ¬ne-tune one™s judgment if one does not have the opportunity to
fail? Thus if making mistakes is necessary for improving and developing
one™s judgment, and if this judgment is integral to personhood, what
follows is that the proper government is one protecting “negative,” but
not “positive,” liberty. Calling on the state to take positive steps toward
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 79

fostering individual judgment”as opposed to merely protecting the lib-
erty of individuals to develop and exercise it on their own”introduces
a means that is signi¬cantly, even fatally, destructive of the desired end.
The welfare state, therefore, fails to meet our moral standards, in just the
way socialistic states did.
If the socialist and the welfare state both betray personhood, however,
then whaich form or forms of government do not do so? Which political
options does respect for personhood leave us with? Those questions bring
us to chapter 3.

appendix to chapter 2

U.S. Federal Government Agencies, 2003
The U.S. federal government in 2003 spent a total of $2.14 trillion, and,
not including military personnel, it had 1,745,013 employees.50 For com-
parison, the company with the highest revenues in the world was Wal-Mart
Stores; its total worldwide gross revenues in 2002 were $245 billion. Wal-
Mart™s revenues beat its nearest worldwide competitor, General Motors, by
about one-third”and yet Wal-Mart had only about one-tenth of the federal
government™s expenditures. Wal-Mart employs 355,500 people, approxi-
mately one-¬fth as many as the federal government™s nonmilitary employ-
ment. And the 2003 total market value of Wal-Mart™s assets was estimated
at $372 billion. To put that into perspective, in 2003 the U.S. federal
government could have bought all of the world™s largest corporation”
land, buildings, equipment, inventories, everything”almost six times
Two notes about what follows. First, with one exception I do not pro-
vide total budget outlays for each agency. The exception is military spend-
ing, which many erroneously believe is the bulk of what the government
does. In 2003 the federal government spent approximately $459 billion
on the military”a not inconsiderable sum, to be sure, but in the end
only about one-¬fth of its total budget. Second, I do not include state
or local government agencies, all of which, of course, have their own

50 On April 28, 2005, the U.S. Congress passed a budget for 2005 of $2.56 trillion”already
an increase of fully 20 percent over the 2003 budget, despite the “cuts” that some critics
highlight and lament. See “Congress Passes Budget with Cuts in Medicaid and in Taxes,”
New York Times, April 29, 2005.
Working Out the Position

Agencies of the U.S. Federal Government in 2003
Air Force Reserve
Air Force Agency for
Accounting and
Modeling and
Auditing Policy
Air Force Reserve
Of¬cer Training
Air Force Audit Agency
Acquisition Department
Air Force Center for
Acquisition and
Air Force Reserve
Personnel Center
Management Services
Air Force Safety Center
Air Force Civil Engineer
Administration and
Air Force Services
Support Agency
Air Force
Air Force Space
Administration for
Children and Families
Air Force Special
Air Force Cost Analysis
Administration on Aging
Operations Command
Air Force Studies and
Air Force Historical
Committee of the
Analyses Agency
Research Agency
Federal Register
Air Force Technical
Air Force Historical
Administrative Law
Application Center
Support Of¬ce
Air Intelligence Agency
Air Force Information
Administrative Of¬ce of
Air Mobility Command
Warfare Center
the U.S. Courts
Air National Guard
Air Force Inspection
Air Resources
Advanced Technology
Air Force Institute of
Air University
Advisory Council on
Air Weather Service
Air Force Legal Services
Historic Preservation
Aircraft Technology
Aeronomy Laboratory
Air Force Logistics
African Development
Operations Of¬ce
Management Agency
American Battle
Air Force Material
African and Middle
Eastern Reading
Air Force Medical
American Folklore
Operations Agency
AgExport Services
Air Force Medical
American Forces
Support Agency
Agency for Healthcare
Information Center
Air Force News Agency
Research and Quality
American Indian Liaison
Air Force Of¬ce of
Agency for Toxic
Scienti¬c Research
Substances and
American Indian and
Air Force Of¬ce of
Disease Registry
Alaska Native Affairs
Special Investigations
Agricultural Labor
Air Force Of¬ce of
Affairs Coordinator
American Memory
Survivor Assistance
Agricultural Marketing
Ames Laboratory
Air Force Personnel
Ames Research Center
Agricultural Research
Anacostia Museum and
Air Force Real Property
Center for African
Air Combat Command
American History and
Air Force Research
Air Education and
Training Command
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 81

