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369
370 Epilogue

hands, but municipal authorities would soon come to realize that,
if only in the interests of their more prosperous residents, streets
should be laid out, paved, drained, and lit, with access to clean wa-
ter if only at stand-pipes, and that schools and basic medical facilities
should follow. The problem was that no sooner had one such shanty-
town been made more habitable than two or three new ones would
have sprung up around it. The growth in urban populations had in
truth been phenomenal. By 2000, Africa boasted twenty cities with
more than a million inhabitants. Lagos, with more than 10 million,
was the largest, having overtaken Cairo with 9.6 million. Kinshasa,
with 4.6 million, stood third. Whereas the general population of most
African countries was doubling every twenty years, that of most cap-
ital cities was doubling every ten. The reason was, undoubtedly, that
the capital cities received priority for all government services, for
otherwise there would be epidemics, riots, and violent crime. Con-
trary to a widespread misconception, most of the newcomers to the
cities came not from the poorest areas of the countryside, but from
the rural areas immediately adjacent. These areas already enjoyed
a modest prosperity by growing food for the neighbouring towns.
They also bene¬tted from their easy access to the cities™ services in
education and medicine and, above all, as a source of labour at busy
periods in the agricultural cycle. Thus, the family farm could be kept
going by the elders as a place of retirement, receiving some seasonal
help from its younger members living in the city.
In contrast, it was in the remoter rural areas that the poorest of
Africa™s poor were to be found. Here, central government, based in
the towns and concentrating mainly on the urban population, tended
to make their economies “ leaving roads unrepaired; hospitals and
clinics without medical supplies; schools without books, pens, or
paper; the people unprotected by police or soldiers from the atten-
tions of gangs of poachers, marauding private armies, or pastoral no-
mads seeking to enlarge their grazing areas. Many of the very poorest
people in Africa were semi-permanent refugees, who had ¬‚ed from
scenes of warfare in their countries of origin and had resettled in
the frontier districts of a neighbouring country, where unoccupied
land was most likely to be found. The southern frontier districts
of Malawi bordering on Mozambique, and the north-western fron-
tier districts of Tanzania bordering on Burundi and Rwanda, were
Epilogue 371

good examples. So too were the southern frontier districts of Burk-
ina Faso, Guinea, and Mali bordering on Liberia and Sierra Leone.
These were places where the writ of the host countries scarcely ran,
and where most of the motor vehicles painfully negotiating the un-
paved roads and broken culverts were those of the aid agencies of
the developed world. It was likewise from scenes like these that the
aid agencies took the piteous photographs of sick babies and under-
nourished mothers which they used to raise their supporting funds,
and so helped to create an image of Africa as a continent dominated
by violence, starvation, disease, and misery.
Most fearful of all the threats to Africa™s well-being, and the hard-
est to ameliorate from the outside, was the soaring incidence of
HIV/AIDS, highest in the countries of southern and eastern Africa
and lowest in the ancient Islamic countries to the north of the Sa-
hara. By 2001, more than 28 million people in Africa were infected
with HIV/AIDS, and 2.3 million had already died. It was estimated
that as many as 40 percent of the population in some African coun-
tries were infected, of whom most would eventually die in their late
thirties or forties, having already transmitted the infection to their
children. These would be left as orphans while still in their teens, or
even younger, and dependent for continuing support on their grand-
parents or other elderly relations. Botswana, with a population of
1.6 million, had some 600,000 people infected by 2002. Average life
expectancy had fallen as a result to thirty-seven years from a high of
sixty-two years in the 1980s. And this in one of the richest and polit-
ically most stable states in the continent, with a gross national per
capita income higher than that of South Africa, and where there was
universal free education and health care. The incidence of HIV/AIDS
infection among Tswana girls ages 15 to 19 was 28 percent in some
areas, twice that of boys of the same age, with worrying implica-
tions for the country™s future economic and reproductive capacity.
One reason for it was thought to be the widespread practice of inter-
generational sex, whereby older men slept with much younger girls
because they thought them less likely to have been infected. Sadly,
one of the commonest types of such encounters was that between
male schoolteachers and their female pupils.
In neighbouring South Africa, with its population of 43 million,
the situation was almost as dire, with 20 percent of adults between
372 Epilogue

the ages of 15 and 49 infected and life expectancy likely to have di-
minished from 65.8 years to 47.9 by 2005. Here, seasonal work in
mining and agriculture was often blamed as the main reason for
casual sex, but next-door in Zimbabwe “ where adult infection had
reached 25 percent and where life expectancy was projected to be
falling from a high of 66.5 years to 42.9 by 2005 “ it was among
teachers and health workers that the incidence was highest. Farther
north, in Tanzania and Kenya, HIV/AIDS hit hardest among the more
prosperous urban males and the prostitutes they frequented, and
those whose occupations involved frequent travel “ transport work-
ers above all others. The reactions of those in authority in African
countries and of bodies such as the World Health Organisation to this
devastating epidemic were for too long in denial or overcautious,
but, gradually, more positive steps were taken to grasp the deadly
nettle. Uganda was the only country that actually managed to bring
down the rate of infection. President Festus Mogae of Botswana was
totally committed to putting all the resources of the state and of
voluntary agencies, including some of the big pharmaceutical com-
panies and of Bill Gates of Microsoft, toward eliminating the disease.
His was the ¬rst African country to offer retroviral drugs to everyone
who needed them, a policy which Botswana™s huge neighbour South
Africa was, for ideological reasons, reluctant to undertake.
By 2000, the dilemma facing most African countries was that vi-
tal cohorts of their rising human resources “ men and women in
their late teens, twenties, and thirties, who should have been the
driving force of economic development “ were those most enfee-
bled by HIV/AIDS and by other killer diseases such as malaria and
TB. The epidemic had in¬‚icted a crippling blow on educational sys-
tems that were already in crisis. In Zambia, for example, HIV/AIDS
was killing almost as many teachers as its colleges could train. This
meant that the continent was in danger of being bypassed in the race
to participate in the new information technology. Whereas Europe in
2000 had 204 telephone mainlines for every thousand people, Africa
south of the Sahara had only 16. The entire continent had some 10
million telephones, but half of them were located in South Africa,
and the remainder were so scattered that most Africans lived two
hours away from the nearest instrument. Again, there were only 2.3
Epilogue 373

Internet hosts to serve every 10,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa,
whereas Latin America and the Caribbean had twice the number.
One well-known expert in development economics concluded that
Africa™s lack of infrastructure required for integration into a global
network suggested that it would be impossible to develop a glob-
alised framework for the continent. But such top-down pessimism,
though common currency among many foreign commentators, was
overstated and probably mistaken. Looked at from the ground level
of urban and suburban communities all over Africa, the conclusion
might not be so bleak, and the gloomy statistics could have missed
the mark. Turned on their head, they showed that Africans did have
access to global communications, albeit in improvised and commu-
nal and, as yet, numerically small, ways. Indeed, the ¬rst years of
the new millennium seemed likely to witness a boom in the use of
mobile phones, even in countries as strife-torn as Congo DR, where
the government was doing deals with international telecommuni-
cations companies to provide both the infrastructure and the avail-
ability of phones at affordable prices. Slowly, more and more people
were coming to possess “ or at least have access to “ computers, and
an increasing number of schools and colleges were teaching infor-
mation technology. The Moroccan telecommunications industry, for
example, had so rapidly transformed the country™s outlets that the
number of mobile subscribers rose from 150,000 to more than 4 mil-
lion during the three years from 1999 to 2002, simply by enhancing
the accessibility of their communications services, especially Inter-
net and Broadband.
In his moving account of the civil war in Sierra Leone, Paul
Richards shows how the country™s youth, many of whom played a
prominent and sometimes vicious part in the con¬‚ict, far from be-
ing trapped in isolating poverty, belonged within the vibrant trans-
Atlantic culture. They regularly watched ¬lms and videos “ war
movies, Rambo, ˜Agent™ (James Bond), and Kung Fu being their
favourites. More than 80 percent of the people in Richards™ survey
listened regularly to the radio. Most tuned in to the new popular FM
stations, but many stayed loyal to the older AM transmissions, which
carried more in the way of news, commentary, and social announce-
ments. The Africa Service of the BBC™s World Service was, by far, the
374 Epilogue

