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rules and unity of principles.”24 When the rules in question are condi-
tions, Reason will seek the greatest unity of the totality of conditions for
a thing; and that unity constitutes an “object” to which Reason relates
in its transcendental employment. Since that object includes all the con-
ditions for a given thing, it cannot itself have a further condition, and
so it is unconditioned. But nothing empirical is unconditioned, so the
transcendental objects of reason are the famous Kantian noumena. The
“principle of reason” is not merely for Kant not itself in time “ it is what
leads us out of time, into the timeless world of noumena.
But what if no ¬rm distinction is to be drawn between the principles
of a faculty and the ways we actually use it? Then we would confront a
dilemma. Either the ways we use our faculties do not change with time,
in which case everything Kant has said about the culture of reason is
wrong; or even the basic principles of the faculties, and so the faculties
themselves, would arise from the historical process of trial and error that
Kant has described. In the latter case, which is the more plausible, the
human mind would be historical through and through “ there would
be nothing in it over and above the results of history. History would be
where we got our faculties.
This would mean that even reason and the understanding had come
to be from something else “ either from a different thing or from a
different, earlier state of the same thing. And it would mean that they
are not “necessary” in Kant™s sense: They can change into other things or
into different states of themselves.
What sort of status could the basic principle of a faculty then have? Only
that of any other empirical maxim or concept: that it has been tried and
re¬ned over an historical process, and must serve until something better
comes along. Such an empirical justi¬cation, however, will not allow us
to extend the use of a principle even to the limits of possible experience,
much less beyond them. For example, in the case of the principles (or
pure concepts) of the understanding we could say, “all events up to now
have had causes,” but not that all events whatsoever must have causes
(not a bad restriction, given such “post-Kantian” phenomena as proton
decay). Kantian necessity, as truth for all time, vanishes.
This in turn bears on the “principle of reason,” for it means that we can-
not concoct conditions (conditiones non ¬ngo). The “totality of conditions”

24 III, 362; the overall discussion of Reason as a faculty is at III:355“66.
Unearthing the Wonder 285

for x is simply all the conditions we know about for x. While we may
very strongly suspect that there are others (and on impeccable inductive
grounds, as when we strongly suspect that the water that has frozen does
not contain salt), we cannot know it. Reason thus loses its pull to the
unconditioned: The “manifoldness of rules” that it seeks is merely the
greatest number of known conditions of a thing “ or the greatest num-
ber of currently available concepts. Reason then ceases to strive for what
the human mind cannot have and contents itself with ordering what it
already has. It becomes a housekeeper for empirical concepts.25 It tells
us to bring our concepts into the most parsimonious de¬nitional system
possible: ideally, one in which they would all be de¬ned in terms of one Ur-
concept. The more concepts we can do this with, the more “Reasonable”
our effort.


8. a “post-kantian” paradigm
These four discussions “ concerning (1) aesthetic standard ideas, (2)
common sense, (3) enlarged thought, and (4) the cultivation of reason “
thus have, in my “post-Kantian” version of them, strong interconnections.
(1) describes a process by which an individual mind equips itself with well-
formed concepts; (2) and (3) describe how it applies and enlarges those
concepts in community; and (4) extends all this to the level of the history
of the entire human species. In the course of this, we have seen three cases
where Kant “ unintentionally or, perhaps, in spite of himself “ shows us
how to put into time and experience things that he himself maintains
are exempt from it. (1) Moral ideas, such as freedom, can be derived by
taking a coherent set of experiences, such as a disposition of bodily parts,
and giving it the name ˜freedom™. The distinction between noumena
and phenomena is thus not needed; the problems about the causality of
reason, as Kant has stated them, fall away: (2) Descriptions of situations
need not be validated within the individual mind as propositions that are
true or false for all time, but can be rationally accepted by the individual
as someone who now agrees with her community about the best way
to describe something. And (3) the faculties themselves have origins in
time “ that is, in history.
My sketch of the new paradigm can now be completed (though, to be
sure, competed only as a sketch). It has both historical and systematic sides.
On the historical side, it views our words as having developed over time,

25 Cf. Critique of Pure Reason III, 362.
John McCumber
286

like Kant™s aesthetic standard ideas. It investigates them to see whether
they are, so to speak, tried and true, that is, it examines their histories
to see if those histories can be reconstructed so as to exhibit a gradual
testing-and-re¬ning process resulting in the word as we have it today.
On the systematic side, it organizes the words that survive this exami-
nation via a version of Kant™s principle of reason, resulting in a system in
which they are all de¬ned by the fewest number possible of “basic words.”
This enables us to see, in a given case, just how each word relates to its
competitors: what it commits us to, for example, to describe something
as a ˜cause™ rather than as a ˜ground™, ˜condition™, ˜occasion™, ˜agent™, and
so on.
The aim of this is nothing so grand as truth, but only the chance for
a fallible communal agreement on which way of describing a situation
is currently the best available “ “best” in terms of both its relative accu-
racy to the facts and its promise of making things better. This kind of
philosophy is obviously not mere Schw¨ rmerei; but neither, and equally
a
obviously, is it Kant. As I have argued elsewhere, it is Hegel.26 To state the
main correspondences very crudely: Conceptual “growth by incongruity”
is the recurrent development from certainty through experience to truth
presented in Hegel™s Phenomenology of Spirit; the account of basic words
demanded by common sense is furnished by Hegel™s System itself (with
˜being™ as the “Ur-concept”); the agreement produced by the actual exer-
cise of enlarged thought has the basic structure of Hegelian Reconcilia-
tion; and the historical development of the faculties is the self-mediation
of Spirit “ nothing less than freedom itself, for Hegel.


