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which they can be intelligible and insisting that some are simply not
relevant within certain domains? I shall begin with the first question.
246 A F T E R I D E N T I T Y




The point at which we began this investigation focused on the
issue of what gender, race, and sex are. The conclusions of that inquiry
are two-fold. First, to understand what gender, race, and sex are we
need to apply the hermeneutic (and Wittgensteinian) idea that to
understand what something is to understand the way of life of which
it is a part. Second, however, we need to specify what we mean by a
way of life. For, the problem with gender, race, and sex is that when the
way of life of which they are a part is too broadly conceived, none of
them makes sense. The way of life conditioned by the institution of
slavery does not preclude contradictions and exasperations in provid-
ing consistent standards for who is black, white, non-white, and so on.
Nor does the way of life conditioned by gender differentiation avoid
difficulties in saying what being a man or woman involves. Even sex,
which would seem to be a bedrock conception, can be understood in
contradictory ways, depending on whether one bases it on chromo-
somes, hormones, or shoulder structure. Hence, if race, gender, and
sex are to be intelligible identities, the contexts of which they are a
part must be more precisely defined.
I have argued that these contexts are situational and only occa-
sional wholes. Indeed, I have argued that they are primarily festive
and ceremonial ones. To be sure, the situation in which one is trying
to have a baby allows for identities as males and females but surely
this is the epitome of a festive occasion. For other situations, I have
used the identity of Irish American as an example. Being African
American is part of celebratory situations in which one acknowledges
one™s ancestors, remembers their struggles, and thanks them for their
achievements. Nevertheless, with regard to institutions such as edu-
cation and marriage, prerogatives such as citizenship, and practices
such as medical care and driving, racial identities stick out like sore
thumbs.
Of course, the strength of this claim depends upon how we
understand the institutions, prerogatives, and practices at stake. Just
as who Elinor Dashwood is depends upon how we understand her
story, who the participants in marriage are depends upon how we
C O N C L U S I O N 247




understand marriage. Moreover, just as we can understand who we are
differently depending upon the context in which the issue arises, we
can also understand marriage in more than one way. In considering the
practices, prerogatives, and institutions I have looked at in this book,
then, I have not tried to provide canonical interpretations of their
meaning but, instead, to discover what they do not or cannot mean.
Here, the question is whether certain interpretations make a hash of
the integration of part and whole. The interpretation of marriage as
the union of one man and one woman is an example. In resting on
procreation, this interpretation is unable to integrate current legal
marriages between those who cannot have children. In resting on
natural law, it violates the separation of church and state that is
necessary to marriage™s integration with some of our other practices.
In disregarding Loving v. Virginia as a precedent to expanding those
with a right to marry, it omits a range of other cases including
Zablocki v. Redhail and Turner v. Safely.
Nevertheless, if marriage cannot be understood as the union of
one man and one woman, clearly it can be understood in more ways
than one and the understanding I have offered is only a possibility
rather than the last word. I have understood marriage as an institution
that allows couples to off-load public scrutiny of, and inquiry into,
their private relationship and to imprint that relationship on a com-
mon coinage that commands immediate respect. This understanding
makes sense of some of the court cases we have examined and it also
makes sense of the interest some same-sex couples have in achieving
the right to get married. There are doubtless other ways of under-
standing what marriage is. Nevertheless, some ways, like some inter-
pretations of Sense and Sensibility or Caravaggio™s ˜˜Sacrifice of Isaac™™
simply will not work.
Yet are comparisons of this sort really necessary? Why not
simply claim that race, sex, and gender are irrelevant to marriage? In
one sense, using the hermeneutics of whole and part shows us why
racial, sex, and gender identities are irrelevant: they are irrelevant
because they make no sense, because they cannot be interpretively
248 A F T E R I D E N T I T Y




integrated into the context into which their ˜˜irrelevant™™ use tries to
thrust them. In another sense, to the extent that identities are ways
of understanding who and what we and others are, they are less than
simply irrelevant to certain situations; they are not part of the situa-
tion at all. Elizabeth Dashwood does not exist outside of the context of
Sense and Sensibility. Females and women likewise do not exist out-
side of certain stories and do not figure in every context in which we
live our lives. The same holds of blacks and whites, Asians, Latinos,
and Latinas. We are these identities only in their contexts. We need to
remember the incompleteness, contextuality, and limited duration of
all our multiple identities.
Index