leading international station to which people listened. Although the
rural sample was small, the ¬gures suggest that the alleged isolation
of village dwellers and the uneducated was only relative. In Senegal
in 2002, as in most other African countries, everyone seemed to be
tuning in to the World Cup on radios and televisions. As a Tunisian
exile remarked with some bitterness, ˜We are more politically mature
than our leaders™.
Now that almost half of the population of Africa lived in towns, it
was only necessary to stand and observe the traf¬c on a main road at
the morning or evening rush hour to see the extent and variety of the
people and goods being carried and to realize that, even in countries
with a statistical gross average income of $2 a day, many, many peo-
ple must be enjoying much greater prosperity than the bare statistics
would suggest. In fact, it was in and around these towns that a new
African economy was being born. More than half of all employment
was being provided by small ¬rms in the informal sector, operating
in such ¬elds as construction, transport, trading, market gardening,
manufacturing, and processing. One of the most striking features of
the warlord empires set up from Somalia to Sierra Leone was the
entrepreneurial skill of the warlords and their henchmen.
Straddling the indistinct boundary between the formal economy
and that of the informal and often quasi-criminal economies were
Africa™s exciting cultural, sporting, and entertainment industries.
Musicians from states as far apart as Morocco and South Africa,
Congo and Mali, were performing in the international music arena,
as well as being pop idols in their own countries. The ¬lmmakers of
Burkino Faso and other West African countries enjoyed an interna-
tional reputation. And if nothing else united Africa from the Muslim
north to the old colonial landscape and shantytowns around Cape
Town, it was football. Quite understandably, with the wild success of
their team in the competition, there was no greater instance of ˜World
Cup Fever™ in 2002 than in Senegal. ˜This victory™, wrote Mamadou
Kasse, the editor of Le Soleil,

is not just about football. It is about showing the world that when we work hard
in Senegal, we can succeed in the same way as the people of Europe. A suc-
cessful football team is the expression of a con¬dent nation, one in which there
is democracy, stability and human rights. You do not see Zimbabwe or Camer-
oun producing a winning team. Senegal is a little country, but it has very good
Epilogue 375

political and democratic leadership. We are an example of an African democ-
racy that works. Our president [Abdoulaye Wade] has led the way in the New
Partnership for Africa™s Development. The president is 76, but he dances like a
young man.

A vast capital was waiting to be tapped in African football, and no
one knew better how to make use of this populist resource than
President Gadha¬. He realised that football was the quickest way
for Libya to be accepted back into the international community. As
one of his of¬cials candidly put it, ˜Libya wants to play her part in
the international arena and show that she is not like people think,
about terrorism and all that™. Football was indeed huge in Libya,
with games between the biggest teams attracting crowds of 100,000.
Gadha¬ even used his son, al-Saddi, to front a ¬nancial investment
company to buy a stake in the Italian giant Juventus and to try to
take over the Greek club PAOK Salonika, so that Libyan sides could
participate in the Greek league and thus qualify his country to host
the World Cup in 2010.
The economic inputs of musicians, such as South Africa™s Lady-
smith Black Mambazo, and of world-beating football teams such as
Senegal™s were unlikely to ¬nd a place in the statistics published by
the World Bank and other international agencies. The same could
be said of most of the wealth and bene¬ts created by each country™s
informal sectors and black economies. A large, but immeasurable,
amount of wealth generated throughout Africa must have gone un-
recorded, much of it shared by the poor as well as the rich. The reach
of the World Bank, it has been said, extended only as far as a taxi ride
out of Accra, and it also surely failed to comprehend the side streets
and alleyways of the capital. So, when the World Bank showed Africa
to be at the bottom of every conceivable index, this was true “ but it
was not the whole truth. Other, less measurable, standards reveal en-
terprising, resourceful, ambitious, humorous, canny, and conniving
people getting on with their lives, and ¬nding opportunities to do so
in all the nooks and crannies of their countries™ social and political
structures.
It was encouraging that both the UN Economic Commission for
Africa and the African Economic Outlook for 2001“2 published by
the OECD reported that the continent™s economies were doing better
in spite of the global slowdown during these years, so that in 2001
376 Epilogue

there was an average GDP growth of 4.3 percent, compared with 3.5
percent in 2000. Average income per head across Africa rose by nearly
2 percent in 2001, boosted by lower oil prices, lower in¬‚ation, better
farming methods, and increased exports to the United States arising
from the African Growth and Development Act and to the European
Union under similar trade agreements. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea
saw their economies boom after the ending of their mutual war in
1999. Even Sierra Leone achieved a 5-percent growth after its civil
war ended in 2002. A senior of¬cial of the World Bank enthused over
the better management of the economies of both Rwanda and Congo
DR when he visited these countries in 2002, and recommended that
Congo be rewarded with a hefty helping of debt relief. Such opti-
mistic conclusions, however, taken alone, present a distorted picture.
It is important to remember that the ¬ve largest economies “ those
of South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt “ accounted
for well over half of the continent™s total GDP. And, although these
¬ve states all attracted satisfactory amounts of foreign investment,
Africa as a whole was forecast to attract a wretched 2.3 percent of
all investment worldwide. The deterrents to outside investment have
been well rehearsed as comprising civil violence, political instabil-
ity, folie de grandeur of aging autocrats, corruption at every level,
and “ not least “ the persisting immaturity of the legal and judicial
systems, which made it dif¬cult for otherwise willing investors to
enforce contracts.
With so many state structures failing to provide anything like the
amenities of civil society for their people, the long-term remedies
for the ills of the continent might reasonably be thought to lie with
regional, continental, or even intercontinental organizations. One of
the more successful examples was the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the existence of which had brought Nige-
rian military forces to the aid of the much weaker governments of
Liberia and Sierra Leone in their struggles with political rebellions.
Another had been the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), which had played a useful role in strengthening the de-
fences of neighbouring states during the ¬nal years of the apartheid
government in South Africa, but which had then failed to tackle the
problems posed by Mugabe™s lapses into tyranny in Zimbabwe. At the
intercontinental level, the Commonwealth had, surprisingly enough,
Epilogue 377

proved to be a popular and potent moral club for its African mem-
bers. Although it had few sanctions that could be applied to errant
governments other than the suspension of their membership, this
measure had, in fact, been used against Nigeria during the presi-
dency of Abacha and against Zimbabwe following the scandalous
conduct of the election of 2002. Mozambique had a foot in two
such camps, having joined the Commonwealth in 1995 and having
been the prime mover in the Community of Portuguese-speaking
Countries (CPLP), consisting of Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique, and Portugal, which had its headquarters in
Maputo.
By far, the most signi¬cant move toward more effective alignment
of African states was the establishment of the African Union “ the
inaugural meeting of which was held in Durban in July 2002 “ and
the resultant expiry of the OAU after a life span of thirty-nine years.
The OAU had been founded at the height of nationalistic enthusi-
asm in the decade of political sovereignty and the inviolability of the
ex-colonial frontiers, but was much too feeble to challenge the dicta-
tors or bear down upon the warlords. Thabo Mbeki was chosen as the
African Union™s ¬rst chairman. The intention was to create a Pan“
African parliament, a court of justice, a central bank, and a shared
currency; to set out common electoral standards; and to demand
that independent observers be welcomed before and during any na-
tional election. A small African Peace and Security Council was to
be established, with authority to send troops to stop war crimes and
genocide. Leaders who gained power by military coups would not
be allowed to take part in meetings.
Almost simultaneously with the Durban conference, at the G8
meeting of donor nations in Canada, a New Partnership for Africa™s
Development (NEPAD) was launched. Once again, Thabo Mbeki was
a prime mover in getting the new programme off the ground. NEPAD
was designed to have two basic approaches: First, it was to tackle a
series of speci¬c economic projects, such as the promotion of new
farming techniques and the ¬nancing and construction of a large
new hydroelectric dam at Inga on the lower Congo. Second, it was
to try to bring about longer-term political changes, with a serious
attempt to entrench the rule of law and the observance of business
codes. Projects and targets were to be set, but it was stressed that
378 Epilogue

NEPAD was a programme, not an organization. It would have no
cumbersome bureaucracy. It would operate by a system of ˜peer re-
view™, by which it was envisaged that governments would submit
to criticism by fellow Africans according to commonly agreed stan-
dards. Mbeki wanted a small panel of eminent Africans to make such
reviews, while other leaders were understandably less keen on this
kind of external surveillance.
While the Durban conference was in session, the most immediate
concern for its participants was the severe drought that was rav-
aging much of southern Africa and threatening millions of people
with famine. Unlike the drought in the region of two decades earlier,
this time confrontations between donors and the two countries in
greatest need “ Zimbabwe and Malawi “ were holding up the distri-
bution of aid to the entire region; some countries refused to receive
GM maize. As one observer at Durban commented, it was as if the
heads of state were occupying another universe. For Africa to sur-
vive and prosper, organizations such as the AU and NEPAD needed
to demonstrate that the universe of rhetorical posturing could be
subsumed by the real, live world.
Taking the continent as a whole, the economies of Africa, although
still not keeping pace with the relentless growth of populations, had
in absolute terms turned upwards from the stagnation of the 1970s
and the decline of the 1980s. Industrialists from the outside world
were slowly beginning to see a continent in which they might be
able to invest more and, thereby, to help at least some African gov-
ernments to stand once again on their own feet. Meanwhile, it was
inevitable that Africa would continue to lose, in a diaspora to Eu-
rope and North America, the very people most capable of operating
and energising the kind of regional groupings that could bring good
government and sensible economies to their homelands. And, un-
fortunately, all experience shows that successful migrants from one
continent to another seldom return to their ancestral base.
The events of 11 September 2001 restored, if not the ideology of the
Cold War era, at least high moral rhetoric onto the world stage. The
early reactions of the Bush administration to the terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington seemed to con¬rm the marginalisation of
much of Africa, those countries of the world which were not in the
forefront of the War on Terror being of little immediate concern
Epilogue 379