9. the prices
There are prices to be paid for adopting the “post-Kantian” approach I
have sketched. At every turn, it rejects the view that anything knowable or
thinkable by us can be treated as in any way atemporal. It takes everything
as having come to be from something else and as destined to pass over
into something else; the notion of autonomy, for example, must be given
an historical grounding in the development of modernity (as one stage
in the self-mediation of Spirit). The notion of necessary truth, so dear to
millennia of philosophers, is thus excised from philosophy. This should
be clear from the “un-Kantian” views to which I appealed in the previous
four discussions. Those were (a) the denial of a basic distinction between
aesthetic and cognitive categories, which allowed the aesthetic standard

26 See McCumber (1993), passim.
Unearthing the Wonder 287

idea to give rise to concepts; (b) the assimilation of moral ideals to their
effects, which allowed us (for example) to call certain coherent ways
of behaving by the name of ˜freedom™; (c) the view that imagination,
not being transcendentally grounded, cannot carry out the dialogue of
enlarged thought, which must therefore be a real dialogue; and (d) the
rejection of a ¬rm distinction between the operations of a faculty and
the principles governing those operations. In each case, the claim of
something to be atemporal “ be it a faculty or its principle, the grounding
of something in such a faculty or principle, or a moral idea “ is simply
dropped.
The view that nothing is valid for all time is hardly Kant™s. There is
Kantian warrant for it, however, since Kant held that all our knowledge is
in time (as the form of both inner and outer appearances). Even if there
are eternal or necessary truths, our knowledge of them changes over time.
Whatever is eternal about some object of our knowledge must therefore
be set off from our knowledge of that thing “ that is, it must, in Kant™s
terminology, be a “thing-in-itself.” Even if the Pythagorean theorem has
an eternal core, we cannot say what it is. Every predicate we apply to
the theorem may turn out to have been wrongly applied; it may turn
out not to be about triangles at all (it certainly is not about space in
general). Philosophy is thus not so much “naturalized” as temporalized
and thereby fallibilized “ as Kant™s doctrine of the faculties, which all of my
“un-Kantian” presuppositions in one way or another deny, has turned out
to be distinctly fallible. If abandoning Kant™s account of the human mind
as consisting of ahistorical, principle-governed faculties is the only price
we must pay for connecting certain fragments of the Critique of Judgment
into a new philosophical approach, it may not be thought a heavy one.
But two other prices are revealed by Kant in §§82“4.
The question in these sections is whether the whole of nature can be
considered to have a single ¬nal end. We must see nature this way if
we are to be able to make use of re¬‚ective judgment in the search for
natural laws, for that search presupposes that nature not only contains
various ¬nal causes but is constituted as a uni¬ed system of such causes;
such teleological unity can only consist, it appears, in having a single ¬nal
cause.27 We must give nature a single ¬nal purpose, then, and here there

27 See Nussbaum (1996), 278. Allison, passing over the cognitive motivation for positing
a single end to nature, derives it instead from the status of human beings as capable
of setting their own purposes, which makes Kant™s argument circular: That nature has
a single end both follows from and establishes that humans, in virtue of their capacity
to set their own purposes, can serve as the single end to nature (Allison 2001, 210“
11). If Kant™s argument really exhibits such circularity, then it seems that he calls in
John McCumber
288

are two ways to go. One is to say (V:426) that we are the ¬nal purpose
of nature: Herbivores are eaten by predators, who in turn are put to
many uses by humans. Only humanity can be posited as the ¬nal cause of
nature, for the human being is “the only being on earth who can form a
concept of purposes and use its reason to turn an aggregate of purposively
structured things into a system of purposes” (V:427). But human beings
as such cannot be thought of as the ultimate purpose of nature. The
problem is empirical: Nature makes use of us, too. By killing predators
we reduce their numbers, which makes the balance of nature, not us, the
¬nal cause of nature. Our bodies fertilize the world after our death, as
does any organic matter. In fact, nature treats us like any living beings:
Rocks fall on us and crush us, hurricanes blow us away, and microbes
attack us. So, like other living beings, we are as much means as ends.
Hence the following dilemma:

An ultimate purpose of nature is certainly required for such a system to be possi-
ble, and we cannot posit it anywhere but in man. But man too is one of the many
animal species, and nature has in no way exempted him from its destructive forces
any more than from its productive forces, but has subjected everything to natural
mechanism without a purpose. (V:§427)

The ¬rst step in obviating the empirical problem is to view not humans,
but something in humans as the ¬nal cause of nature. As §83 goes on
to argue, there are two candidates for this: our happiness and our moral
goodness.
But human happiness cannot be coherently posited as the ultimate
cause of nature. One problem is conceptual: Happiness for Kant just
means the satisfaction of all desires, and so is an inherently changing and
inde¬nable concept “ the nature of happiness depends on what desires
you have, and that changes from moment to moment. Hence,

even if [nature] were subjected completely to man™s choice, [it] still could not
possibly adopt a de¬nite and ¬xed universal law that would keep it in harmony
with that wavering concept. (V:430)

Even if the empirical problem were solved, in other words, we could
not coherently posit human happiness as the ¬nal cause of nature. For
nature as such, in Kant™s view, is the “law-governedness of appearances in
space and time” (III:165). A nature that does not operate according to a

the unconditionality of the ¬nal cause of nature in order to make his argument that
humanity under moral laws must be viewed as nature™s ¬nal end “ which would support
my argument that his general argument fails.
Unearthing the Wonder 289