affirmative action 117 drag 163, 166, 172“175
androgen insensitivity syndrome 15“16 Du Bois, W. E. B. 66, 69, 103“105, 169
androgens 149
anti-miscegenation 52“53, 205 Ehrhardt, Anke see Money, John
Appiah, Anthony K. 73, 78“79, 175“176 estrogen 149“150
Arkes, Hadley 199 Evans-Prichard, E. E. see Azande
Arneson, Richard 237 Evolutionary Psychology
Austen, Jane 82, 96, 100 alternative 120, 123“128 see also Low,
see also Sedgwick, Eve Bobbi S.; Wright, Robert
Azande 59“60 traditional 128“132, 136 see also Hawkes,
Kristin et al.; Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer;
Ball, J™Noel 1, 33, 43, 54, 56 Roughgarden, Joan; Zuk, Marlene
Barkawi, Turak 218“220
Beardsley, Monroe C. 90“91, 92 Family and Medical Leave Act 184
Beauvoir, Simone de 3 Fausto-Sterling, Anne 8
Behavioral Ecology see Evolutionary
Psychology Gadamer, Hans-Georg 86, 94
berdache 10, 20, 162 Gallagher, Maggie 191
bigamy 210 Gary, Thomas 51“52
binaries 8, 165 George, Robert P. 194
Bornstein, Kate 160“164, 169, 171 Greely, Andrew 92
brain studies 139
Butler, Judith 4, 160, 164“168, 244 Hacking, Ian 63“65
Hammill, Graham L. see Caravaggio
Califia-Rice, Matthew 31 Hamlet 94“96
Caravaggio 101, 109, 180 Hawkes, Kristin et al. 130“131
Card, Claudia 189, 203, 208, 221 Hawkes, Terrence 94“96
Caroll, Noel 91, 93 Heidegger, Martin 86
¨
Caucasian 57 hermeneutics 86, 89, 90, 95, 96, 100, 105,
Christian Scientists 238“241 109, 180, 188, 212, 223, 224
citizenship 54, 56 status 227
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) Hirsch, E. D. 90“91, 99
142“144 Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer 129, 131“132
Copp, David 1“2, 4, 6, 13, 225
identity
Dandeker, Christopher 218“220 Amish 234, 235, 236
Defense of Marriage Act 188 authentic 174“175, 205
Derrida, Jacques 88 contexts of 108, 109, 114“115
diversity , college 117 contingent 13, 45
˜˜Don™t Ask, Don™t Tell™™ 213, 216, 221 defined 225
Douglass, Fredrick 63 formation 226
250 I N D E X




identity (cont.) Nafisi, Azar 97“98
Francophone 233 Nussbaum, Martha 215
gender and sex 18“47, 26, 45, 151,
153, 164, 171, 176, 182, 188, Omi, Michael 61“65
190, 216 one-sex model 8“9
imperial 84, 108
intersections of 10“12 Patino, Maria Martinez 1, 41
legal determinations of: sex 33“45, 159; Piper, Adrian 13
racial 70 pluralism 98“99, 107
meanings, as 5“6, 7, 102 politics of recognition 69, 70, 78, 115 see also
medical contexts of 110“114, 182 Taylor, Charles
necessary 13, 45 polygamy 210
occasional 82 pregnancy 182“185 see also Califia-Rice,
optional 82, 187 Matthew
politics of 158, 160 Pregnancy Disability Act 183
racial 59, 60“61, 158, 176, 214 pronouns, gendered 178“179
recreational 78 psychoanalytic theory 121“122
rigidity of 47
social constructionist account of see Riley, racial profiling
Denise; social construction law enforcement 109
thin black 115 medical 110“114
incest 210 Reimer, David 1, 15“18, 142, 223“224,
intelligence tests 137 226, 229
´
interpretive frameworks 92, 102“104, 171, Richards, Renee 1, 40
232, 238 Riley, Denise 154“156, 157
intersexuality 34, 35, 36, 46 Roughgarden, Joan 129, 133“134
surgery for 35“36, 224
˜˜Sacrifice of Isaac, The™™ see Caravaggio
Kier, Elizabeth 216 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst
Kymlicka, Will 68, 228“230 86, 90
Scott, Joan Wallach see EEOC v. Sears 159
Laqueur, Thomas 8“9 Sedgwick, Eve 82, 89, 97, 99, 100, 102
Littleton, Christie 1, 33, 43 self-identity 63
looping effects 82, 84, 95, 96, 116, 225 see also sex/gender distinction 3“4, 121
Hacking, Ian sexual normativity 26, 165
Low, Bobbi S. 123“125, 126“127 Shapiro, Ian 239
Shelby, Tommie 115
marriage 33, 43, 54“55, 56, 188, 200, 221 social construction 61“65, 66,
common law 201 77, 86
interracial 52“53 suffrage, women™s 156
natural-law account of 194“197 Sullivan, Andrew 141“142
right to 206“210, 221
slave 199 Taylor, Charles 67, 233 see also politics of
traditional civil 190“192 recognition
military 188, 213 testosterone 141“150
Mitchell, Juliet 4, 121 theoretical commitments 75“77, 85, 121,
Money, John 15“16, 22, 142 140, 163
moral psychology 1“2, 85, 171 see also Copp, transexuality 46, 153
David transgender 31“32
Morris, James 1 Truth, Sojourner 11
I N D E X 251




Warner, Michael 212 Woolf, Virginia 179
warrior identity 218“220 Wright family 50“51
Wimmsatt, W. K. Jr. 90“91 Wright, Robert 125“126
Winant, Howard 61“65
witch 59“60 Zuk, Marlene 128“132,
Wittig, Monique 4 133, 134

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