Tunis
Algiers
Rabat TUNISIA
O
CC
Canary
RO Tripoli
Islands
O Cairo
M ALGERIA
El Aaiun
LIBYA EGYPT
WESTERN
SAHARA



MAURITANIA
Nouakchott
MALI NIGER
SENEGAL Asmara ERITREA
Khartoum
CHAD
Dakar
Banjul Bamako BURKINA Niamey SUDAN
L. Chad
FASO
GAMBIA
Ndjamena
Bissau Djibouti DJIBOUTI
Ouagadougou
GUINEA-
BISSAU G U I N E
IN
BEN




NIGERIA
GH




Conakry Addis Ababa
TOGO
A




IVORY
Freetown Abuja
ANA Ac




ET HIOPIA
SIERRA COAST
N
Lagos




IA
O

LEONE CENTRAL AFRICAN
Yamoussoukro
O


Monrovia
ER



Cotonou




L
REPUBLIC
LIBERIA cr
Lo




a m©




A
M
Ab




M
CA




Bangui
ja Gulf of Malabo
id




O
Yaounde
n Guinea EQUATORIAL S
UGANDA
Bata
GUINEA Mogadishu
O



K E N YA
Kampala
NG




Libreville
SÃO TOMÉ D E M . R E P. L. Victoria
& PRINCIPE Kigali
GABON Nairobi
O




O F RWANDA
C




Bujumbura
Brazzaville BURUNDI
CONGO
Dodoma Pemba I.
Kinshasa
Cabinda
Zanzibar I.
Major oil producing countries L. Tanganyika
TANZANIA
Dar es Salaam
Algeria Luanda
M A L AW
Libya L. Malawi
Nigeria
IA

Moroni
ANGOLA
Angola Lilongwe
B
I


Comoros
ZAM
Middling oil producing countries
E
Lusaka U
Sudan
IQ
L. Kariba
Congo-Brazzaville B
Harare Antananarivo
M




Gabon ZIMBABWE
A




MADAGASCAR
Small oil producing countries
MOZ




NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
Egypt Windhoek Gaborone
Chad
Pretoria
Cameroon Maputo
Equatorial Guinea Mbabane
SWAZILAND
Benin LESOTHO
Maseru
Togo SOUTH
Democratic Republic of Congo AFRICA
Western Sahara (Morocco)

Natural gas

35. Oil in Africa.


to America. African regimes which had a proven track record of
anti-terrorist activities, however authoritarian they might be “ such
as those of King Muhammed of Morocco and President Boute¬‚ika of
Algeria “ became the friends and allies of the United States, whereas
countries that were on America™s list of evil states found it prudent
to slough off their old radical ways. President Gadha¬ was encour-
aged to renounce his abetting of terrorism, while the Sudan regime
cast off some of its Islamic extremism and was prepared to make
peace with the South. If comments in the press were to be believed,
African public opinion, while accepting with ill grace the U.S.-led
380 Epilogue

campaign in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, was out-
spokenly hostile to the preemptive war against Saddam Hussein in
Iraq. ˜Were preemption to become the rationale for just war™, wrote
one South African columnist, ˜then one can imagine the endless can
of worms this would open up for much of Africa. No peace process
would be safe™. Nevertheless, once the dust has settled, African lead-
ers will have to put their compunctions about the policies of the Bush
administration aside and come to terms with the cosmic shift in in-
ternational relations that has taken place since the end of the Cold
War, with the United States becoming fully conscious of its status
as the world™s only superpower and determined to pursue policies
which re¬‚ect this preeminence.
One exception to Africa™s low-pro¬le participation on the world
stage was the exploitation of oil. The U.S. determination to ¬nd an
alternative energy source to the Middle East generated a new oil
rush in sub-Saharan Africa. After September 11, American compa-
nies became much more aggressively involved in the opening up
of new ¬elds throughout the Gulf of Guinea, especially in Angola,
Equitorial Guinea, and Nigeria. Nevertheless, the economic, social
and environmental consequences of oil exploitation, substantial and
grave as these might be, affected only fairly limited areas (many of
the new ¬elds were offshore) in a small number of countries. By
mid-2003, the United States showed signs of renewed interest in
the continent. President Bush pledged to spend $15 billion to ¬ght
HIV/AIDS in poor countries and even contemplated sending U.S.
troops to troubled Liberia. In July 2003, he paid his ¬rst visit to the
continent, taking in Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda, and
Nigeria. In August 2003, after the arrival of Nigerian peacekeeping
forces in Monrovia, Charles Taylor left Liberia for exile in Nigeria.
For a time, U.S. troops were deployed in the country, before the
arrival of a large number of UN peacekeepers. Gyude Bryant was
chosen to head an interim administration, pending elections. After
nearly two decades of con¬‚ict, Liberia seemed poised for a more
peaceful future. Likewise, the United States took steps to bring the
even longer-running con¬‚ict in the southern Sudan to a conclusion.
In October 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell persuaded govern-
ment and rebel leaders meeting in the Kenyan town of Naivasha to
sign a comprehensive peace treaty by the end of the year.
Epilogue 381

In the aftermath of the Iraq War, the American government took
steps to become more actively engaged with African issues. Even
if many people were sceptical of American intentions toward their
continent, Africans could turn being less in the forefront of world
politics and con¬‚icts to their own advantage, manipulating the deep
divisions in the ranks of the world™s privileged countries. Indeed,
there was much to be gained from being left alone. It may be that
what was, above all, necessary, was for Africa to revive its belief in
itself and in its own power to identify and address its problems, and
to be master of its own development, instead of being dependent on
and subservient to outsiders to effect this development. Many serious
Africans were pinning their aspirations on an African Renaissance,
which, if it were to be anything more than humbug, would require
people in all walks of life, up and down the continent, to emulate
the example of the old master: ˜We have not taken the ¬nal step of
our journey™, wrote Nelson Mandela at the end of his story, ˜but the
¬rst step on a longer and even more dif¬cult road. For to be free is
not merely to cast off one™s chains, but to live in a way that respects
and enhances the freedom of others. The true test of our devotion to
freedom is just beginning™.1

1
Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, New York, 1994, p. 544.
Suggestions for Further Reading




GENERAL

J. F. Ade Ajayi (ed.), General History of Africa IV: Africa in the Nineteenth
Century until the 1880s, Paris, UNESCO, 1989.
John E. Flint (ed.), Cambridge History of Africa V, c1780“c1870, Cambridge,
1976.
Roland Oliver and G. N. Sanderson (eds.), Cambridge History of Africa VI,
c1870“c1905, Cambridge, 1985.
A. A. Boahen (ed.), General History of Africa VII: Africa under Colonial Dom-
ination 1880“1935, Paris, UNESCO, 1985.
A. D. Roberts (ed.), Cambridge History of Africa VII: 1905“1940, Cambridge,
1986.
Michael Crowder (ed.), Cambridge History of Africa VIII: 1940“1975, Cam-
bridge, 1984.
A. A. Mazrui (ed.), General History of Africa VIII: Africa since 1935, Paris,
UNESCO, 1993.
Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, London, 1991.
Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts (eds.), The End of Slavery in Africa,
Wisconsin, 1985.
L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870“1960,
5 vols., Cambridge, 1969“75.
Bill Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African
Society since 1800, Boulder, CO, 1998.
Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940, Cambridge, 2002.
John Iliffe, The African Poor: A History, Cambridge, 1987.




383
384 Suggestions for Further Reading

Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 1880“1995, Cambridge,
1999.
David Killingray and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Africa and the Second World
War, New York, 1986.
Prosser Gifford and Wm Roger Louis (eds.), The Transfer of Power in Africa:
Decolonisation 1940“1960, New Haven, CT, 1982.
David Birmingham, Decolonisation in Colonial Africa, London, 1995.
John D. Hargreaves, Decolonisation in Africa, 2nd ed., Harlow, 1996.
Adrian Hastings, A History of African Christianity 1950“1975, Cambridge,
1979.
Paul Darby, Africa, Football and FIFA: Politics, Colonialism and Resistance,
London, 2002.
J. F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), Historical Atlas of Africa, London,
1983.
World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?, Washington, 2000.