“de¬nite and ¬xed law” would be able to serve human happiness only by
a series of continual ad hoc adjustments of its causal chains, and would
not properly be a law-governed “nature” at all.
Moreover, this does not solve the empirical problem. Not only does
nature in general have no regard for our happiness, but our human
nature causes us much misery “ wars, oppression, and so on: “man himself
does all he can to work for the destruction of his own species” (V:430).
In sum, “in the chain of natural purposes man is never more than a link”
(V:431); the ¬nal purpose of nature cannot be human happiness, which
means that the ¬nal purpose of nature cannot be found in nature at all.
What else is there in us, over and above what nature can deal with? The
answer, for Kant, is our capacity to set our own purposes, that is, to act
freely. This is a “formal and subjective” condition, and to view it as the
¬nal cause of nature means postulating that we can use nature as a means
for freely setting our own purposes. The way we do this is “culture.” So,
within nature, the expression of the ¬nal purpose of nature is human
culture.28 But as §84 points out, if the ability of humans freely to set their
own purposes is unconditioned, it is not itself something empirical; it
can never be realized. It is, rather, a noumenon, for it is nothing other
than freedom. This is the ¬nal, non-natural purpose of nature, then: The
noumenal realm is the ¬nal cause of the natural realm.29
There are, then, two further prices we must pay for abandoning the
atemporal realm. One is that science would no longer be justi¬ed in using
the maxims of re¬‚ective judgment to gain knowledge of natural laws. It is
open to doubt, of course, whether science really does use them in the way
that Kant requires. Scientists may, for example, be motivated to bring their
results under as few natural laws as possible by a bureaucratic imperative:

28 Culture so considered corresponds, I take it, to the relatively indeterminate goal of
enlightenment in “What Is Enlightenment?”. Kant here (V:431) ¬lls in a gap that Paul
Guyer points out in the argument at V:426“7, which does not say why the ¬nal purpose
of nature as expressed within nature must be a being capable of setting its own ends.
Guyer rightly sees that the justi¬cation lies in the centrality of human beings to this stage
of Kant™s philosophy; but the point is more than the mere “reminder” he takes it to be.
Seen in light of V:431, the argument is disjunctive: There are only two things in us that
can be the natural expression of a ¬nal purpose of nature, happiness and the ability to
set purposes; it cannot be happiness; therefore, it must be the ability to set purposes
(Guyer 2000a, 38).
29 Kant™s argument here has been credited by Paul Guyer (2002a) with “astounding
temerity.” I can only agree. Charles Nussbaum has noted that “not everyone will be
prepared to grant that ˜the unconditioned™ is an unavoidable requirement of theoret-
ical and practical rationality” (1996, 278). Again, I agree “ for I am not prepared to
grant it.
John McCumber
290

to present their results in as organized a way as possible so that others
may have access to them. The Cold War™s replacement of Great Science by
government-and-industry-funded Big Science renders it unlikely in any
case that scientists will seek any kind of larger organization in nature, as
opposed to uncovering heaps of useful and lucrative truths.
The remaining price, however, is heavy indeed: We must abandon any
attempt to think of ourselves as more than natural beings. In particular,
we cannot view ourselves as the ¬nal causes of nature; we are merely links
in the natural causal chain, with respect to which our most bene¬cent
function is to maintain the various balances of nature. I am willing to pay
even this heavy price. For I take the principle that there are for us no
immutable truths to be, not itself an immutable truth, but an indispens-
able counsel of philosophical prudence: Too many “timeless truths” have
turned out to be false for me to have any con¬dence whatsoever in Kant™s
version. The “post-Kantian” paradigm that emerges from Kant™s isolated
and fragmentary discussions in the Critique of Judgment sounds strange
indeed. Certainly it looks strange in the most thoroughgoing attempt yet
made to carry it out, which, as I have mentioned, is the philosophy of
Hegel. He, and the myriad philosophers who in his wake have thought
historically “ Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida, Foucault “ are
then neither Kantian nor anti-Kantian. They are not even really post-
Kantian, for the basic elements of their approach can be found scattered
throughout the Critique of the Power of Judgment.30 They are fragments of
the wonder of Kant.

30 Hence the quotation marks around “post-Kantian” throughout this essay.
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Index




abstraction, 38, 50, 101, 225, 226 aggregate
Locke on, 43 and extensive magnitude, 142, 143
role in concept acquisition, 87 Allison, H.E., 3, 18, 19, 40, 111, 154,
acquaintance, 99, 106 159, 169, 203, 250, 254
distinguished from cognition, and McDowell, 77
on relation between ¬rst and third
97“9
actuality, 228 Critiques, 81
actus, logical. See abstraction; on schematism, 75
comparison; re¬‚ection analogy, 241
addition, 141 and relation of beauty and moral
aesthetic attribute, 253, 256 good, 128
aesthetic sense, 13 and symbol, 241
aesthetic standard idea. See beauty, in symbolization, 136
aesthetic normal idea of relation to aesthetic judgment,
aesthetic, the, 1, 8. See also Critique of 232
relfective, 231
Pure Reason; Critique of the Power of
Judgment; sensibility; imagination; animal sapience. See sapience, animal
judgment, aesthetic apparentia. See appearance
as challenging critical project, 15, appearance, 93“6
apperception, 186
16
place in critical philosophy, 15, 20, transcendental unity of, 25, 146,
22 152, 180
publicity of norms, 239 apprehension, 145, 146, 163, 171, 176,
role in cognition, 246 205
role in cognition and judgment, 9 in experience of beauty, 185
aesthetics, 1 synthesis of, 167, 170
Kant™s, 1 architectonic, 2, 21, 195, 264, 278
relation to epistemology, 3 Longuenesse and, 28
relation to morality, 111, 114, 124, Aristotle, 266
common sense in, 158
134