Bureau of Engraving
Barry M. Goldwater and
Animal and Plant Health
and Printing
Excellence in
Inspection Service
Bureau of European and
Education Foundation
Antitrust Division
Eurasian Affairs
Bene¬ts Review Board
Appalachian Regional
Bureau of Indian
Bettis Atomic Power
Architect of the Capitol
Bureau of Industry and
Board of Contract
Architectural and
Bureau of Intelligence
Board of Governors of
Barriers Compliance
and Research
the Federal Reserve
Bureau of International
Archives of American
Labor Affairs
Board of Veterans™
Bureau for International
Arctic Research
Narcotics and Law
Border and
Enforcement Affairs
Argonne National
Bureau of Justice
Branch of
Armed Forces
Bureau of Justice
and Research
Research Institute
Bureau of Labor
Broadcasting Board of
Armed Forces
Retirement Home
Bureau of Land
Brookhaven National
Army Financial
Bureau of Legislative
Building and Fire
Army Materiel
Research Laboratory
Bureau of Medicine and
Bureau of
Army Medical
Bureau of Naval
Bureau of African
Army Research
Bureau of Near Eastern
Bureau of Alcohol,
Army Review Boards
Tobacco, and
Bureau of
Arthritis and
Bureau of Arms Control
Bureau of Oceans and
Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration
Environmental and
Scienti¬c Affairs
Bureau of Consular
Arthur M. Sackler
Bureau of Political
Military Affairs
Bureau of Democracy,
Arts and Industries
Bureau of Population,
Human Rights, and
Refugees, and
Bureau of Diplomatic
Asian Division Reading
Bureau of Prisons
Bureau of Public Affairs
Bureau of East Asian
Associate Administrator
Bureau of Reclamation
and Paci¬c Affairs
for Commercial Space
Bureau of Resource
Bureau of Economic
Atlantic Oceanographic
Bureau of South Asian
Bureau of Educational
and Meteorological
and Cultural Affairs
Working Out the Position

Command, Control,
Center for Scienti¬c
Bureau of
Center for Veterinary
Commandant of the
Bureau of Western
Marine Corps
Centers for Disease
Hemisphere Affairs
Commission of Fine Arts
Control and
Bureau of the Census
Commission on Security
Bureau of the Public
and Cooperation in
Centers for Medicare
Europe (Helsinki
and Medicaid Services
Business Reference
Central Intelligence
Committee on Foreign
Cataloging Directorate
Investment in the
Chemical Safety and
Cataloging Distribution
United States
Hazard Investigation
Committee for the
Cataloging Policy and
Implementation of
Chemical Science and
Support Of¬ce
Textile Agreements
Cataloging in
Committee for Purchase
Publication Division
from People Who Are
Chief Financial Of¬cers
Center for Biologics
Blind or Severely
Evaluation and
Chief Information
Commodity Futures
Center for the Book
Trading Commission
Chief Information
Center for Cost and
Of¬cers Council
Financing Studies
Chief of Naval
Center for Devices and
Financial Institutions
Radiological Health
Chief Procurement
Center for Drug
Community Relations
Evaluation and
Children™s Literature
Compliance Review
Center for Earth and
Citizens™ Stamp Advisory
Planetary Studies
Congressional Budget
Center for Faith-Based
Civil Division
Congressional Research
Civil Rights Division
Center for Food Safety
Climate Diagnostics
and Applied Nutrition
Center for Information
Engineering Research
Climate Monitoring and
Center for Organization
Consumer Product
and Delivery Studies
Safety Commission
Clinical Center
Center for Outcomes
Contract Reform and
Coastal Habitat
and Effectiveness
Privatization Of¬ce
Cooper-Hewitt National
Center for Practice and
Design Museum
Cognitive, Neural, and
Coordinating Council
Biomolecular Science
on Juvenile Justice
and Technology
Center for Primary Care
and Delinquency
Cold Regions Research
Center for Quality
Corporate Programs
and Engineering
Improvement and
Patient Safety
A Matter of Principle, I: Betrayal of Personhood 83

Department of
Defense Human
Corporation for
Resources Activity
National and
Department of Defense
Defense Industrial
Community Service
Department of Defense
Supply Center
Cotton, Oilseeds,
Education Activity
Defense Information
Tobacco, and Seeds
Department of
Systems Agency
Defense Intelligence
Council of Economic
Department of Energy
Department of Health
Defense Legal Services
Council on
and Human Services
Department of
Defense Logistics
Homeland Security
Courts of Appeal
Department of Housing
Defense Logistics
Criminal Division
and Urban
Information Service
Critical Infrastructure
Defense Logistics
Assurance Of¬ce
Department of the
Support Command
Customer Service:
Defense National
Department of Justice
Stockpile Center
Department of Labor
Defense Nuclear
Department of the Navy
Facilities Safety
Department of the Navy
Dairy, Livestock, and
Defense Prisoner of
Poultry Division
D.C. Circuit
Department of State
Personnel Of¬ce
Defense Acquisition
Department of
Defense Reutilization
and Marketing Service
Defense Administrative
Department of the
Defense Security
Support Center
Cooperation Agency
Defense Advanced
Department of Veterans
Defense Security Service
Research Projects
Defense Supply Center
Departmental Account
Defense Commissary
Defense Supply Center
Defense Contract Audit
Departmental Appeals
Defense Supply Center
Defense Contract
Defense Technical
Management Agency


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