NORTH AND NORTH-EAST AFRICA

J. M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1975.
C. R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History, London, 1999.
Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830“2000: A Short History, Cornell UP, 2001.
John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation,
Bloomington, 1992.
Charles-Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present,
London, 1991.
Derek Hopwood, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia: The Tragedy of Longevity,
London, 1992.
Ali A. Ahmidam, The Making of Modern Libya, New York, 1994.
M. W. Daly (ed.), The Cambridge History of Egypt II: Modern Egypt, from 1517
to the End of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, 1998.
Afaf Lat¬ al-Sayyid Marsot, A Short History of Modern Egypt, Cambridge,
1985.
Robert Collins and Robert Tignor, Egypt and the Sudan, Englewood Cliffs,
1967.
Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan™s Civil Wars, Oxford, 2003.
Deborah Scroggins, Emma™s War, Atlanta/London, 2003.
Bahru Zewde, History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855“1991, Athens/Oxford, 2002.
Donald Crummey, Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia
from the 13th to the 20th Century, Oxford, 2002.
Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance,
Nationalism, 1941“1993, Cambridge, 1995.
I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, Oxford, 2002.
Suggestions for Further Reading 385

WEST AFRICA

J. F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa, vol. 2,
London, 1974.
A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, London, 1973.
Richard L. Roberts, Two Worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the Regional
Economy in the French Soudan, 1800“1946, Stanford, 1996.
Janet Vaillant, Black, French, and African: A Life of L´ opold S´ dar Senghor,
e e
Cambridge, MA, 1990.
John Peterson, Province of Freedom: A History of Sierra Leone, 1787“1870,
Evanston, IL, 1969.
Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in
Sierra Leone, London, 1996.
Astride R. Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast, 2nd ed.,
Princeton, 1969.
Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1975.
David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nation-
alism 1850“1928, Oxford, 1963.
Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946“1960, London, 1964.
John Carmichael, Gold Coast to Ghana, London, 1993.
Richard Rathbone, Murder and Politics in Colonial Ghana, New Haven, 1993.
Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in
Ghana, 1951“60, Athens, 1999.
David Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah: The Father of African Nationalism,
Athens, 1998.
James S. Coleman, Nigeria: A Background to Nationalism, Berkeley, 1968.
J. D. Y. Peel, Religious Encounters and the Making of the Yoruba, Blooming-
ton, 2000.
Julius O. Ihonvbere and Timothy Shaw, Illusions of Power: Nigeria in Tran-
sition, Rochester, 1998.
Toyin Falola, Nigeria in the Twentieth Century, Carolina Academic Press,
2002.


EASTERN AND WESTERN CENTRAL AFRICA

Vincent Harlow, E. M. Chilver, and Alison Smith (eds.), History of East Africa,
vol. 2, Oxford, 1965.
D. A. Low and Alison Smith (eds.), History of East Africa, vol. III, Oxford,
1976.
Robert L. Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya, Princeton, NJ, 1978.
Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Con¬‚ict in Kenya and
Africa, London, 1992.
386 Suggestions for Further Reading

Wunyabiri O. Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt,
Bloomington, 1998.
Valerie Cuthbert, Jomo Kenyatta: The Burning Spear, Harlow, 1982.
John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge, 1979.
Annie Smyth and Adam Seftel (eds.), Tanzania: The Story of Julius Nyerere,
Kampala, 2000.
Michael Twaddle, Kakungulu and the Creation of Uganda, 1868“1928,
Oxford, 1993.
Ren´ Lamarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, London, 1970.
e
Ruth Slade, King Leopold™s Congo, London, 1962.
Osumaka Likaka, Society and Cotton in Colonial Zaire, Wisconsin, 1997.
Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonisation and Independence,
Princeton, NJ, 1965.
George Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, from Leopold to Kabila: A People™s His-
tory, New York, 2002.
Michela Wrong, In the Steps of Mr Kurtz, London, 2000.



SOUTHERN CENTRAL AFRICA

David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin (eds.), History of Central Africa: The
Contemporary Years since 1960, Harlow, 1998.
R. J. Hammond, Portugal and Africa 1815“1910, Stanford, 1966.
Douglas L. Wheeler and Ren´ Pelissier, Angola, New York, 1971.
e
Tony Hodges, Angola from Afro-Socialism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism,
Oxford, 2001.
Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique, London, 1995.
Allen F. Isaacman, Cotton Is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work and Rural
Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938“1961, Portsmouth, NH, 1996.
Merle Bowen, The State against the Peasantry: Rural Struggles in Colonial and
Postcolonial Mozambique, Charlottesville, VA, 2000.
Martin Chanock, Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in
Malawi and Zambia, New York, 1998.
Andrew Roberts, A History of Zambia, London, 1976.
B. S. Krishnamurthy, The Making of Modern Malawi, London, 1992.
John Flint, Cecil Rhodes, London, 1976.
Robert Blake, A History of Rhodesia, London, 1977.
T. O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896“7, London, 1967.
Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia
1900“1933, London, 1976.
Richard Gray, The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations
in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, London, 1960.
James P. Barber, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion, London, 1967.
Suggestions for Further Reading 387

Patrick Bond, Uneven Zimbabwe: A Study of Finance, Development and
Underdevelopment, Trenton, NJ, 1998.
Hevina S. Dashwood, Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transformation,
Toronto, 2000.
W. Minter, King Solomon™s Mines Revisited, New York, 1986.
Helmut Bley, South-West Africa under German Rule, London, 1971.
Raymond Kent, From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic, Westport, CT,
1976.


SOUTH AFRICA

Monica Wilson and L. M. Thompson, The Oxford History of South Africa,
2 vols., Oxford, 1969“71.
William Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, Oxford, 1994.
James Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, Oxford, 1999.
Rodney Davenport and Christopher Saunders, South Africa, A Modern His-
tory, New York, 2000.
Noel Mostert, Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa™s Creation and the Tragedy
of the Xhosa People, London, 1992.
Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, London, 1979.
Charles van Onselen, Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Wit-
watersrand 1886“1914, 2 vols., London, 1982.
W. K. Hancock, Smuts, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1962“8.
Peter Walshe, The Rise of Nationalism in South Africa: The African National
Congress 1912“1952, London, 1970.
Francis Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911“1969, Cam-
bridge, 1972.
H. J. and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa 1850“1950, Har-
mondsworth, 1969.
Deborah Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948“1961: Con¬‚ict and Compro-
mise, Oxford, 1991.
A. Adedeji (ed.), South Africa and Africa: Within or Apart?, London, 1997.
A. Guelke, South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle, London,
1999.
Jack Spence (ed.), After Mandela, London, 1999.
Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, London, 1994.
F. W. de Klerk, The Last Trek, Johannesburg, 1999.
Index




Abacha, Sani, 361, 377 missionaries and, 116
Abbas, Ferhat, 190“1, 240, 242 in Namibia, 297
Abbas I, of Egypt, 43 National Party and, 287
Abboud, General, 231 war between Britain and, 143“5,
Abdallah, brother of Usuman dan Fodio, 200“1
67 see also South Africa
Abdallahi, the Khalifa, 44, 47 Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung, 1955),
Abd al-Qadir, 57“9 216, 230, 243
Abd al-Qrim, 188 Afro-Brazilians, 72“3
Abd ar-Rahman, of Morocco, 55, 59 Afro-Malagasy Joint Organisation
Abeokuta, 74, 76 (OCAM), 266
Abiola, Moshood, 361, 362 agriculture, expansion of, 37“9, 91“2,
Abushiri, 137, 161 174, 219, 225, 228, 269, 324,
Accra Conference (1958), 254, 261 328
Achimota, 221 Ahmad, bey of Tunis, 61
Acholi people, 97 Ahmad, Sayyid, 195“6
Adamawa, 66 Ahmad, Tijani, 64
Addis Ababa Agreement (1972), 314 Ahmadu Lobo (Hamadu Bari), 67
Adowa, battle of (1896), 51 Ahmadu Sefu, 68, 131, 149
Afar people, 233 AIDS. See HIV/AIDS
Afghanistan, 353, 356, 380 Akan states, 15
Afonja of Ilorin, 73 Akasombo dam, Ghana, 326“7, 336
African National Congress (ANC, South Akitoye, Oba, of Lagos, 76
Africa), 209, 234, 270, 280, 283, al-Azhar University, Cairo, 184
288“90, 301“2, 367 al-Bashir, Omar, 356
African Union, 359, 368, 377 Alexandria, 228
Africa Service (BBC), 373 Algeria
Afrikaans language, 143, 207, 294 France and, 56“8, 89, 241“2
Afrikaner National Party, 206, 207 independent, 226, 353“4, 379
Afrikaners (Boers) nationalism in, 190“1, 216, 240“3
Africans and, 30, 103“5, 111, 114, 116 Algiers, 7“8, 52, 55
Great Trek and, 111“14, 202 al-Hajj Umar, 66“8, 77, 131, 149
jobs taken by poor, 284 al-Hasan, Mawlai, of Morocco, 59