297
Index
298

free, 176, 189, 273
association
ground of in judgments of beauty,
contrasted with cognition, 146
natural, 24 209
ideal of, 174, 272, 273, 278, 279
Aufkl¨ rung. See Enlightenment
a
ideal of, representation of human
autonomy, 113, 270, 286. See also
body as free, 274
freedom
in logical judgment, 201
aesthetic, 263
intellectual interest in, 112, 116,
and enlarged thought, 282
and experience of the beautiful, 125 124, 125
natural, 112, 116, 218, 219
and historical in¬‚uence, 239
relation to common sense, 156
relation to disinterested action, 125
Baumgarten, A.G., 175
relation to disinterested love, 125
beauty, 2, 13, 19, 28, 114, 126, 128,
relation to faculty of concepts, 176
131, 149, 162, 172, 184, 233, 240,
ubiquity of, 172
255, 270, 273, 280
Berkeley, G., 43
accessory, 276
Hume™s relation to, 44, 45
adherent, 176, 182, 189, 192
intentionalist reading of empirical
aesthetic normal idea of, 153, 154,
universality, 48
272, 273, 275, 280, 285, 286, 287
Locke™s relation to, 39
aesthetic normal idea of, as image,
on general ideas, 43
274, 276
aesthetic normal idea of, role in Blomberg Logic, 235
Brandom, R., 239
concept formation, 276
Budd, M., 174
and aesthetic idea, 127, 136, 192
Burge, T., 82
and feeling, 273
Burke, E., 199
and ideas of reason, 126
and moral interests, 134
capacity to judge. See judgment,
and natural ends, 124
faculty of
and pleasure, 21, 120, 164, 177, 178,
category, categories, 9, 16, 17, 96, 113,
179, 196, 233
and purposiveness, 116, 257, 270 141, 145, 180, 195, 286
and re¬‚ective judgment, 225
and re¬‚ective judgment, 223
and synthesis, 147, 195
archetype of, 154, 155, 274
and understanding, 251
artistic, 112, 182, 189, 190, 192, 218,
application, 180, 225
219
contrasted with concept of
as idea of reason, 135
re¬‚ection, 227
as indeterminable concept, 135
contrasted with idea of reason, 241
as predicate of aesthetic judgment,
role in Transcendental Deduction,
194, 196“201, 212
as predicate, implicit judgment in, 168
scheme, 251
212
table of, 194
as symbol, 114, 125, 126, 135, 241
cause, 180, 286
contemplation of, 177
category of, 168
criteria for, 181
¬nal, 287
experience of, 168, 175
schematization of, 169
formalism of, 121
Index 299

as orientational principle, 234
certainty, 286
general capacity in all human
cognition, 3, 6, 31, 88, 97, 99, 101, 105,
beings, 121
130, 151, 162, 165, 172, 193, 215,
relation to deduction of taste, 113
232, 245, 247, 248, 257
role in judgment of taste, 156
and aesthetic idea, 253
communicability
and experience of beauty, 173
aesthetic pleasure based on, 204,
and intentional relation to objects,
207
97“8
and common sense, 18, 157
and judgment of taste, 154, 158
and subjective universality, 18
and the aesthetic, 9, 256
necessary for normativity of
as recognition, 247
judgment of taste, 159
creative dimension of, 253
of sensation, 164
empirical, 1, 3, 25
universal, 149, 200, 203, 214, 216,
in Longuenesse, 246
objective, 25, 92, 107 217, 218, 273
community, 23, 30, 199, 269, 285
of beautiful object, 183
and aesthetic consensus, 235
reliance on unity of consciousness,
and concept formation, 281
91
and enlarged thought, 282
role of concepts in, 146
and universal agreement, 26
role of imagination in, 170
ideal, 115, 234
role of intuition and imagination
of judging subjects, 14, 23, 29, 200,
in, 22
role of judgment in, 247 201, 217
universal, 234
subjective conditions of, 134
comparison, 38, 50, 101, 104, 106, 112,
coherence, 248, 250
coherentist empiricism, 267 155, 225, 226, 227
and re¬‚ective judgment, 231
common sense, 13, 21, 26, 27, 29, 139,
and schema generation, 41
157, 159, 214, 216, 233, 234, 257,
as intuitive ability, 103
260, 272, 279, 281, 282, 285
role in concept acquisition, 87, 101,
and aesthetic ideas, 261
and aesthetic judgment, 264 103, 153
compulsion, 73
and Aristotle, 158
concept, 3, 8, 35, 133, 156, 170, 176,
and communicability, 18
and community of judging subjects, 179, 183, 191, 195, 276, 280,
284, 285. See also rules;
217
understanding
and critique of taste, 26
acquisition, 38“42, 52, 106, 113. See
and enlightenment, 218
also concept, formation
and feeling, 123, 159
application to intuition, 121
and interpretive understanding,
as rule, 7, 35, 62, 146, 147, 179, 247,
259, 262
and play, 158, 260 275
development by incongruity, 277,
as a priori form of intensive
intuition, 152 286
empirical, 9, 178, 227, 284, 285
as form of sense, 139, 157
faculty of, 13, 14, 26, 176
as natural or developed capacity,
form of, 170
216, 234, 260, 261
Index
300

Analytic of Principles, 25, 63
concept (cont.)
Anticipations of Perception, 140,
formation, 24, 166, 225, 226, 244,
142, 143, 145, 151, 159, 160
245, 247, 249, 252, 276, 277, 278,
Antinomies of Pure Reason, 279
281, 285, 287. See also concept,
Metaphysical Deduction, 67, 91
acquisition
Refutation of Idealism, 81
indeterminable, 114, 124, 127, 135
relation to second and third
indeterminate, 114, 175, 176
Longuenesse on two senses of, 40 Critique, 2
relation to third Critique, 23, 29, 245
mathematical, 76
Schematism, 10, 14, 20, 21, 25, 184,
of happiness, 288
pure, role in schematization, 38 271
scholarship on, 3
revision, 31, 279, 280
Subjective Deduction, 146
role in aesthetic experience, 185,
Table of Judgments, 28
256
Transcendental Aesthetic, 8
role in aesthetic judgment, 206,
Transcendental Analytic, 16, 180,
241, 243
role in cognition, 165, 167 245
Transcendental Deduction, 7, 8, 9,
role in empirical judgment, 206
role in experience of beauty, 273 12, 16, 21, 50, 59, 91, 103, 167,
role in judgment of taste, 178 168
synthetic distinguished from Critique of the Power of Judgment, 1
Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment,
analytic, 226
Ur-, 285, 286 255
Analytic of the Beautiful, 28, 112,
consciousness, 182
unity of, 91, 103, 226 119, 194“219, 255
Critique of the Aesthetic Power of
consensus, aesthetic, 234
Judgment, 13
contemplation, 202
Critique of the Teleological Power
contingency, 19, 20, 228, 264, 281
of Judgment, 125
and re¬‚ective judgment, 229
First Introduction, 170, 249
of ¬t, 12, 18
relation between sensibility and
of harmony, 116, 118
understanding in, 80
continuity, principle of, 250
relation to ¬rst and second Critique,
coordination, 231“2, 243
Copernican revolution, turn, 5, 6, 7, 8, 2
relation to ¬rst Critique, 29, 245
16, 19, 83. See also critical
role in critical philosophy, 6
philosophy
scholarship on, 1, 2, 3
Longuenesse on, 26
systematic character of, 129
role of judgment of taste in, 212
unity of, 111
Crawford, D., 3, 166
critical epistemology, 1, 2, 3, 4, 16, 20,
Dahlstrom, D., 266
22, 26
Davidson, D., 31, 61, 82, 87, 246
critical philosophy, 3, 4, 11, 15, 16, 19,
de¬ning criteria, 119
20, 78, 83, 96, 98, 267, 272. See
Deleuze, G., 2
also Copernican revolution, turn
delight. See feeling; pleasure
Critique of Pure Reason, 1
demand, 207, 216, 217
Amphiboly, 225, 245
of moral duty, 215
Analogies of Experience, 148
Index 301

Erkenntnis. See cognition; recognition
Derrida, J., 290
Evans, G., 82
Descartes, R., 74
evil, 112, 114
desire, 201. See also feeling; pleasure
example
and happiness, 288
and determinate image, 238
and pleasure, 197
and prejudice, 235
determinative judgment, 1, 7, 11, 12,
relation to exemplary, 237
15, 29, 35, 223, 228, 233, 236,
exemplarity, 224, 237, 238, 273, 274
237, 245“6, 247, 248
exempli¬cation, 251
relation to re¬‚ective judgment, 30,
experience, 1, 12, 286
223, 224, 228, 232, 243, 244, 245
aesthetic, 31, 168, 271, 272, 273
dialectic of the critique of taste, 218
animal, 25
disposition
in Refutation of Idealism, 82
and habit, 45
perceptual, 24
associative, in Ginsborg, 79
possible, 5, 16, 271, 284
in animals, 51
relation to judgment, 8
normativity of, 24, 54
role of imagination in, 37
dogmatism, 4
role of intuition in, 37
domain, 228, 232
extensive magnitude. See magnitude,
dualism, 25, 83
extensive
of sensibility and understanding, 14
duration, 148
faculty, faculties, 8, 287
D¨ sing, K., 129
u
and history, 285, 286
duty, 115, 131, 216, 217, 218
and transcendental re¬‚ection, 227
ideal of, 124
cognitive, 5, 6
respect for, 124, 125
in pure judgment of taste, 152
principle of, 5, 283, 287
Elgin, C., 30, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251,
proper use of, 283
253, 255, 257, 260, 262, 265
feeling, 113, 116, 129“30, 131, 144,
empirical cognition. See cognition,
empirical 150, 159, 202, 216, 272, 280. See
also pleasure
empirical realism, 6, 16
and common sense, 13, 121, 123
emulation, 239
and moral motivation, 124, 125
end
of beauty, 131, 172
abstraction from concept of, 179
of communion, 206
and adherent beauty, 189
universal communicability of, 217
and ¬ne art, 191
universal validity of, 123
and harmony of faculties, 181
¬eld, 228, 232, 242
moral, 112, 114, 116, 124
¬gurative synthesis, 9, 12, 17, 18, 21,
enlarged thought, 272, 281, 282, 285,
63
286, 287
¬ne art, 136, 177
Enlightenment, 233, 268, 269, 283
and purposiveness, 190
aesthetic dimension of, 271
role of concepts in, 191
and common sense, 218
¬‚owing, 159, 160
goal of, 269
Forster, E., 15
prejudice against prejudices, 235
Foucault, M., 31, 268, 290
enthusiasm, 267, 271, 272, 273,
free play. See play of faculties
286
Index
302