389
390 Index

All-African People™s Conference, Accra baaskap, 201“3, 285
(1958), 254 Babangida, Ibrahim, 361“2
al-Madhi, Sadiq, 314“6, 356 Badagry, 74
al-Turabi, Hasan, 356 Baganda people, 97“8, 100, 158, 161“3,
Alula, Italian Protectorate, 196“7 312
Alvor accords (1975), 277 Baker, Samuel, 44, 97
al-Zubeir Rahman, 41 Bakongo people, 263, 273, 274
Amhara, region of Ethiopia, 47, 50 Balafrej, Ahmad, 189“90
Amin, Idi, 311“13, 358, 363 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 249, 308
amir, 6, 36, 196 Bamako, 131, 251
Anglo-Boer War, 143“5, 200“1 Bamangwato people, 107
Angola, 21, 23, 78 Bambara kingdoms, 67, 68
independent, 278, 339“40 Banda, Hastings, 271“2, 310, 365
Portugal and, 32, 68, 78“81, 87, 158, Bandung Conference (1955), 216
268, 273“6 Bantu, 20
South Africa and, 278 in East Africa, 30“2, 257, 312
see also Frente Nacionale de Eastern Bantu, 20, 24“6, 28
Liberta¸ ao de Angola; Movimento
c˜ in South Africa, 28, 103“5, 291
Popular de Liberta¸ ao de Angola;
c˜ trade in Bantu states, 26“8
Uniao Nacional para a
˜ Western Bantu, 20“4
Independˆ ncia Total de Angola
e Bantu Education Act (South Africa,
animal husbandry, 1“3, 14, 24, 29, 33, 1953), 286“7
85, 105“6, 219, 237, 314“15 Bantu languages, 20
Ankole kingdom, 24“5, 96 Bantustans. See Homelands
Anyanya National Army, Southern Banyamulenge people, 347
Sudan, 232, 314 Banyoro people, 163
Aole, Ala¬n, of Oyo, 73“4 Baptista, Pedro Joao, 78
˜
apartheid (separate development), Baqqara people, 45“6, 358
285“95, 299“302 Barbot, James, 27
discriminatory legislation, 286“7 Barghash, Sultan of Zanzibar, 100, 137
Arab League, 229, 237 Barotse. See Lozi
Arabs Barre, Mohammad Siad, 236, 317“18,
East Coast, 30“2, 40, 42, 46, 342
314 Barth, Heinrich, 55, 69
see also Swahili Basoga people, 97
North African, 1, 4, 8 Basuto. See Sotho
see also bedouin Arabs Basutoland, British Protectorate, 201,
Arden-Clarke, Charles, 247“9 203, 205, 295“6, see also Lesotho
arms. See ¬rearms Basutoland Congress Party, 296
Asante, 16, 72, 75 Basutoland National Party, 296
Britain and, 76, 134, 153, 163 Batlokwa, 107
Asians Baudouin (Belgium), 262
in East Africa, 293 Bayeke people, 83
in northern Africa, 328 Bechuana. See Tswana
in South Africa, 211 Bechuanaland, British Protectorate,
assimilados (Portuguese Africa), 268, 116“17, 127, 201, 203, 205, 295“6,
278 see also Botswana
association (French policy), 177“9 Bechuanaland Democratic Party, 296
Aswan dam, Nile, 191, 230, 326 B´ di´ , Henri, 360
ee
Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 180, 245, 246, bedouin Arabs, 7, 36, 60, 136, 195“6,
249 237
Index 391

Behanzin, of Dahomey, 131 Greek independence and, 41, 53
Belgium, 213, 216 in Middle East, 42, 53
Congo and, 156, 178“9, 260, 262 in North Africa, 55, 61“2
see also Leopold II in South Africa, 30, 111“14, 127“8
Katanga and, 83, 86, 141“2, 155 in West Africa, 16“17, 68, 72, 75“8,
Ruanda-Urundi and, 171, 261“2 119“20, 249“50
Bemba people, 95 see also individual colonies
Ben Ali, Zine al-Abidine, 354“5 British Commonwealth, 252
Ben Bella, Muhammad, 242“3 British South Africa Company, 140“41,
Benelulua people, 261, 263 143, 157, 161, 175
Benghazi, 55, 60“1 Bruce, James, 11
Benguela, 78, 81 Brynat, Gyude, 380
Benin, 76, 163, 361 Buganda kingdom, 24“5, 44, 94, 96“7,
B´ nin (Dahomey), 16, 72“3, 75, 253
e 100
Berber people, 1, 4, 7“10, 237, 243, Britain and, 137, 158, 161“2
353“4 in independent Uganda, 257, 259, 312
Berlin Conference (1884“5), 86, 126, Bugeaud, General, 57“8
129, 135“6, 138 Bunyoro kingdom, 24“5, 44, 96, 97
Betsileo kingdom, Madagascar, 140 Britain and, 138, 163
beys of Tunis, 7, 61“2 Burkina Faso, 337, 371
Biafra, 308“10, 332 entertainment industry in, 374
Biko, Steve, 295, 299 Burma, 215
Bisa people, 78“80 Burton, Sir Richard, 91, 94“5
Bismarck, Otto von, 123, 126, 128 Burundi kingdom, 24“5
Black People™s Convention (BPC, South independent, 264, 345
Africa), 294 see also Ruanda-Urundi
Blyden, Edward, 180, 244 Bush, George W., 378“80, 381
Bobangi people, 87 Bushmen. See San people
Boers. See Afrikaners Buthelezi, Gatsha, 293
Bokassa, Jean, 311“12 Butler, R. A., 272
Bongo, Omar, 334
Bophuthatswana Homeland, 291, 293 Cabora Bassa dam, Zambezi, 276, 327,
Borgu, 134 332, 366
Bornu Kingdom, 12, 53, 60“1, 66, 135 Cairo, 6“7, 10“7, 44“5, 56, 184, 228,
Botha, P. W., 205, 206, 295, 300“2 370
Botswana, 116“17, 127, 296 Cameroun, 18, 20“30, 63, 171
HIV/AIDS in, 371“2 Germany and, 123, 127, 136, 157
see also Bechuanaland independent, 253
Boum´ dienne, Houari, 243
e under mandate, 171
Bourguiba, Habib, 190, 239“40, 310, 354 Cape Colony, 20“30, 34, 103“12, 114,
Boute¬‚ika, Abdalelaziz, 353, 354 127, 143, 201, see also South Africa
Brazil, 27, 72, 76, 91 Casablanca group of states, 304
Brazza, Savorgnan de, 122 Casalis, Eug` ne, 108“10
e
Brazzaville group of states, 156 cash crops
Britain, 310, 326, 354 government marketing of, 148, 217
in India, 214“15, 284 see also individual crops
Sierra Leone and, 352 Central African Federation, 259, 267“73,
world war and, 214“15 304
Britain (precolonial only), 60, 118“19 Central African Republic, 78
in East Africa, 49 C´ saire, Aim´ , 250
e e
in Egypt, 45, 53, 126, 128, 191“3 Cetshwayo, 115
392 Index