precognitive interpretation, 27, 165,
freedom, 267, 285, 286, 287, 289
and indeterminate inner purpose, 166, 170, 172, 178, 185, 187, 192.
See also play of faculties
274
heautonomy, 113
as ¬nal end of nature, 126
and principle of purposiveness,
as noumenal, 11, 289
concept of, 229 129
of taste, 134
of public discourse, 269
Hegel, G.W.F., 31, 83, 199, 267, 286,
of the imagination, 125
of the will, 125 290
Heidegger, M., 2, 10, 15, 20, 25, 83,
problem of appearance of, 279
relation to nature, 124, 241 93, 108, 246, 290
Henrich, D., 166
Herder, J.G., 271
Gadamer, H.-G., 31, 166, 290
history, 268, 285
on prejudice, 235
and beauty, 270
Gasch´ , R., 238
e
and coherence, 249, 251
general ideas. See ideas, general
and use of faculties, 283, 284
genius, 2, 136, 190“1, 218, 253, 254,
as basis of common sense,
257, 261, 272
Schopenhauer on, 172 260
goal of, 270
Ginsborg, H., 3, 76, 79, 80, 157, 167,
homogeneity, principle of, 250
207, 208, 277
Hume, D., 24, 39, 43, 44, 48, 59, 79,
˜given,™ the, 23, 25
Goodman, N., 30, 31, 40, 246, 251, 113, 117, 266
association, 51, 54
253, 255, 260
constructivist account of knowing,
idea of freedom, 279
257
idea of reason. See reason, idea of
understanding in, 247, 248
idea, aesthetic, 30, 112, 127, 135, 177,
government, 269“70
Gracyk, T., 149 191, 218, 231, 241, 247, 252, 254,
guidance, problem of, 64, 65“6 255, 256, 261
and idea of reason, 115, 136, 241,
Guyer, P., 3, 82, 128, 145, 203
243
idea, moral, 267, 279, 285
Hamann, J.G., 271, 272
idea, rational, 127, 177, 191
happiness
ideal of beauty. See beauty, ideal of
and ¬nal end of nature, 288
idealism, 76
harmony
absolute, 267
metacognitive interpretation, 27,
empirical, 7, 16
162“82, 183, 186, 187, 189, 192
nineteenth century, 83
multicognitive interpretation, 27,
subjective, 24
165, 169, 171, 175, 178, 187, 188,
threat of, 25, 62, 72, 79, 80, 81
192
ideas, general
of faculties, 11, 13, 19, 26, 27, 114,
Berkeley on, 43
116, 118, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128,
Hume on, 44
130, 132, 135, 149, 150, 155, 158,
Locke on, 42, 43
162, 163, 165“9, 181, 208, 233,
illusion, 281
237, 259, 272
Index 303

and concept, 3, 36, 195
imagination, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,
and harmony of faculties, 167
17, 20, 22, 23, 26, 31, 58, 92, 105,
and judgment of taste, 133
127, 133, 136, 138, 143, 148, 149,
and play, 189
152, 153, 154, 156, 162, 163, 170,
and the given, 25
205, 252
applicability of categories to, 76,
activity of, 23, 37, 50, 51
aesthetic, 1, 21 168
as constraint on judgment, 63
and enlarged thought, 282, 287
difference between human and
and free play, 164
animal, 104
and intuition, 163
diminished role in third Critique, 11,
and purposiveness, 19
and re¬‚ective judgment, 11, 12 14, 80, 150
extensive form of, 150
and schematization, 10, 238
in McDowell, 66, 78, 80
freedom of, 125, 138, 139, 150, 159,
intensive form of, 145, 148, 149“51,
164, 186
156. See also magnitude, intensive;
principles of, 17, 19
time, intensive form of
relation to understanding, 10, 63,
objectivity of, 25, 91, 93
113, 133, 149, 150, 162, 208, 210,
pure, 179
238, 256
pure form of, 8, 9, 180
reproductive synthesis of, 50, 147
relation to phenomena, 93
spontaneity of, 63
role in animal sapience, 91, 93,
synthesis of, 13, 18, 27, 63, 139, 256
imitation, 239 100
role in cognition, 22, 83, 93, 98,
inference
and reason, 283 165, 166
role in empirical judgment,
and re¬‚ective judgment, 226, 230
from analogy, 230 61
Sellars on, 66
inductive, 230
sensible, 37, 69
relation to experience, 8
relation to sensibility, 4
intensive magnitude. See magnitude, J¨ sche Logic, 103, 225, 230
a
and transcendental re¬‚ection,
intensive
interest, 30, 131, 182, 263 236
judgment, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 23, 67, 71, 91,
and interpretive understanding,
106, 186
258, 259, 261, 262
and ¬gurative synthesis, 10, 17
and universal communicability, 217
and genius, 254, 257, 261
and universality of taste, 263
intellectual, 217, 218 Beurteilung, 224, 233, 276
collective, 282
moral, 210, 218
discursive, relation to aesthetic,
of understanding, 183
interpretation, 30 20
form of, 2, 7, 195, 245
and aesthetic judgment, 242
logical functions of, 194“5
intuition, 8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 23, 62, 63,
of sense, 263
68, 72, 77, 78, 80, 93, 97, 99, 121,
subjective conditions of, 133
123, 139, 142, 151, 154, 171, 173,
table of, 2, 7
175, 179, 210, 273
Index
304