Ceylon, 215 education in, 178“9, 221“2
Chad, 61, 151“3, 156, 165, 311, 315, 359 independent, 219, 260“4
Chaga people, 99 under Leopold II, 120“3, 141“2, 154“6
Changamire dynasty (Zimbabwe), 111 see also Zaire
Chewa people, 160 Congo (French), 156, 261
children™s crusade, 304 Congo (region), 20“1, 23, 27
Chiluba, Frederick, 365 Congo river
China, 216, 241“3, 275, 277 hydroelectric project in, 219, 327, 377
Chissano, Joseph, 365, 366 navigation on, 21, 86“9
Chokwe people, 82“3, 88, 89 in nineteenth-century, 86“9
Christian church Congress Alliance, South Africa, 288
in Ethiopia, 10“1, 17, 47“9 Convention People™s Party (CPP),
independent African, 314 Ghana, 247“8
Christian missions, 26 copper, 12, 20, 25, 83, 218, 268“9, 297,
African nationalism and, 167“9 327, 330“1, 365
in East Africa, 3, 90, 98, 232 corruption, 334“5
in Madagascar, 101“2 corsairs, of Algiers, 7“8
in South Africa, 10, 283 cotton
in West Africa, 26, 66, 69, 245 as cash crop, 43, 87, 150, 330
Churchill, Winston, 194“5, 199 spinning of, 218
Ciskei, 291 cotton textiles
civil service, 333 British, 10
Clapperton, Hugh, 55, 66 Indian, 11
Clinton, Bill, 342 Coussey, Sir Henley, 247
cloves, cultivation of, 92 Crete, 41
cocoa, as cash crop, 150, 153, 324, 335 Cromer, Lord, 191“2
coffee Cuba, 242, 277“9, 299, 302
as cash crop, 33, 37, 87, 330 Angola and, 339
slave trade and, 33 Ethiopia and, 317, 340
Cold War, 239, 317, 319, 323, 336 slave-trade and, 72, 91
Colonial Development and Welfare Acts cultural/sporting/entertainment
(Britain, 1940, 1945), 217“18 industry, 374“5
Coloured people, South Africa, 143, Cyprus, 62
284“7 Cyrenaica, 55, 60, 61
Communism (Marxism), 244, 263, 278, Italy and, 135“6, 195, 196
282, 288, 304“5, 328, 365 part of independent Libya, 237
Communist countries, 319
Communists: African Dahomey, 163
French, 180, 251“3 France and, 119, 126, 131, 134, 149“51
South Africa and, 302 independent. See B´ nin
e
Zanzibar and, 259“60 Dakar, 151, 221
Community of Portuguese-speaking Danakil people, 233
Countries (CPLP), 377 Darb al-Arba™in (Forty Days™ Road) IT, 12
Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce Dar es Salaam, 127
et l™Industrie (CCCI), 150“5 Darfur, 11“2
Compagnie du Katanga, 155 Delegorgue, Adolphe, French traveller,
concessionaire companies, 155“6 105“6
Congo, People™s Republic of, 78 Denmark, and West Africa, 16, 68, 118
Congo (Belgian), 221 Dergue, military government, Ethiopia,
Democratic Republic of, 23, 78, 85, 317
274, 347“9, 376 d™Estaing, Giscard, 311
Index 393

Destour Party, Tunisia, 62, 190 independent, 340
Devlin Commission, on Nyasaland, Italy and, 136, 196, 197
271 joined to Ethiopia, 233“4
deys of Algiers, 7, 56 war with Ethiopia, 314“17, 340
Diagne, Blaise, 106, 180, 212“13 Ethiopia, 10“11, 37
Diamonds, 114“15, 202 civil war in, 315“18
Difaqane (Mfecane), 107 economic growth in, 376
Dingane, 112“14 independence regained, 234“5
Dinka people, 358 Italy and, 138, 198“9, 213, 233
Diop, Alioune, 251 liberation movement in, 340
Diouf, Abdou reuni¬cation of, 47“51
Djibouti, 197, 236 European Economic Community (EEC),
Doe, Samuel, 349 276
Domingo, Charles, 168 Evian agreement on Algeria, 240,
Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa 242
(Lugard), 171 exchange rate, manipulation of, 334
DuBois, W. E. B., 180, 244“5, 259
Dufferin, Lord, 191 Faidherbe, Louis, 76“7, 150
Fang people, 88, 311
East African Community, 304 Fante people, 72
Ebou´ , Felix, 214
e Farouk, king of Egypt, 228, 307
´
Ecole William Ponty, Dakar, 178 Fashoda, 39
Economic Community of West African Anglo-French confrontation at,
States (ECOWAS), 349, 351 135“6
Eden, Anthony, 231 Federation of African Trades Unions,
education, 176“8, 217, 219“22, 225 252
development in independent country, Fernando Poo (now called Bioko),
324“5 311
in Ghana, 324 Fezzan, 53, 60, 195, 237
in Madagascar, 102 FIDES, 218
by missionaries, 147, 164“7, 220, Field, Winston, 272
245 ¬rearms
in South Africa, 294 East Africa, 94
university, 10, 184, 221, 235, 253, Egypt, 42
324“5 Ethiopia, 45“51
E¬k, 74“5, 162 miners paid in, 115
Egal, Mohammed, 342 of Moroccans (1591), 13
Egba people, 73, 74 North Africa, 7
Egypt, 52, 226 obtained by sale of slaves, 53
Britain and, 128, 191“3 power of, 33, 81, 83
Buganda and, 97“8 traded for gold, 72
gross national per capita income, 369 traded for ivory, 51, 82“3, 88, 90
independent, 226“31, 307 traded for slaves, 16, 53
Napoleon and, 17 traded for war captives, 13
nationalism in, 42, 192“5, 228 used in hunting, 103“12
radical Islam in, 353, 355“6 used in war, 16, 53
Entente Council group of states, 253 Firestone Rubber Company, 211
Equatorial Guinea, 311 First World War, 170“1, 212
Eritrea Fodio, Usuman dan, 64“6
economic growth in, 376 foreign investment, 376
Egypt and, 50 Fort Salisbury, 141
394 Index

France, 216 geography/climate of Africa
Ivory Coast and, 361 northern half, 1
world war and, 214“15 south of equator, 18
France (precolonial only), 118“19, 123 German East Africa, 157, 161, 170, 266,
in Egypt, 45, 53 see also Tanganyika
in Ethiopia, 50 German East Africa Company, 161
in Madagascar and East Africa, 102, German South-West Africa, 117, 157,
128, 162 171, see also Namibia
North Africa and, 53, 55, 61“2, 136 Germany, 123“6, 136, 157, 162“3
in West Africa, 16, 68, 76“80, 119“20 in world wars, 213“14
see also individual colonies Gezira, 193
Franco-Prussian war (1870“1), 123 Ghadames oasis, 7
French Community, 224, 261 Ghana, 15, 249, 253, 305“7
French Equatorial Africa, 156, 178, 214, agriculture in, 324
261 education in, 324
French Union, 224 IMF and, 335“6
French West Africa, 149“51, 177“8, 180, industry in, 326“7
214, 250“4 parliamentary democracy and, 360
Frente de Liberta¸ ao de Mo¸ ambique
c˜ c see also Gold Coast
(Frelimo), 275, 278, 279, 365 GM maize, 378
Frente Nacionale de Liberta¸ ao de
c˜ Gobir, 64
Angola (FNLA), 273“5, 277 gold
Frere, Sir Bartle, 115“16 in North-East Africa, 11, 25, 26
Fria dam, Guinea, 218 in South Africa, 127, 200, 202
Frobenius, Leo, 24 in West Africa, 3, 5, 72, 153, 336
Front de Lib´ ration Nationale (FLN),
e in Zimbabwe, 25
Algeria, 241“3, 353 Gold Coast, 149, 150
Fuad, of Egypt, 193 Britain and, 72, 75“6, 134, 151, 153,
Fulbe (Fulani) people, 14, 63“7, 249 157
emirates of, 154 independent, 249
Funj sultanate, 11, 37“9 nationalism in, 179, 216
Futa Jallon, 64 see also Ghana
Futa Toro, 13“4, 64 Goldie, George, 119“20, 134“6
France and, 7, 77 Gondar, 10“11
Fynn, Henry, 106 Gordon, Charles, 44, 46, 97
Gowan, J., 308, 310
Gabon, 78, 119, 135“6, 156, 337 Grant, James A., 44
Gadha¬, Muammar el-, 237, 311, 358“9, Granville, Lord, 191
375 Great Trek, 112“14, 202
Gallieni, General, 131, 140, 149 Great Zimbabwe, 25
Gambia, 151, 250 Greece, 41, 52“3
Gandhi, Mahatma, 203“4 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 332“3
Garang, John, 314, 358 2000/2002, 376
Garanganze, 83, see also Msiri 1987 country analysis of, 329“31
Garvey, Marcus, 180, 244 groundnuts, as cash crop, 150
Gaulle, Charles de, 214 Guinea
African independence and, 241“2, France and, 119, 131, 149, 150
252“3, 261, 266 independent, 305
Gazankula, Homeland, 293 Islam in, 165
Gbagbo, Laurent, 360 lack of development in, 371
Gbedemah, K. A., 248“54 Guin´ Bissau, 276
e
Index 395

Habe rulers, 66, 69 Ibadan, 74, 221
Haile Selassie, of Ethiopia, 198“9, 213, Ibo people, 75, 162, 249, 308
233“5, 314, 315 Ibrahim Pasha, 41“3
Hamadu Bari (Ahmadu Lobo), 67 Idris, king of Libya, 196, 236“7
Hammerskjold, Dag, 264
¨ Ijaw people, 74“5, 162
Harrar, 44 Ijebu people, 73, 74
Hassan, of Morocco, 239, 310, 311, 353, Ilorin emirate, 66, 73“4, 134
354 Imbangala, 80“2
Hausaland, 69, 131, 134 Independent Schools Association,
Hausa people, 12“3, 15, 64, 66, 308 Kenya, 181
Haya people, 97 India, 216
Hayford, J. E. Casely, 179, 212“3 British in, 214“15, 284
health services, 325, see also HIV/AIDS routes to, 17, 37
Hehe people, 96 Indians
Heligoland, 128 in East Africa, 158
Hema people, 348 in southern Africa, 201“7, 284,
Herero people, 115, 160, 162“3, 297 286“7
Herstigte Nasionale (Reconstituted indirect rule, 173“4, 212“3, 222
National) Party, 287 Indo-China, 215, 224, 241
Hertzog, General, 206“7 Indonesia, 215
Hijaz, 36“7 Industrial and Commercial Union,
Hinde, Sidney, 84“5 South Africa, 209
Hitler, Adolf, 199 Industrialisation, 225, 323“9
HIV/AIDS, 331“2, 364, 369, 371“2, Inga hydroelectric project, 219, 327, 377
380 interlacustrine region, 24“5, 27“8, 91,
Ho Chi Minh, 215 96“8
Hofmeyr, J. H., 207“8 International Court of Justice (The
Holland, 118, 213, 214 Hague), 239, 298
in South Africa, 29“30, 34 International Monetary Fund (IMF),
in West Africa, 16, 68, 78 335“7, 364
Homelands (Bantustans) Iraq, 356, 380
South Africa, 291“3 iron ore, 20
Swazi kingdom, 293 Ironsi, General, 308
Transkei, 291“3 Islam (also Muslims), 165
Zulu people, 291 in East Africa, 3“4, 30, 46“7, 50, 165,
Hottentots. See Khoi people 314“15, 356“8
Houphou¨ t-Boigny, Felix, 251, 253“4,
e in Egypt and Sudan, 3“4, 11“12, 353,
305, 310, 360 355“6
Hova people, 33, 101“2, 140, 162, 266 in North Africa, 3“4, 7, 55“6, 60“1,
Huggins, Godfrey (Lord Malvern), 352“5, 358“9
269“71 in West Africa, 4, 64, 165, 362“3
Hussainid dynasty, Tunis, 7 Islamic fundamentalism, 314“15, 352
Hussein, Saddam, 380 Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), 353
Hutu people, 261“2, 264“5, 343 Ismail, Khedive of Egypt, 43“5, 49“50,
hydroelectric power, 219, 326“7 97
on Congo, 219, 327, 377 Ismail, son of Muhammad Ali, 37“9
in Egypt, 191, 230, 326 Istiqlal party, Morocco, 190, 238
in Ghana, 218, 326“7 Italy, 232“3
in Guinea, 218 Eritrea and, 196, 197
in Uganda, 218 Ethiopia and, 50“1, 138, 211
on Zambezi, 218, 276, 327, 332, 366 Mozambique and, 366
396 Index

Italy (cont.) Katanga, 20, 23, 82, 83, 97
North Africa and, 53, 135“6, 195“6, Belgium and, 83, 86, 141“2, 155
358“9 secedes from Congo, 263, 304,
Somalia and, 233 308“11
world war and, 214 see also Shaba
ivory, 72, 83, 86“90, 95, 157 Katsina, 13, 66
¬rearms traded for, 51, 82“3, 88, 90 Kaunda, Kenneth, 272, 280, 300, 310,
Ivory Coast, 15 320, 336“7, 365
France and, 119, 131, 149, 150, 251 Kavango, 298
independent, 253, 287, 310 Kenya, 98“9, 163
parliamentary democracy and, 360“1 Britain and, 137, 157, 175, 236
ivory trade cash crop in, 330
East Africa, 11, 25, 26, 39“41, 46, 92, Germany and, 137
95, 99 HIV/AIDS in, 372
Portuguese government monopoly of, independent, 257, 259
81, 87, 89 nationalist movement in, 181, 246“57
parliamentary democracy and, 364
Jabavu, John Tengo, 202, 204“5, 212“13 Kenya African Democratic Union
Jaja, of Opobo, 134 (KADU), 257, 259
Jameson, L. S., 145 Kenya African National Union (KANU),
Janssens, General, 263 245, 257, 259
Japan, 214, 299 Kenyatta, Jomo, 181, 236, 244“56, 259,
Jesus II, of Ethiopia, 11 282
Jidda, 37 K´ r´ kou, Matthieu, 361
ee
jihad, 14, 57, 63“8 Khaled, Amr, 355“6
Jinja dam, Nile (Uganda), 218 Khalifa, the (Abdallahi), 44, 47, 128
John IV, of Ethiopia, 49“50 Khama, Sir Seretse, 296
Johnson, James, 169 Khartoum, 39, 97, 135“6, 221
Johnson, Prince, 349 Khoi people, 30, 103“5, 112“15, 297
Johnson, Samuel, 15 Kibaki, Mwai, 364
Jonathan, Chief Leabua, 296 Kigali, 345
Jos´ , Amaro, 78“81
e Kikuyu Central Association, 181
Kikuyu people, 99, 181, see also Mau
Kabaka Yekka party, Uganda, 259 Mau
Kabbah, Ahmad, 352 Kimbo dam, Guinea, 218
Kabila, Joseph, 348 Kingsley, Mary, 88
Kabila, Laurent, 347“8 Kinshasa, population of, 370
Kadalie, Clements, 209 Kirk, Sir John, 100
Kagame, Paul, 345 Kissinger, Henry, 280
Kalenjin people, 257 Kiswahili, 365
Kalonji, 263 Kitchener, General, 135“6
Kamba people, 99 Kitching, Bishop, 166
Kanem-Bornu. See Bornu Klerk, F. W. de, 300“2, 322
Kano, 13, 66, 135, 362 kola-nuts, 5
Karagwe kingdom, 24“5, 96 Kongo kingdom, 20“1, 23
Karamanli dynasty, Tripoli, 53, 60 Kony, Joseph, 364
Kariba dam, Zambezi, 218, 327 Korana. See Khoi people
Kasanje, 79“80 Kosoko, of Lagos, 76
Kasavubu, Joseph, 260, 262“4 Krapf, Johann, 99“101
Kasongo, 84“5 Kruger, Paul, 143“5
Index 397

Kuanda, Kenneth, 305 Luba people, 23, 261, 263
Kufuor, John, 360 Lugard, F. D., 134, 154, 169, 171“4
Kwazulu, 291, 293 Lumumba, Patrice, 254, 261, 263, 273
Lunda people, 23“4, 27, 82
Laden, Osama bin, 356 Luo people, 99, 257
Lagos, 73“4 Lusaka Accord (1974), 278
Britain and, 76, 134, 151, 153 Lusaka Manifesto (1969), 300
nationalism in, 179 Luthuli, Albert, 288“9
population of, 370 Lyautey, Marshal, 140, 187“9
Lamba, 81
Lamy, Captain, 135“6 Macaulay, Herbert, 212“13
Lander, John, 75 Machar, Rick, 358
Lander, Richard, 73, 75 Machel, Samora, 276, 278, 280, 282
land policy, colonial Mackay, Alexander, 97“8
East and Central Africa, 269 Macleod, Ian, 259, 272
North Africa, 58 Macmillan, Harold, 271“2
South Africa, 103“4, 112, 205, 291“3 Madagascar, 32“3
West Africa, 155“7 education in, 102
League of Nations, 198“9, 210 France and, 128, 140, 158, 162, 265
Mandates Commission of, 171, 215, independent as Malagasy Republic,
298 253, 265“6, 310
Leabowa, Chief Jonathan, 291 in Second World War, 214, 265“6
Lendu people, 348 Maghrib, 6, 214, 237“8
Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 259 French settlers in, 184“7
Leopold II, of Belgium, and Congo, 86, slaves in, 52
88“9, 100, 120“3, 137, 141“2, 155“6 see also Algeria; Libya; Morocco;
Lesotho, 108“10 Tunisia
independent, 296, 300 Mahdi. See Muhammad Ahmad,
see also Basutoland al-Mahdi
Lewis, Arthur, 323 maize, introduction of, 29
Lewis, Samuel, 169 Majid, of Zanzibar, 92“4, 100
liberalism, Cape, 201“2 Maji-Maji rebellion, 266
Liberal Party (South Africa), 287, 290 Makerere University College, 221
Liberia, 211, 349“51 Makhzen, 354
Libya Makoko, ruler of Teke, 122
GDP in Makololo (Bafokeng), 107
gross national per capita income, 369 Makonde people, 275
independent, 236“7, 313 Malagasy Republic. See under
Italy and, 195“6, 199 Madagascar
radical Islam in, 358“9 Malan, D. F., 208, 285
sports in, 375 malaria, 75, 325
see also Cyrenaica; Fezzan; Malawi, 272, 305, 310, 365, 370,
Livingstone, David, 94“5, 112, 116“17 see also Nyasaland
Lobengula, 140, 143 Mali, 15, 253, 371
Lockerbie, 358 Mali Federation, 253
Loi Cadre (Outline Law), 251“2, 266 mamluks, 6, 17, 36“9, 43
Louren¸ o Marques (Maputo), 278
c Mandates Commission, 171, 215
Lovale people, 81 Mandela, Nelson, 234“5, 288, 290,
Lozi (Barotse) people, 81, 107, 160 301“2, 320“2, 359, 366, 367, 381
Luanda, 21, 78“81, 154“5 Mande people, 13
398 Index