and universal communicability, 203
judgment, aesthetic, 1, 3, 6, 11, 14, 16,
deduction of, 27, 111, 112, 160, 214,
20, 21, 22, 28, 114, 118, 129, 139,
217, 218
151, 156, 162, 163, 168, 170, 173,
disinterestedness of, 117, 120, 121,
179, 183, 184, 192, 195“6, 201,
233, 247, 262
205, 216, 229, 230“3, 240, 241“3,
empirical interest in, 217
246, 247, 255, 256, 261, 264. See
exemplary, 237
also judgment of taste; judgment
ground of, 210
of beauty; re¬‚ective judgment
indeterminacy of, 240
af¬rmative, 196
justi¬cation of, 122, 123, 129
and re¬‚ective judgment, 112, 224,
necessity of, 26, 213, 214
233
normativity of, 139, 150, 156, 233
ground of, 129, 204, 210, 216
pure, 25, 113, 114, 119, 131, 133,
intensive magnitude in, 151
normativity of, 18, 79, 195, 224, 167, 174, 233, 235, 237, 260
relation of faculties in, 162
257, 259
relation to pleasure, 118, 162, 163
pure, 13, 18, 152, 223, 245
relation to principle of
pure, deduction of, 112, 113, 119,
purposiveness, 115
122, 132, 133, 164, 171
role of concepts in, 178, 243
relation to intuition, 27
role of feeling in, 129
relation to re¬‚ection, 237
role of imagination in, 138
subject of, 179, 184, 194
role of intensive intuition in,
universality of, 18, 133, 201, 263
validity of, 14, 234 149“51
subjective necessity of, 217
judgment of beauty, 13, 36, 58, 155,
universality of, 120, 126, 214, 257,
159, 163, 171, 173, 175, 176, 179,
218, 272, 276. See also judgment, 263, 280
validity of, 26, 119, 186, 233
aesthetic; judgment of taste;
judgment, categorical, 209, 210, 212
re¬‚ective judgment
judgment, cognitive, 7, 21, 36, 150,
and purposiveness, 112, 189
156, 215, 264. See also judgment,
and re¬‚ective schematization, 238
empirical
free contrasted with adherent, 174
and aesthetic judgment, 195“6,
judgment of experience, 205
as determinative judgment, 233 247
and judgment of taste, 26, 138, 160
subjective necessity of, 214
objecitivity of, 158
judgment of perception, 139, 205
relation to intuition, 27, 139
judgment of re¬‚ection
subjective universality of, 205, 215
aesthetic judgment as, 184
judgment, empirical, 8, 13, 19, 21, 22,
judgment of taste, 13, 14, 22, 26, 29,
24, 30, 61, 62, 64, 205. See also
36, 112, 113, 130, 132, 133, 134,
judgment, cognitive
138, 139, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152,
judgment, faculty of, 10, 17, 35, 60,
154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 164, 166,
85, 88, 129, 133, 150, 163, 173,
176, 194, 196, 201, 208, 209, 232,
175, 176, 217, 224, 229, 234, 247
233, 237, 242, 247, 256, 280. See
lacking in animals, 86, 104
also judgment, aesthetic;
relation to faculties of imagination
judgment of beauty; re¬‚ective
and understanding, 113
judgment; taste
relation to feeling, 116, 129“30
and intensive magnitude, 150
Index 305

Man, P. de, 2, 166
judgment, hypothetical, 209
McDowell, J., 3, 15, 16, 23“5, 31, 61,
judgment, moral
relation to aesthetic judgment, 27, 66, 72, 76, 82, 84
mechanism, 268
29, 261
Meerbote, R., 167
unconditional necessity of, 264
metaphor
judgment, preliminary, 236, 237, 242
and aesthetic idea, 253
judgment, symbolic, 242
and understanding, 251, 252
judgment, teleological, 6, 246
justi¬catory criteria, 119, 132 Metaphysik Vigilantus, 142
modality, 2, 26, 28, 29, 194, 195, 213,
kennen. See acquaintance 257, 284
moral character, 2
Kern, A., 166
moral ideal, 287
Korsgaard, C., 127
moral imperative
Kripke, S., 40
necessity of, 214
Kuhn, T.S., 246
moral law, 124, 125, 216, 261, 270,
Larmore, C., 83 271
moral obligation, 214, 217
Lebensgef¨ hl. See life, feeling of
u
morality
Lectures on Logic, 76
ground of, 267
role of intuition in, 93, 98
in Kant and Schiller, 271
Leibniz, G.W., 144, 227, 283
relation to aesthetics, 114, 124,
life
biological, 196“99 134
symbolized by aesthetic ideas, 137
feeling of, 197“200, 201
of the mind, 200
narrative
of the spirit, 199, 200, 201
and understanding, 251
Locke, J., 39, 42“3, 45, 48, 88, 227,
nature, 228, 229, 249, 288
283
design in, 256
logic
¬nal end of, 287
general, 10, 225
systematic order of, 229
transcendental, 225, 226
systematicity of laws of, 112
Longuenesse, B., 3, 15, 30, 40, 93“4,
necessity, 228
224, 232, 245, 247, 254, 265
of agreement of judging subjects,
love, 124
Lyotard, J.-F., 2 213
of categories, 15
of relation of object and pleasure in
magnitude
aesthetic judgment, 213
category of, 168
subjective, and re¬‚ective judgment,
schema of, 140
magnitude, extensive, 27, 139, 140, 229
Newton, I., 143
141“4
Nietzsche, F., 290
magnitude, intensive, 27, 139, 140,
noumenon, noumena, 5, 228, 279,
141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 149, 150,
284, 285. See also supersensible;
151, 156, 160
thing-in-itself
Maier, A., 149
number
Makkreel, R., 3, 15, 168, 253, 274,
pure schema of magnitude, 140
276, 279
Index
306