manioc (cassava), introduction of, 27 Morocco, 8“10, 52
Mantatisi, 107, 111 France and, 136, 224
manufacturing, 284“5 independent, 238“9, 310
marabouts, 8, 14, 56, 59 information technology in, 373
Marchand, Commandant, 135“6 nationalism in, 187“90, 235,
Masai people, 27, 98“9, 160, 163 238“9
Mashona. See Shona; Shona (Mashona) radical Islam in, 353, 354
people Spain and, 135“6
Mashonaland, 140, 143 terrorism and, 379
Masina, 11, 68 Moshesh (Moshweshwe I), of Lesotho,
Masire, Quett, 296 116
Massawa, 37, 49“50, 197 Moshweshwe II, 296
Matabele. See Ndebele; Ndebele Mossi states, 150
(Matabele) people Movimento das For¸ as Armadas, 238“9
c
Matanzima, Kaiser, 293 Movimento Popular de Liberta¸ ao de

Mau-Mau, 255“7 Angola (MPLA), 273“5, 277“9, 298,
Mauritania, 63, 149, 238“9 339“40
Mauritius, 91 Mozambique
Mawlay Sulaiman, of Morocco, 55, 59 independent, 268, 277“8, 280, 377
M™ba, L´ on, President, 253
e nationalist movement in, 274“6
Mbeki, Thabo, 348, 366, 367, 377, 378 parliamentary democracy and, 365“6
Mbokodvu Party, Swaziland, 297 and Portugal, 32, 91, 268
Mboya, Tom, 248“54 Portugal and, 158
Mbundu people, 20“1, 27 Msiri, 82“3, 85, 142
Mecca, 4, 352“3 Mswazi, 108
Menelik, of Ethiopia, 50“1, 138, 195“6 Mubarak, Husni, 353, 355
Mengistu, Haile Mariam, 317, 340 Mugabe, Robert, 270, 280“2, 366“7
Merina kingdom, Madagascar, 101“2, Muhammad Abdile Hassan, Sayyid,
127, 140 197“8
Merriman, John X., 203 Muhammad Ahmad, al-Mahdi, 46“7, 60,
Mfecane. See Difaqane 135“6
Micombero, Prime Minister, 265 Muhammad Ali, Pasha of Egypt, 36“7,
Milner, Alfred, 145, 203, 206 39, 41“3, 53, 60
mining, 174, 176, 284 Muhammad al-Kanemi, 66
Mirambo, 96 Muhammad al-Sanusi, 60
missionaries. See Christian missions Muhammad al-Tunisi, 11“12, 65
missionary road, 116, 117 Muhammad Bello, 67
Mkapa, Ben, 364 Muhammad bin Hamed. See Tippu Tip
Mobutu, Sese Seko, 264, 307, 334“5, Muhammad Said, of Egypt, 43
346“7 Muhammad V, of Morocco (Sidi
Moffat, Robert, 116 Mohammad), 189, 214, 238
Mogae, Festus, 372 Muhammed VI, of Morocco, 354
Moi, Daniel arap, 365 multiracial constitutions, 224, 255,
Mombasa, 92, 99 258“9
Momoh, Joseph, 351 Muluzi, Bakili, 365
Monckton Commission, on Central Munongo, Godfrey, 83
African Federation, 272 Museveni, Yoweri, 313, 363
Mondlane, Eduardo, 275“6 musk, 37
Monrovia group of states, 304 Muslim Brotherhood, 194
Moors, 63 Muslims. See Islam
Index 399

Mussolini, Benito, 196, 198, 199 Nigeria, 149, 377
Mutesa I (Buganda), 25, 97“8 Britain and, 134“6, 153“4, 162, 176,
Muzorewa, Bishop Abel, 281, 282 211, 221
Mwanawasa, Levy, 365 civil war in, 308“10
Mwanga of Buganda, 98, 100, 163 independent, 249, 253“4, 307“10
Mwata Kazembe, 23“5, 32, 78“83 see also Northern Nigeria; Southern
Mwata Yamvo, 23“5, 27, 30“2, 78“81, Nigeria
163 Niger (region), 74“5
Mwene Mutapa, 25“6, 31 France and, 61, 131“4, 149
Mwinyi, Ali Hassan, 364 independent, 340
Mzilikazi, 111, 140 Islam in, 64, 165
Nimeiri, Gafar el-, 311, 314
Nama people, 115, 210, 297 Nkomo, Joshua, 270, 272, 280“2
Namibia, 24, see also South-West Africa Nkrumah, Kwame, 181, 213, 244“6
Nampoina, of Imerina, 33, 101, 140 fall of, 306“7
Nandi people, 27 as head of government, 247“9, 253“4,
Napoleon, and Egypt, 17, 35“6, 55 263
Nasser, Gamal A., 194, 229“31 pan-Africanism and, 246“7, 303,
Natal, 112“14, 127, 201, 203“4, see also 304
South Africa Northern Nigeria, British Protectorate,
National African Company, 134 135, 151“4, 173
National Congress of British West Islam in, 64, 165
Africa, 180 part of Cameroun united with, 254
National Islamic Front, 356 Northern Rhodesia. See Rhodesia,
nationalism, 167“9, 179, 183“4, 189“91, Northern
209, 226, 228, Nubia, 11
see also under individual countries Nuer people, 358
National Party (South Africa), 285“7, Nupe kingdom, 66, 134
290, 300“1, 320 Nyamwezi people, 28, 78, 82“3, 86, 89,
National Patriotic Front for Liberia 91“2, 94“5
(NPFL), 349 Nyangwe, 83
Nationalist Resistance Movement of Nyanja people, 275
Mozambique (RENAMO), 279 Nyasaland, 128, 137
Natives Land Act (South Africa, 1913), British protectorate, 143, 157“8
205 in Central African Federation, 259,
Natives Representation Act (South 269“71
Africa, 1936), 201“7 independent, 272
Navarino Bay, battle of (1827), 41 nationalist movement in, 168, 256
Ndebele (Matabele) people, 110“11, see also Malawi
116“17, 143, 160, 162, 270 Nyerere, Julius, 254, 258“9, 300, 305“6,
Neguib, General, 229“30 310, 313, 364
N´ o-Destour Party, Tunisia, 239
e Nzima people, 245
Neto, Agostino, 274, 277
New Partnership for Africa™s Obasanjo, Olusegun, 362“3
Development (NPAD), 377“8 Obbia, Italian Protectorate, 196“7
Ngala people, 87 Obote, Milton, 259, 307, 312“13, 363
Ngoni people, 95“6, 111, 160 Odendaal Plan, 297“8
Nguema, Macias (Equatorial Guinea), OECD, 363
311 Ogaden, 316“17, 340
Nguni people, 28“9, 115“17 Ogoni people, 362
400 Index

oil (petroleum), 237, 278, 308, 330, plantations, 330
332“3, 354 Polisario Front, 238“9
in Libya, 359 pombeiros (African trading agents),
in Nigeria, 362 79“81
recent exploration, 380 Pondo people, 290
for Rhodesia, 279 population
in Sudan, 356“8 economic consequence of increase,
in Zimbabwe, 359 325“9
Oil Rivers, 75, 76, 87, 134, 153 growth of by 2000, 369
British Protectorate, 134, 151 political consequence of increase,
Ojukwu, Lieutenant-Colonel, 308“10, 318“22
331 Porto Novo, 74
Oman, 28 Portugal, 118, 216
Ondo, 73 East Africa and, 26“8
Orange Free State, 114, 200“1, military coup (1974), 276
see also South Africa nationalist movements and, 276“8
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Rhodesia and, 128
235, 242, 266, 298, 304“5, 359 West Africa and, 16, 21“3, 68, 82, 91
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting see also Angola; Guin´ Bissau;
e
Countries (OPEC), 332“3 Mozambique
Ormsby-Gore, William, 174“6 Portuguese Guinea, independent as
Oromo people, 10“11, 47, 138, 317 Guin´ Bissau, 274
e
Ottoman empire, 6 Powell, Colin, 380
Egypt and, 6, 16 Pr´ sence Africaine, 251“6
e
Maghrib and, 6“8, 16, 60“1 Pretorius, Andres, 105“6, 114
see also Turkey Progressive Reform Party, South Africa,
Oubangi-Chari, French territory, 287
156 Pyramids, battle of the (1798), 16“7

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