prejudice, 263
object, 88, 93
aesthetic, 235, 237, 243
Observations on the Feeling of the
and re¬‚ection, 236, 244
Beautiful and the Sublime, 215
logical, 235, 243
orientation, 30
of taste, 235, 237, 238, 243
and re¬‚ective coordination, 232
presentation, 163, 218
spatial, 237
of a concept, 171
principle of purposiveness of nature,
Parsons, C., 141
perception, 31, 49, 50, 70, 72, 90“1, 12, 19, 27, 30, 111, 112, 113, 114,
115, 129, 229, 249. See also
142, 169, 186
purposiveness; re¬‚ective
Phenomenology of Spirit, 83, 199, 286
judgment
phenomenon, phenomena, 5, 6, 16,
psychology, 175
93“5, 97, 228, 285
pure concepts of the understanding,
Plato, 266
Play. See play of faculties; harmony 16, 77, 91, 105, 113, 168, 180,
play of faculties, 11, 13, 120, 121, 124, 284
and schematization, 75, 76, 78, 144,
149, 150, 155, 156, 158, 162, 163,
168
165, 170, 176, 182, 186, 188, 197,
purpose. See also purposiveness
206, 212, 259, 265
and freedom, 1, 289
and common sense, 157
¬nal, 287
free, 26, 27, 207, 208, 211, 213,
inner, 274
214, 216. See also harmony
ultimate, man as, 243
pleasure, 19, 20, 21, 36, 115, 117, 121,
purposiveness, 128“9, 154, 156, 164,
138, 139, 149, 150, 151, 156, 162,
175, 185, 190, 229, 240, 256, 272.
163, 164, 173, 177, 178, 181, 190,
See also judgment, faculty of;
197, 200, 202, 203, 207, 211, 213,
principle of purposiveness of
214, 229, 233, 234. See also feeling
nature; purpose; re¬‚ective
and aesthetic judgment, 150, 151,
judgment
163, 184
as idea of reason, 135
and beauty, 117, 120, 166, 177, 178,
form of, 135, 210
179
formal, 211, 233, 237
and common sense, 259
internal, 126
and harmony of the faculties, 19, 21,
of form, 121, 122
118, 122
of the mind, 211
and intensive magnitude, 27
subjective, 121, 126, 171, 210, 211
and judgment of taste, 157, 162,
without a purpose, 211, 212, 240,
186, 245
communicability of, 26 257, 270, 271
Putnam, H., 82
disinterested, 130, 197, 198, 199,
200, 201, 203, 204, 210, 233
quality, 2, 28, 143, 194, 196“201, 210
in determination of will, 178
intensive magnitude as, 140
intentionality of, 118
quantity, 2, 28, 144, 194, 196, 201, 210,
normativity of, 158, 217
role in aesthetic re¬‚ection, 213
and difference between extensive,
246
intensive magnitudes, 141
subjective universality of, 201
category of, 141
possibility, 228
Index 307

re¬‚ective equilibrium, 249, 250, 251,
quid facti, 112, 113, 114, 119, 121, 122,
258, 259, 260, 262, 264
123, 132
and concept formation, 249
quid juris, 112, 114, 119, 121, 122, 132
re¬‚ective judgment, 7, 12, 18, 23, 24,
Rawls, J., 249 27, 29, 30, 35, 111, 112, 115, 124,
reality 125, 129, 170, 173, 223“5, 228,
category of, 144 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234,
reason, 6, 267, 268, 283, 284 236“7, 242, 243, 245, 249, 255,
and aesthetic idea, 253 256, 265, 272, 278, 289
and determinative judgment, 30,
and freedom of will, 125
and idea of beauty, 273 223, 224, 228“9, 243, 244, 245
and ideal of beauty, 273
and re¬‚ective judgment, 29, 223,
and natural law, 287
226, 230, 249
and schematization, 238
and systematicity, 250
as mode of inference, 226
cultivation of, 272, 285
as orientational, 223, 244
culture of, 284
in J¨ sche Logic, 225, 230
historicality of, 31 a
role in concept formation, 36, 247
idea of, 114, 115, 126, 127, 128, 135,
regress of concepts or rules, 10, 17,
136, 154, 241, 243
39, 113. See also rules; concept
ideal of, 30
Reinhold, K.L., 61
ideal of beauty as concept of, 154
representation
practical, 181“2
grades of, 99
practical idea of, 128
reproduction
principle of, 284, 286
synthesis of, 167
relation to understanding, 7
rightness of ¬t, 258
transcendental employment of,
Rousseau, J.J., 218
284
rules, 23, 58, 59, 146, 147, 155, 179,
receptivity, sheer, 63“7, 82“3
recognition, 80, 86, 89, 92, 100, 101, 191, 213, 254, 276, 284“5. See also
regress of concepts or rules;
103, 106, 130, 184“5, 247
concept; schemata; understanding
animal capacity for, 88
role in reproduction, 49“51
as translation for Erkennen or
Rush, F., 169, 177
cognoscere, 97
synthesis of, 106, 138, 146, 167
sapience, animal, 85
reconciliation, 286
Savile, A., 173
re¬‚ection, 24, 31, 85“7, 93, 97, 106,
Schaper, E., 3
107, 112, 136, 163, 176, 178, 205,
schemata, 144, 240. See also rules
223, 227, 236, 244“5, 249
as intuition, 77
aesthetic, 30, 169, 246, 256, 257
as sensible categories, 77
and re¬‚ective judgment, 29, 224,
indeterminate, 238

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